

THE GREAT WAR

BY


FRANK H. SIMONDS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

<http://www.archive.org/details/greatwar02simo>

Pauline H. F. H. H. H.
on May 1st 1881

THE GREAT WAR



THE POLISH WHEEL

GERMAN STRATEGIC AND RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL RAILWAYS SHOWN BY HEAVY BLACK LINES. NOTE THE EASE WITH WHICH GERMAN TROOPS CAN BE MOVED ON THE FRONTIER

THE GREAT WAR

THE SECOND PHASE

FROM THE FALL OF ANTWERP TO THE
SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

FRANK H. SIMONDS



NEW YORK · MITCHELL KENNERLEY · 1915

COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY
MITCHELL KENNERLEY

PRINTED IN AMERICA

To My Father

WILLIAM H. SIMONDS

CONTENTS

IN FLANDERS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	Preface	
I	The Second Phase	11
II	Antwerp, the Empty Pistol	18
III	Sir John French Goes to Flanders	24
IV	On to Calais	30
V	The Battles of Flanders	35
VI	On the Anniversary of Metz, 1870	43
VII	Turkey Enlists	50
VIII	Italy Crosses the Adriatic	57
IX	A New Eastern Question	63
X	The Defence and Fall of Kiao-Chau	69

IN POLAND

XI	Slav and Teuton	75
XII	The Battle of the Vistula	80
XIII	Hindenburg Tries Again	86
XIV	Servia Cannot be Conquered	94
XV	Austrian Fortunes Continue to Decline	101
XVI	Turk's Progress	106
XVII	Giolitti's Statement	119
XVIII	Prince Von Bülow's Mission	125
XIX	The French Yellow Book	132
XX	Half a Year of the Great War	139

SEA POWER BEGINS TO TELL

XXI	Naval Operations	149
XXII	Submarine Warfare	155

Contents

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXIII	The Battle of the Mazurian Lakes	160
XXIV	At the Dardanelles	166
XXV	The Battle of Champagne	171
XXVI	Italy's Terms	177
XXVII	Bulgaria also Stirs	183
XXVIII	Neuve Chapelle	190
XXIX	In Alsace	197
XXX	Defeat at the Straits	203
THE COMING OF SPRING		
XXXI	Przemysl	208
XXXII	St. Mihiel	216
XXXIII	In the Carpathians	223
XXXIV	The Third Campaign for Warsaw	234
XXXV	Joffre's Nibbling	239
XXXVI	The Second Battle of Ypres	246
XXXVII	The Winter Campaign in the West	253
XXXVIII	The Winter Campaign in the East	263
XXXIX	The End of the Second Phase	273
	Dates in the Great War	278

PREFACE

Almost without exception the chapters describing the military operations are printed here for the first time. In describing the diplomatic and secondary aspects I have borrowed freely from articles of mine printed in various magazines and newspapers.

My thanks are due to Mr. Herbert Croly, Editor of *The New Republic*, to Dr. Albert Shaw, Editor of the *American Review of Reviews*, to Mr. Ogden Mills Reid, Editor of *The Tribune* and to Mr. William C. Reick, President of The Sun Printing and Publishing Association, for permission to use extracts from articles of mine published by them.

I take this occasion to acknowledge my real indebtedness to Mr. Reick for generous and consistent support in the early days of the conflict, which contributed much toward any success my "war editorials" in the *Evening Sun* may have had.

I should be ungrateful, too, if I did not record my obligation to a very large number of correspondents, many of them unknown to me, who have sent me information, maps, and shown a very real interest in my work. To these, I express my thanks here.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Upper Montclair, N. J., May 1, 1915.



IN FLANDERS

CHAPTER I

THE SECOND PHASE

IN the larger view the first phase of the Great War was comprehended in the concentration, advance, attack, of the German offensive. In the history of modern war no such gigantic operation, the blow of a whole nation in arms, had been known. Pivoting on the Donon, a peak in the Vosges, west of Strassburg, their marching flank sweeping in a broad half circle from Liège through Brussels to the gates of Paris and east of Paris to Provins, more than forty army corps, above 1,500,000 men, divided into seven armies, driven at top speed, aided by enormous trains of automobile transports, had swept on for four weeks. They failed finally at the Marne in a battle which, in the nearer contemporary vision, seems destined to rank among the few decisive battles in all written history.

The single controlling purpose of this German offensive had been to crush France as she had been crushed in 1871. In the Franco-Prussian War speed had been essential to prevent the entrance on

the French side of German neighbors still smarting under recent defeat. In 1914 the presence of Russia and England on the French side made it equally imperative to dispose of France promptly. All German military writers had asserted, preached that ultimate German success in a war on "the two fronts" was predicated on the destruction of French military power before the allies of the Republic could come to her assistance.

By the time the Germans reached the Marne their great enveloping movement had failed, French and British armies had escaped from the net. While the eastern barrier fortresses from Verdun to Belfort still held, the Anglo-French armies, heavily defeated but intact, had come back beyond the Marne and the Germans were now in turn threatened with envelopment from Paris and from Verdun upon both their flanks, while the French line south of the river between the two fortresses held firmly. It was no longer possible to hope for a favorable decision, the strength of the German offensive was spent and retreat became inevitable.

In the first days of this retreat the world believed that the Allies might succeed in expelling the Germans from Northern France, might turn the withdrawal into a rout. But this task was beyond the strength of the armies, which had so long retreated and had only by a narrow margin escaped destruction. In the second week of September the retreating Germans halted behind the Aisne and the

Vesle, from Soissons to Rheims, then made good their ground from the Meuse to the Oise, and the campaign fell to the level of trench operations, such as those about Richmond in the closing year of the Confederacy.

Frontal attack upon the German position having failed, the French attempted to turn the German right, to come in from Amiens and Arras upon the main trunk lines between Liège and the German front, the life lines of German armies in Northern France. But this effort also failed. Making use of the French railway lines running parallel and at the rear of their own front, the Germans promptly rushed reënforcements from Alsace and Lorraine, from Metz and Strassburg, to St. Quentin and Péronne. By October 1 the French operation had terminated. From Switzerland to French Flanders, in a broad half circle, the Germans now dug themselves into Northern France.

The change in the character of the war brought a measure of reassurance to the Allies. For the present it was plain that the German offensive had failed. Talk of a second siege of Paris ceased. The scheme to crush France before Russia was up, had gone glimmering. France, to use Talleyrand's famous phrase concerning his own history in the Terror, "had lived." For the Germans there was almost equal satisfaction in having escaped disaster at the Marne, in the possession of most of Belgium and nearly 10,000 square miles of French territory,

in the occupation of almost impregnable positions far from their own vulnerable frontier along the lower Rhine.

Having failed in her purpose to crush France as an essential prelude to dominating Europe, Germany had now to face the probability of an attempt on the part of Europe, of the major fraction of Europe allied against her, to crush her in turn. For such a struggle she had already fortified herself by her great initial victories that had given her possession of the barrier fortresses of Eastern Belgium and North-western France. In his long battle with Europe, Napoleon had for ten years made Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, even Russia the scene of his operations. This Germany could hope to do for a long period, at least on her western front.

It was still possible that, concentrating new forces from what was for months to seem an inexhaustible reservoir of human material, Germany might interpose between the Allied forces and the Channel, come south between the Lys and the sea, turn the uncovered flank of the Allies, straighten out her own front, seize the Channel ports, take Dunkirk and Calais, and threaten Britain from Boulogne, as Napoleon had. Conceivably such a move might again bring her to Paris, this time on the west. At the very least such an operation would end all peril to her right flank and solidify her position in Belgium.

This chance was too attractive to be left untried,

but in the immediate present, Germany had also to consider the conditions in the East. There Austria had gone from disaster to disaster. In the opening weeks it had been the task of the Dual Monarchy to hold back the Russian flood, while Germany "dealt with France," to use Bernhardt's familiar phrase. This Austria had attempted. Early in the war she had pushed armies far into Poland toward Lublin and Cholm. But this offensive had collapsed when the Russians came south and west into Galicia, took Lemberg and Jaroslav, approached Tarnow and the Carpathians.

Russian victories about Lemberg, at Rawaruska, Tomazov, Guelya Lipa, the Servian triumph at the Jedar, had in a few weeks well nigh ruined Austrian military power and utterly destroyed her prestige. Turkey, a few weeks before, on the point of joining the Austro-German alliance, had relapsed into reluctant neutrality. Italy and Rumania, with secular appetites for Austrian and Hungarian lands, seemed about to cast their lots with the sea powers. Galicia to the Carpathians and the Dunajec had been lost, Bosnia and Herzegovina were invaded by Servians and Montenegrins, Austria seemed already overtaken by a disaster as complete and as prompt as that which had overwhelmed Francis Joseph's ancient opponent, Napoleon III, in 1871.

Not even the glorious German victory at Tannenberg, the first in the long list of memorable triumphs of Hindenburg, the "old man of the Mazurian

Lakes," had served to counterbalance Russian successes in the East. A German invasion of Suwalki Province, following Tannenberg, had failed at Augustovo, and the Russians were again at the East Prussian frontier. At the very moment when the press of the world was dazzled by the fall of Antwerp, German high command was facing a problem in the East of first magnitude, and Russian advance was sweeping forward from the Niemen to the Pruth. France had not been conquered, but Austria must now be saved.

If Germany was still bound to make one more effort to crush France finally, before she accepted the defensive rôle in the West, if the world too easily credited the first reports of German disaster in the West and weakness in the East, there could still be no mistaking the fact that the whole character of the war was now beginning to change. One more of the terrible wars which fill European history prior to the fall of the Napoleonic Empire, and not a brief, tremendous campaign, such as those in which Moltke crushed first Austria and then France, seemed now developing. Not a Sadowa or a Sedan, but a conflict reminiscent of the Civil War began to appear inevitable, and attrition, not a Waterloo or a Gravelotte, to threaten the weaker.

In such a struggle the odds against the two Kaisers were unmistakable. Sea power, which in the opening days had been little noted and of minor interest, was now beginning to take on a new im-

portance, which was to increase until in February and March it became the most conspicuous detail. The foe and the weapon which had, after long years, destroyed Napoleon, were now turned against Germany. The "place in the sun," so passionately sought by all Germans, was disappearing in two continents. But the question of bread, not colonies, was presently to be raised. More and more in the following months the German people were to be forced to recognize how disastrous for them had been the English participation, and more and more Britain was to become for the subjects of the Kaiser, "the single foe."

The first phase had been comprehended in the German assault upon France, the effort to conquer Europe in detail; that which was now opening was to see Germany standing off Europe in arms, defending not alone herself but her Austrian ally, was to witness William II essaying not without measurable competence, the rôle which in 1814 proved too great for Napoleon I.

CHAPTER II

ANTWERP, THE EMPTY PISTOL

UPON the world, the fall of Antwerp on October 9 had an effect strikingly disproportionate to any immediate military advantage it brought to its captors. This was due to the great reputation its defences had enjoyed rather than to any clear perception of the value of the city itself. That ten days of siege should have sufficed to reduce a fortress held only second to Paris in the world, came as a paralyzing surprise to Allies and neutrals alike.

That much praise was due the Germans for the celerity and efficiency of their operations, was undeniable. Yet from the very morning of the catastrophe military critics marvelled at the escape of the Belgian Army, and presently began to censure the defenders for their failure to hold the Germans away from vulnerable forts by trenches, as the French were doing at Verdun. The failure of the British to send any considerable reënforcement to give moral as well as military support to an army and a nation which justly felt itself too little considered by allies for whom it had suffered terribly, was similarly condemned, while German gibes at

the character and number of the British marines tardily sent seemed warranted.

Viewed from the vantage-ground of later events, however, it is now plain that the escape of the Belgian Army was little less than a disaster for the Germans, almost exceeding the value of the victory itself. If Napoleon had called the Flemish port "a pistol pointed at the heart of England," a British military critic now justly observed that the pistol was unloaded, an empty threat; since, owing to the neutrality of the Scheldt, it could not be used as a base for naval attack upon England.

It was conceivable that the Germans would disregard this neutrality of the Scheldt, as they had that of Belgium. But to do this would probably be to bring Holland into the battle line of the enemy, since Holland was the guarantor of this neutrality; to open to the attack of the Dutch Army now fully mobilized, the flank which the taking of Antwerp had just covered. More than this, it would open a broad and undefended avenue east of the Dutch frontier into the great industrial regions of Westphalia, to Essen and the factories of the Krupp, the very heart of German defence, because it was the centre of the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

Even if Holland should refuse to be drawn into the war, should submit weakly to German aggression, it was a simple task for the British fleet to seal up the mouth of the Scheldt with mines. Dutch acquiescence would also provoke a British declara-

tion of war, or at least the proclamation of a blockade, which would close the Dutch ports that had now become the most direct and useful outlet from Germany to the neutral world. These considerations were, as it was soon proved, controlling upon the Germans. Antwerp was garrisoned, its forts reconstructed, but no effort was made to use the Scheldt for warlike ends.

Useless as a naval base, Antwerp was similarly without value in the Belgian field of operations on the offensive side. Fortresses, as a French military writer subsequently pointed out justly, are designed to prevent access to a region lacking in natural defences, to bar a road or a railroad. But Antwerp had no such mission. It had not been constructed in the vicinity of threatened frontier. It was, as the French critic indicated, the citadel of Belgium, the national redoubt, the place of asylum of the Belgium Army, to which it should retire when it could no longer keep the field. To take the camp and let the army escape was a fatal blunder soon to cost heavily along the Yser. The cardinal doctrine of Prussian military teaching is that the hostile army, not a geographical point, is the objective of a German commander. In disregarding this principle, German strategy had established its soundness.

It is true that, Antwerp fallen, the victorious army made a desperate effort to repair the initial blunder. Pushing north from Tamise and Ter-

monde, German columns did intercept the rear guard of the retreating force, compelled some thousands of Belgian infantry and British marines to take refuge in the Dutch province of Zealand, where they were interned. But King Albert and his main army, much exhausted, but still in good order, safely passed through the narrow gap between the Scheldt and the Dutch frontier, brought nearly 50,000 troops back upon Bruges, upon Ostend, from which the Belgian government now fled to Havre, and presently back upon the line of Yser, from Nieuport to Dixmude.

Had the Germans captured the garrison with the fortress, the effect upon the subsequent campaign would have been well nigh incalculable. Between the Lys and the sea there was at this time a gap into which the British were only beginning to come from the south and with a force far too small to cover the whole front. Not until October 11 did the first detachments of Sir John French reach the Aire-Bethune line, and it was only on October 21 that the whole British Army was in line, its left flank completely uncovered save for the Belgians. Without the Belgian support, supplemented presently by French divisions, the British would not have been able to hold the Allied left in the next few weeks, and Calais, Dunkirk, Boulogne, must have followed Antwerp into German hands. In effect, the Germans, in capturing Antwerp, had released

an army which by a swift and splendid retreat reached the left flank of the Allies at a moment of gravest peril.

Upon England the fall of Antwerp produced an effect surpassing all previous incidents in the war. The German advance to Paris in August had left London cold. But now as the Germans entered Antwerp, occupied Bruges, and presently came to the open sea at Zeebrugge and Ostend, there was brought home to the British a real perception of the meaning of the war to them. Since the fall of Napoleon no foe had approached the British seas, but now William II was nearing Boulogne, from whose heights the great Emperor had planned a descent upon Dover. Not France but Britain, not Paris but London, now felt itself menaced, and the English people rightly recognized that the arrival of the Germans at the sea must prove the preface to attacks by Zeppelins and new and more dangerous raids by submarines.

For Germany, the triumph came at a fortunate time. It relieved the gloom which had followed the defeat on the Marne and the Austrian disasters in Galicia. It was hailed as the prelude to new victories in the West, it was celebrated as the promise of blows launched against England. Finally, for the Turks, still hesitating, the capture of Antwerp was a sign long awaited, an assurance of German victory. Fortified by this shining exploit, German diplomacy now redoubled its efforts at the Golden

Horn and achieved complete success. Morally, then, the taking of Antwerp was of incalculable advantage to the Germans, but on the military side it was an empty triumph which had freed, not destroyed, a hostile army.


CHAPTER III

SIR JOHN FRENCH GOES TO FLANDERS

ON September 12 the British Army had driven the German rear guard across the Aisne, north of Soissons. In the next few days its determined efforts to advance and push the invader down the northern slopes of the Champagne Hills between Laon and Craonne, had failed with heavy loss. German artillery and reënforcements hurried from Maubeuge, which fell on September 7. German entrenchments prepared while the Battle of the Marne was still continuing, proved adequate to beat down the British pursuit, and by the third week of September the Battle of the Aisne had become a mere siege operation.

For such work Sir John French wisely concluded the French reserve formations were wholly suitable, and promptly urged upon General Joffre that the British Army, which had so well proven its steadiness in the field, should be drawn out of the Aisne trenches and sent north for an offensive operation in Belgium, before it should have lost its fighting edge by long inaction in the trenches.

Looking at the western field in the opening days



THE TRANSFER OF THE BRITISH TO FLANDERS

SOLID BLACK LINE SHOWS ALLIED FRONT BEFORE THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN

LINE AND ARROWS SHOW ROUTES OF BRITISH TO FLANDERS AND OF BELGIAN RETREAT FROM ANTWERP TO THE YSER

of October, it was plain that such a British offensive held out brilliant promises of considerable success. Northward from the Oise at Noyon to the environs of Lille, the French and Germans faced each other in a deadlock precisely like that from Noyon to the Meuse. Along this whole front the war had become a siege, and such fighting as continued was of merely local importance. But north and west of La Bassée, the northern end of the French battle line, the country to the sea was still unoccupied by German or French troops, save for some regiments of Uhlans, who were just beginning to thrust a wedge between the French left and the Channel.

What Sir John French proposed and Joffre promptly agreed to, was that the British Army, now three corps strong, should be drawn out of the Aisne trenches, giving its place to French reserve formations, which were rapidly coming up, and be put in west of Arras on the Aire-Bethune line. From this front these troops could be pushed rapidly north and, if not discovered by the Germans in time, might move north into Belgium and down the west bank of the Lys and the Scheldt to the relief of Antwerp, still holding out and as yet believed to be impregnable. Such an advance, if successful, would open the way to a thrust at Brussels and the turning of the whole German flank, thus driving the Germans out of France.

This strategic combination, the most ambitious

since the Battle of the Marne, depended upon two things: first, that Antwerp should continue to hold out, and, second, that the Germans should not have prompt information as to British movements. But Antwerp fell while the British were still en route and the German aviators, despite the fact that the British were entrained at night, were equally quick in reporting the change in the hostile lines. The first Allied advance into Belgium had been brought to nothing by the sudden and utterly unexpected fall of Namur, for the second venture the surrender of Antwerp was equally amazing although far less disastrous.

The transfer began on October 3. To withdraw an army of more than 100,000 men from the firing line in the presence of the enemy, to move it around the rear and flank of the French armies actively engaged, and necessarily across the lines by which they were supplied, to transport the artillery and train of such an army, was a task of huge proportions. But it was completed with few delays and no other mishap than that incident to its discovery by the German airmen, a discovery which again demonstrated how little chance there was in modern warfare for such surprises as made Napoleon's greater campaigns memorable. By October 11 the second British corps had detrained near Bethune and was pushing north, driving the German cavalry before it. The following day the third corps reached St. Omer and took the field on the left of the second. Both

corps were now moving north with Lille and Ypres as their objectives.

The surrender of Antwerp, however, had changed the whole situation in this field. It had at once released two German corps, which had been besieging the fortress, and these with other reserve formations were rushed south through Ostend and Lille to meet the oncoming British. Before the right wing of this German advance the Belgians and the British troops which had been sent to Belgium to coöperate with the Antwerp force some weeks earlier, withdrew hurriedly toward Nieuport and Ypres. By October 15 the first German troops to pass Lille had brought the second British corps to a dead halt about La Bassée and the third was similarly checked about Armentières on the following day. On this same date the British force in Belgium, the seventh division and the cavalry division were near Ypres, the Belgians were occupying the lines of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude and French territorials and Algerians were filling the gap between the British at Ypres and the Belgians, standing behind the Yser-Canal.

The arrival of the first army corps and the Lahore division of the Indian corps on October 20 permitted Sir John French to complete a line from the Yser Canal around Ypres to La Bassée. But the line was so thin that he had, as he subsequently confessed, the gravest doubts as to whether it could hold through the critical days before French reën-

forcements could reach the point of danger. Already the two corps which had detrained first were so heavily engaged about Armentières and La Bassée that the British commander had to decide between reënforcing them with his third corps, and putting it in at Ypres to close the gap in the Allied line.

At Ypres, as at Mons, the British Army had by a curious fatality reached the post of peril at the moment when the storm was about to break. Its position now was wholly analogous to that it had held in August. It was on the extreme left of the Allied line from Switzerland to the Yser. Again, its own left was covered only by territorials and the Belgian remnant from Antwerp. If it recoiled, the whole Allied flank would be left in the air, as it had been after Mons; if its supports to the left gave way it would be threatened by the same danger which had so nearly destroyed it at Cambrai. Fortunately for the British their flank guards were this time to prove as adequate as those in August had shown themselves worthless.

Once more it is necessary to emphasize the value of the Belgian Army at this moment. Had it not escaped from Antwerp, and reached the Yser, there would have been a wide gap between the British and the sea, from Ypres to Nieupoort, for which there were lacking any defenders. Instead of standing about Ypres, the British would have been compelled to fall back to escape destruction, the Channel ports would have been captured, the Allied line thrown

back to the Somme. But the Belgian Army now filled this gap and, animated by their gallant King, who shared all dangers and inspired the exhausted troops to one more unequal combat, it had still the necessary strength and courage to cling for the next few critical days to the tiny fragment of the Fatherland still unconquered.

From Mons to the Marne, to the Aisne, ill luck had dogged the British, even now they had missed the great success that they had hoped for their advance to Flanders. But they were here to take terrible revenge for their previous sufferings. As for the Belgians, they were once more to supply the decisive delay to a great German offensive, to save the Channel ports, as in August they had contributed so invaluable to holding back for precious days the German drive to Paris.

CHAPTER IV

ON TO CALAIS

IN the weeks immediately following the Battle of the Marne the offensive passed from the Germans to the Allies. In that period it was General Joffre who set the tune and the Germans were compelled to rush all their available troops to meet the successive efforts to turn their right flank from the Oise to the Lys. Eastward, too, the plight of Austria made heavy demands upon their reserves. It was not until Antwerp fell that troops were at hand for a new offensive. But this event released two corps and a large number of reserve formations, hitherto needed to garrison Belgium. To these were added fresh troops just come from the training camps.

Just as the Allies had looked at the gap between the German right and the sea, German attention was now fixed upon this same opportunity. Viewed from the German standpoint, there was now the chance to send the troops newly released around the left of the Allies into the Tom Tidler's ground between La Bassée and the sea. Such an operation would be wholly like that of General von Kluck in August from Mons to the gates of Paris.

The maximum profit of the later operation would be to approach Paris again, this time from the west, to bring into play the great howitzers, which had just levelled the forts of Maubeuge and Antwerp, to win the war by crushing France, since Russia was still held in play and the arrival of the new British army a remote contingency. The prize in October was the same as that in August; the opportunity, from the point of strategy, strangely similar. Oddly enough, too, an approach to Paris by the coast had once been planned by the great Frederick himself.

But if Paris again proved unattainable, there were immediate and unmistakable profits, seemingly within sure grasp. Coming south between La Bassée and the sea on the Allied left flank, it seemed inevitable that the Germans would force the Allies back, compel them to shorten and straighten their front until it lay behind the Somme from Abbeville to Amiens. At this point it was reasonable to believe that the Allies might check the Germans. But such an advance meant an approach to the Channel. Calais, Dunkirk, Boulogne, would fall to the Kaiser. The conquest of Belgium would be complete.

From Boulogne and Calais the Germans could send their Zeppelins across the narrow strait to London. In these harbors they could launch new submarines, new mines to close the Channel. London port might presently become as dead as Hamburg. New and mightier guns than the 42-centimetre were heralded as capable of carrying a shell

from France to Britain. If Antwerp had proved an empty pistol, there was no reason to doubt that Calais might be as dangerous to England as in other days.

Again, Boulogne and Calais conquered, all Northern France from the mouth of the Somme to Verdun in his hands, the Kaiser might pause in his campaign, if the road to Paris proved closed. To defend this new front would require far fewer troops than were needed to hold the present line from Ostend, through Lille to Noyon. The troops thus released might be sent east, where German guns were already audible in Warsaw. Russia, in her turn defeated, the German frontier carried to the Vistula, Poland conquered, Germany might resign herself to the defensive, east and west, await on hostile soil the attacks of her enemies, who, having worn themselves out and ravaged their own lands, might be willing eventually to talk of peace — on German terms.

Such terms were plain, were suggested by Maximilien Harden in his newspaper at this moment — to Germany what she held, Belgium, the Channel ports of France. If this did not bring immediate and unquestioned supremacy for Germany on the Continent, if France were still undestroyed, it gave Germany a vantage point at which to strike at her great enemy and time to compose her quarrel with Russia. France would thus be reduced to the level

of a second-class power. All the territory that would thus be acquired had long been included in the German color by the Pan-German map-makers. It had been a part of the Empire of Charles V. The coal of Lens, of Charleroi, the iron mines of Briey, the industrial region along the Sambre in Belgium, within the French Departments of the Nord and Pas de Calais, would become German.

Such were the political possibilities that opened to the Kaiser on the morning of the fall of Antwerp. Such were the prizes for which the next campaign was fought, a campaign directed at England rather than France, at London quite as much as Paris; a campaign bloodier and more terrible than had yet been seen in the West.

Antwerp once taken, the Germans dashed forward on their great adventure with characteristic celerity. One column moved west and south between the Scheldt and the sea, following the retreating Belgians and engaging the British infantry and cavalry who were covering the retreat. Bruges and Ghent fell without defence, Ostend was occupied without a shot on October 15. A few days later the Germans were at the Yser, before Nieuport. Another column was entrained and sent south to Lille, where it encountered the British expedition under Sir John French, just moving into the gap toward which the German flood was rushing. By October 20 the British advance had been halted and

turned back before Armentières and La Bassée, the opening shots of a great battle were being fired in the vicinity of Ypres.

From La Bassée to the sea there now stretched across the German front the most heterogeneous army Europe had seen in the West in centuries — a force made up of British, French, Moroccans, Algerians, Senegalese, British Indians, gathered up hastily from all sides and flung into the vortex.

Americans will recall that at the critical moment in the second day at Gettysburg, when the Confederates were swarming up Little Round Top, chance sent General Warren to this spot and he seized a handful of passing troops and rushed them to the summit, just in time to stop the Confederate dash for the key of the Union position. Much the same part King Albert and his gallant little army were now to play in a far more tremendous conflict. Looking on the operation with such knowledge as is yet available, it seems no exaggeration to say that it was the escape of the Belgian Army, its wonderful retreat, and its new stand which wrecked the German strategy, which would otherwise have prevailed, despite the coming of the British, unforeseen when the German plan was devised.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS

THE great struggle, which for the world is known as the Battle of Flanders, was, in fact, two quite distinct engagements. The first was fought by the Belgians, supported by French marines and territorials, African riflemen, and by a British fleet. This is known in official reports, as the Battle of the Yser, and began about October 21. The second, in which the British bore the brunt of the German attack, has been named the Battle of Ypres by Sir John French in his official reports. Although there was continuous fighting along the whole front from La Bassée to the sea from October 20 to November 16, the two contests actually represent successive efforts to break through the Allied lines, first along the Yser, then about Ypres.


To understand the confused and baffling struggle along the Yser, it is necessary first to grasp the character of the country itself. Rising in France, east of Dunkirk, the Yser River flows into Belgium, parallel to and about a dozen miles from the coast. At Dixmude it turns suddenly to the west and flows at right angles to its former course straight to the

sea, which it enters at Nieuport. From Nieuport to Dixmude the river is itself canalized, and the country about it is flat and cut with innumerable drainage canals, which are higher than the country itself and if the sluices were opened, would inundate it for many miles.

Coming south from Ostend, the main highway and the railway follow the dunes along the sea coast, which offer the single solid ground by which an army might come safely to the Yser. At Dixmude the Bruges-Dunkirk railway crosses the Yser and sends a branch off to Nieuport on a high embankment. This embankment played a very important part in the Battle of the Yser.

Advancing south from Ostend, following the retreating Belgians, the Germans found them posted behind the Yser. They then deployed along the ten miles of front between Dixmude and Nieuport, their right facing Nieuport, their centre directed at St. Georges, half way between Nieuport and Dixmude, their left opposite Dixmude. Fifteen miles behind the Yser was the French fortress of Dunkirk, the objective of the German advance, a fortress of the first class, defended by detached forts, but incapable of resisting the new German artillery.

In their attacks upon the Yser position the Germans employed mainly new formations made up of young men fresh from the training camps and composed largely of Berlin volunteers. These troops lacked the training of the regulars. In this engage-



THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS

POSITIONS OF BELGIANS, FRENCH AND BRITISH MARKED
IN SMALL TYPE

ment they displayed a courage which commanded the admiration of their enemies and enlisted the mournful applause of the world. But sent forward in solid masses, they suffered losses in the next few days which were beyond repair and without reward.

The first attack was delivered along the dunes before Nieuport. Here the Germans actually passed the Yser, took Nieuport, and were brought to a standstill only when the British warships came up and shelled the roads along which they were advancing and light-draught gun-boats actually entered the canals. The losses in this operation were serious, but less than those in the next attack.

In their second try the Germans were compelled to draw inland away from the shell-fire of the ships. This brought them into the district of the dikes and canals. Through this region, turned into a swamp by the heavy autumnal rains, too low to permit the construction of trenches, and destitute of all cover, the German volunteers advanced, singing as they came, carrying not rifles but planks to form the necessary bridges. Behind the plank bearers came the lines in solid array. Under the artillery fire of the defenders these columns melted away, but new regiments came on. The canals were choked with bodies, until the living crossed upon the dead. Again and again these boys returned to the charge, they passed the river in half a dozen places, but at the railway embankment were definitively halted.

The decisive turn in this phase came after a week,

when the Belgians opened the dikes and the sluices and the flood poured in, drowning innumerable Germans, turning the country into a swamp, waist deep in mud and water, through which neither artillery nor men could move. By October 28 the German attacks ceased, the south bank of the Yser was evacuated, the terrible bombardment which had endured for many days ended. The Battle of the Yser was over, and from Dixmude to the sea the Belgians had held their ground. So far the Channel ports were safe. It was now the turn of the British.

About the Yser the ground had been wholly favorable to the Allies, around the Ypres the contrary was the case. Eastward from the Yser to Ypres, behind the canal which connects the Lys and the Yser and leaves the latter south of Dixmude, French territorial troops were posted in an advantageous situation, which was never seriously attacked. But the British position extending from the canal just west of Ypres in a broad half circle about the town and some five miles outside of it, until it touched the Ypres-Armentières highway, south of the former town, was lacking in all natural advantage for the defenders.

Ypres, itself, was the centre of a number of highways. In Allied hands the town was a menace to German hold upon Lille to the south. But the town itself constituted a dangerous salient, which could be shelled from three sides and was surrounded by

wholly open country, adapted to trench work and too high to be flooded.

Could the Germans break the British line between Ypres and the Lys the defence of the Belgians would prove unavailing. Through the gap between the Belgians and the French the German flood would pour, enveloping the Belgians on the right, the French on the left. If the Belgians were able to get back to Dunkirk, they could only expect another siege like Antwerp, with the same result. As for the British Army, it would either be totally destroyed, or swept back in another mad retreat like that of August, again uncovering the French left. Short of the Somme there was no chance of a stand, and this might prove but the prelude to a new German approach to Paris.

To defend a front of at least thirty miles the British had four small army corps. On paper this means about 150,000, but so great were the early losses that two corps were combined early in the fight and it may be doubted if General French commanded much more than 100,000 in the hardest days of the conflict. This was a force insufficient to hold the extent of front, as the British commander recognized at the outset. Yet there was left him no choice. The fate of the Channel ports, of Northern France, now depended upon him. Once more it was asked of a British Army to display precisely the same service which had won Waterloo and made the great retreat of August forever memorable.

The Battle of the Yser practically ended on October 28; meantime for a week the Germans had been concentrating a great army in front of the British. On October 31, after much preliminary fighting of a serious character, the real battle began, and on this day, as Sir John French reports, the British line was broken in several places and only by the most desperate fighting was it able to hold on. On this day and during the next two weeks violent assaults were made by the Germans, culminating in the advance of the Prussian Guard on November 15, under the eyes of the Emperor himself.

In these two weeks the British, gradually reënforced by French corps, were slowly forced back upon Ypres. A number of outlying villages, whose names filled the war bulletins, were taken and lost by both sides. Ypres itself was practically destroyed by bombardment, with all its famous treasures of Flemish architecture. Not only did the Prussian Guard distinguish itself by its magnificent courage and bear frightful losses, but the Kaiser's wish that his Bavarians might meet the British was gratified.

After losses, which Sir John French officially estimated as three times as great as his own, after considerable but indecisive successes, the Germans were brought to a halt. By November 16 the combat along the Yser and about Ypres had dropped to the level of a war in the trenches and the Battles of Flanders were at an end. They had cost the Germans, according to British and French estimates, not less

than 150,000 men. By the same observers the German strength was estimated at 600,000.

Summing up the work of his army in his official report, Sir John French wrote: "No more arduous task has ever been assigned to British soldiers; and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them." This is perhaps the final word for the British conduct in this great battle. Certainly not less praise is due to the Belgians, to their King, who shared all their perils and displayed that supreme quality of leadership that made possible this final gallant stand of an army, now without a country.

Such reports as we yet have of the battle come from Allied sources, even these pay full tribute to German valor, endurance, high devotion, and, at the end as at the beginning, their spirit was unshaken. Yet, in their consequences the Battles of Flanders must be reckoned German defeats, only less disastrous to German purpose than that at the Marne, where the hard work and the real glory belonged to the French, as in the later struggle it fell chiefly to the British and Belgians.

With the close of the Battles of Flanders the western struggle reached a complete standstill. A gigantic deadlock from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier had now succeeded field operations. East and West the Allied and German lines both rested on the sea or neutral territory. All questions of flanking, of

enveloping, had disappeared. On lines which they were to occupy with insignificant changes for many months to come, the armies of the West now faced each other. Siege had succeeded campaign. But if the French and their allies had failed to sweep the Germans out of France and Belgium, they had succeeded in checking the second tremendous offensive, practically at its starting place. For the rest, the world for many weeks and months was to look eastward, to watch the tremendous struggle between the Czar and the two Kaisers.

CHAPTER VI

ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF METZ, 1870

ON October 28, 1871, Bazaine surrendered Metz to the Germans. In the history of modern war no such ignominious disaster had overtaken a great nation. Three Marshals of France, three thousand officers, 176,000 men, all that were left of the regular army of France, laid down their arms. As the sequel of Sedan the surrender of Metz marked the lowest ebb in the military fortunes of France.

From that hour to 1914 the shadow of these disasters of the "terrible year" had rested upon the French people. Twenty years earlier the younger generation were still frankly pessimistic as to the future of the race, while the older men, looking over toward the "lost provinces," seemingly gone irrevocably, spoke with bitterness of a newer time, of newer ideas and ideals, which they did not understand and could not respect.

In all these years, however, it was unmistakable that the French nation, beneath the surface, underneath the cover of domestic politics, unattractive, unsavory, and despite the scandal of Dreyfus, the strife of the Church separation, was undergoing a

discipline, passing through one of those periods so familiar in French history, which have followed the most brilliant times and preceded the new glory with which France has so frequently shone forth.

Looking back over the past fifteen years of French history, the period when internal disorder mounted, when the spirit of internationalism planted the national colors on the dunghill, when Hervé was still unregenerate and Jaurès triumphant, when the three-year law was repealed, the navy reduced to insubordination and terror, the army honeycombed with jealousies, with inefficiency, with disobedience, can there be any wonder that when the latest trial came Europe waited, doubtful, to see what the France of 1914 really was?

In the opening hours of the war, too, all that those who loved France best had feared most, seemed at hand. On every field there was defeat. Political influence sent armies away from the German pathway. Charleroi, Neufchâteau and Saarburg in as rapid succession as the opening defeats of 1870 seemed to promise a new, perhaps a final, dejection of the French people.

Yet suddenly, in the moment of gravest peril, there was discernible in France that wholly unexpected spirit, hitherto only recorded at her great periods. First of all, there was no panic, no revolution in Paris. While German armies raced forward to the capital from three sides, when the Government withdrew to Bordeaux, when the second siege was in

plain view, instead of violence there was calm; the familiar, the terrible wail, "We are betrayed!" was nowhere heard. In a word, in the moment of supreme trial France was found confident.

More than that; at the moment when the Kaiser's cannon were heard from the northern forts of Paris; the French Ambassador in London signed a treaty for his country, binding her to make no peace with Germany save with her allies. Something in the spirit of the Romans who bought on a rising market the land on which Hannibal was encamped, the French surrendered all privileges to save themselves at the expense of their allies, however sore their own plight.

At the same moment, too, a new circumstance was beginning to be visible: French armies, which had been defeated, German bulletins said routed, in Belgium, in Lorraine, were now discovered flowing back, not in rout, not in disorder, but steadily, solidly, without confusion, toward a general concentration. Every one knew French soldiers could advance, charge, but here were a million beaten conscripts withdrawing calmly, without confusion, without disorder.

So at last came the Battle of the Marne, and these beaten French armies, after weeks of defeat, retreat, sprang suddenly forward again. Having reconcentrated after war had begun, the most difficult of all operations, they now changed from defensive to offensive operations. After five weeks of uninter-

rupted reverses, there suddenly shone forth the old spirit, the spirit which for twenty years once defied all Europe in arms.

From September 7, the date of the beginning of French success at the Marne, to the anniversary day the tide had flowed steadily, slowly, almost indiscoverably at times, with the French. Half the territory lost in August had been recovered in September and October. Nowhere in France had German advance made real progress since Von Kluck started north from the Marne.

Compared with Germany, France was unprepared for war. So every democracy must be, when brought suddenly into conflict with efficient autocracy. The Chamber of Deputies elected on the eve of the present war was expected to consider some method of "modifying" the three-year law for French conscripts. Almost on the day the Servian crisis broke, French politicians in open Senate announced French forts were defenceless, French armies lacking in such essential details as shoes. When the overwhelming masses of the Germans were approaching Paris, Frenchmen, trained, ready to fight, eagerly clamoring for guns, had to be sent home because equipment was lacking.

Yet above and beyond all this serious side of recent French experience, and that of England was not different — American experience in 1898 was identical — it became plain now that there was something sure. In the hours of disaster in 1914, disaster

which seemed to be almost as complete as that of 1870, France herself was unshaken. Those who loved France despaired, but somehow, translated from the vague despatches, the stray anecdotes of correspondents, there was, unmistakable, the fact that France did not despair.

Now the terrible storm had partially passed. In all the military incidents since the Battle of the Marne there had been revealed a steady advance in French resources, in French efficiency. Six weeks before the battle raged at the very gates of Paris. Now the real conflict was in Belgium, and in France German advance, checked long ago, had been unable to get up and start forward again.

Terrible as was this war, there was no mistaking the grandeur of the national spirit it had disclosed, not in France alone, not in poor Belgium merely, but in Germany as well. The world knew now how foolish and how futile were the early reports which portrayed the war as the creation of the Kaiser, blindly accepted by a reluctant people.

Men do not fight as had the Germans, as they were now fighting; nations do not bear, suffer, endure, unless the very depths of their spirit responds to the call made upon them by their country's need. Not in any record of history had any nation given more supreme evidence of devotion, of courage, than the Germans in the recent months.

Yet it was not for Germany that the world had misgivings. What was still in doubt was whether

France, so long held decadent by those who knew least and spoke most about her, so maligned by her own children of the generation that had lost confidence as well as hope, could endure the strain of another terrible struggle in which defeat was the initial circumstance on every field in the month of August.

That question had been answered. It had been answered completely. Europe now knew that the spirit of 1792 was with the French soldier, that the nation which could endure adversity with calmness, as the French did in August, might be defeated, but that the France that the whole world loves, irrespective of present issues and passing strife, would not die — had indeed already given one more evidence of that eternal and virile youth which makes her history so splendid and so completely beyond all understanding.

For forty-four years Frenchmen had faced the Metz anniversary with a feeling of deep humiliation and shame. Napoleon's final disaster, Waterloo, left no pang. France had been defeated, but she shared with her conquerors the honor. But Metz was a national humiliation, a blot on the national escutcheon. Now at last, and rightly, Frenchmen for the first time could endure this day with calm. Whatever came thereafter, 1870 was not to be repeated in 1914.

On this anniversary it was impossible not to recall the words of the Duc d'Aumale when Bazaine was

tried for treason because he surrendered Metz. There was nothing left, the Marshal had explained, in defending himself. He meant that the Empire had fallen, their Emperor was a prisoner in exile.

“But there was always France,” the old Royalist responded — and the word has lived, perhaps as the final expression of the spirit of the French people — the thing that bound the old and the new — 1792 with 1914.

CHAPTER VII

TURKEY ENLISTS

ON October 29, the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau*, flying the Turkish flag but manned by their German crews and officered by their old commanders, who had brought them through the Mediterranean to Constantinople in the opening days of the war, bombarded the Russian ports of Odessa and Theodosia. Thus by intrigue, by manipulation, by the use of unlimited money, Germany had at last brought the Sultan to the point of war, had persuaded Turkey to enlist.

By no means all the Ottoman statesmen favored the war. On the contrary, not a few learned with actual amazement and indignation of a fact of war, for which there had been no preparation. To one man had been due the entrance of Turkey — to Enver Pasha, the defender of Tripoli, the soldier to whom Turkey owed the recapture of Adrianople. His influence had proved decisive and his sympathy, his loyalty, was to the Kaiser quite as much as to the weakling who now by title at least was "Commander of the Faithful." To the war Enver consented joyfully, for it he had labored unceasingly; but, in fact, it had been forced upon the nation by

the German naval officers, whose attack upon Russian ports in time of peace, made war inevitable; war in which Turkey's ancient defenders were now united with her secular enemy in seeking her destruction.

The entrance of Turkey into the Great War, the extension of the flames of the European conflict from the Straits of Dover to the Golden Horn, naturally and inevitably provoked retrospect. There was in the arrival of Turkey on the battle line something so logical as to suggest the fifth act of a drama immeasurably grand and technically perfect.

For at bottom it was the decision of European statecraft a generation before with respect to Turkey that explained the fact that men and women were to-day dying in Flanders and in Champagne. The ruins of Louvain, the fire-stricken fields of France, the still unreckoned sacrifice of the seed corn of Germany, were but contemporary tributes to the humanity, wisdom and genius of the nineteenth century, incarnated by men of state.

A generation before the Great Powers of Europe had sat about the table of the Berlin Congress and willed certain things. Their main purpose, the main purpose of all statesmen, was to protect their own peoples from war, to prevent their rivals from bringing home disproportionate profit. To accomplish this, the statesmen assembled in Berlin turned back two million Bulgarians in Thrace and Macedonia to

the gentle mercies of the Turk. Similarly the Serbs of Bosnia were transferred to the actual, but not the titular, sovereignty of Austria. The Greeks of Epirus, Macedonia, and the Ægean Islands were left beneath the Osmanli yoke. Russia was placated by leave to rob her Rumanian ally of Bessarabia, inhabited by Rumanians. Rumania was quieted by a permit to seize the Bulgar land of Dobrudja.

Now consider the consequences. For a generation, each succeeding spring saw men in revolt, women dishonored, children murdered, anarchy and human agony extended over the whole region of Macedonia. In Armenia there were massacres of Christians by Kurds almost too terrible to be ignored by European statesmen. In Bosnia, Servian national and racial ambitions were crushed by Austrian bayonets, and the southern Slavs entered a purgatory wholly comparable with that of Italy half a century before. From the Danube to the Ægean Islands some millions of men and women lived in agony and died in misery and shame that there might be peace in Champagne and the Rhineland, prosperity in London and Berlin.

When this condition had endured for a quarter of a century there suddenly shone forth a new phenomenon, the Young Turkish revolution. Seen now in retrospect, it was rather a tawdry thing, the feeblest of imaginable imitations of 1789. Yet it had its great moment when Albanian, Slav, Os-

manli, Christian, Jew and Mohammedan struck hands and proclaimed a perpetual truce, a coming of justice, liberty and progress. In this spirit they marched to Stamboul, overset the throne of Abdul the Damned, adopted a constitution of freedom.

How did the great states of Europe receive this new Balkan revolution? First, since the cardinal purpose of the Young Turkish movement was to redeem Turkish provinces, Austria hastily annexed Bosnia. Then Italy, having for half a century looked enviously out upon Tripoli, an ancient Roman province assigned to her when the "Sick Man of Europe" should die, beheld the "Sick Man" simulating health. At once Italy took an inordinate interest in the African estate, and annexed Tripoli. Finally Russia, enraged by Austrian advance in the Balkans, prevented from effective protest by Germany's appearance in "shining armor," set skilfully to work to create a Balkan alliance which should aim at the definite extinction of Osmanli power in Europe, and the creation on the ruins, of a Slav confederacy obedient to Russian will and threatening Austria on the Danube as Sardinia had threatened her on the Po.

Before the first sounds of this Balkan Confederacy the feeble Turkish echo of 1789 went silent. It was a poor imitation, it was perhaps predestined to extinction; but it was the remote chance that it might succeed which stirred Europe to action; it was

the prospect that there might be a Young Turkey, a Turkey strong because its citizens were free, happy, loyal, which precipitated the ruin.

Once Turkey was crushed in the First Balkan War there was a brief promise of happiness for the liberated millions. There was a chance that Bulgaria, Servia and Greece, having sunk ancient rivalries in common action, might now divide the Balkans and extend with their new boundaries the blessings which they had known in the narrower territories already theirs.

But such a possibility was fatal to Austrian ambition. Hence Austria decreed that Servia should have no "window on the sea." Holding the natural window, Bosnia, she acquired sudden interest in the Albanians who occupied the other window. Wherefore Servia must give up her Adriatic conquest. But must she then resign Macedonia, conquered by her, held by her, and promised to Bulgaria in the belief that Durazzo was to be hers?

Servia believed not; and in an instant the whole Balkan Confederacy was gone to ruin as complete as that of the Young Turkish revolution. That the inestimable blessings of peace might continue to prevail north of the Danube, Europe accepted the Austrian policy, which condemned the millions south of that stream to new horrors, atrocities, campaigns. So the Turk came back to Adrianople; the Serb, Bulgarian, Greek and Rumanian joined in the Second Balkan War. This was, in fact, the fourth act. But

when it ended, of a sudden all men perceived the inevitable, ineluctable fifth.

For this time the Balkan peoples did not sink back obediently into suffering. On the contrary, there now stood forth a new, strong Serbia, looking hopefully across the narrow Save to the Serbs of Bosnia, a new Slavic Sardinia, victorious and confident. There was, too, another Rumania, no longer held by Hohenzollern leading-strings, gazing with unmistakable intent upon Bukovina, Transylvania. Finally, a greater Greece, still denied Epirus to satisfy Italian apprehensions, affirmed herself an advance post of the Triple Entente.

In sum, the great idol of Europe had suddenly fallen to dust and its temple was vacant. The idol was the balance of power; the temple, the empty structure on the dunes of The Hague. Henceforth the superiority of the Triple Entente over the Triple Alliance promised to grow with each year. More than that, the ruin of Austria seemed assured, and the Slavs within and without the Hapsburg empire were dreaming of a new *risorgimento*, while Italy, committed to Mediterranean colonial aims, was fast and deliberately turning her back upon Berlin and Vienna.

So now the world had the fifth act, the Great War. The men, women and children of Macedonia, Thrace and Armenia, who were sacrificed that there might be peace north of the Danube, had died in vain, but not unavenged. Champagne and Picardy,

Brabant and Flanders, East and West Prussia, Galicia and Poland, now knew the horror that was the share of Macedonia for a generation.

As this terrific conflagration mounted higher and higher, the pacifists perceived in it the negation of all things sound and best in human life, extolled the peace that was before, and prayed that it might speedily return. Yet granting all that could be said of the horror of all wars, this war beyond all others, was there not discoverable in it proof that the inexorable antecedent condition to peace is that it shall prevail south of the Danube as well as north?

That the men and women of Flanders and Picardy might prosper, those of the Balkans had perished for a generation. That there might be peace for England, Germany, Austria, Italy and France, these nations consented to the torture of those in Macedonia. Looking backward, then, was it not now possible to perceive that the thing some men called peace was, in fact, a sham, an inveracity at length fallen to the estate which is the final phase of all inveracities in a world in which the truth does most remorselessly prevail?

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY CROSSES THE ADRIATIC

SIX months earlier the announcement of the landing of Italian marines at Valona, of the return of Greek troops to Northern Epirus, would have promptly precipitated a general European crisis. If on October 30 it was overlooked in the presence of desperate battles in Flanders and Poland, it had still to be recognized as promising one more complication, one more major change in European conditions, when at last peace should be restored.

The value of Valona is revealed by a single glance at the map of the Adriatic. At the mouth of the sea, where it narrows and both shores are visible from the deck of a steamer in midchannel, on the eastern shore is the wide bay of Valona. Forty miles here separate Italy from Albania. In Italian hands Valona commands the Adriatic. In Austrian hands, in the possession of a weak State, guaranteed by neutrality, treaties which are but "scraps of paper," it would become an instant peril for Italy.

Look again at the same map and it will be seen that all the good harbors are on the eastern shore,

most of them covered by the Austro-Hungarian colors — Trieste, Sebenico, Gravosa, Fiume and Cattaro, the last the finest of all, have belonged to the Hapsburgs since the Congress of Vienna. Yet without exception they bear Italian names, and in all of them are to be found the splendid monuments of ancient Venetian glory.

The creation of the Kingdom of Albania, at the Conference of London in 1913, was the direct consequence of conflicting rivalries. For the Albanians, no great Power cared. But Austria was resolved that the Serbs should not have their "window on the sea." Italy was determined that the Austrian Empire should not descend the Adriatic until it touched the Greek frontier and included Valona. Finally, Italy and Austria alike were agreed to keep the Slav protégés of the Czar from possessing an Adriatic littoral which might afford a base for Russian fleets.

Yet even as the Albanian Kingdom was created, it crumbled. The State included within its territories not a nationality striving for unity, not a new Serbia or a second Bulgaria, but a number of warlike tribes, separated by religion, by rivalries of princes, a country wholly comparable with the Scotland of the clansmen. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, had been created because of an internal *risorgimento*, but from the fall of the Roman Empire to the Peace of Bucharest Albanian conditions had not changed.

Thus, before the tragedy of Sarejevo had pro-

voked a world war, the German princeling who resided rather than ruled in Durazzo had once been a fugitive from his capital and was already little but a prisoner. With the opening shot of the great conflict he quitted his State, leaving behind him only the chaos which had been the normal condition for centuries.

If Austria and Germany should win in the great war then it would be inevitable that Servia and Montenegro would become Hapsburg provinces, Austrian empire would descend the Valley of the Morava toward Salonica and along the Adriatic from Cattaro to Scutari and Valona. Once this advance came, Italy would in fact lose the mastery of the Adriatic. More than that, the Austrians would outstrip her in the march toward the Near East.

It was to forestall this that Italy now landed her marines in Valona, as she had sent her troops to Tripoli three years earlier. Whoever won in the present struggle would have to confront the accomplished fact of Italian possession of the key of the Adriatic. For the Allies this had no peril. Italian possession of Valona, an Italian protectorate of Albania, both were without menace to any near or remote concern of the enemies of Austria and Germany.

But, on the other hand, and this was the vital thing, a victorious Austria would not endure the presence of Italy on both sides of the Straits of Otranto. England could quite as patiently see Germany in

Calais and in Dover. Such Italian expansion would, in fact, throttle the naval and the commercial future of the Hapsburgs. If Austria had been willing to risk a world war to protect her Bosnian and Croatian provinces, she could hardly accept Italian sovereignty on the Albanian coast willingly.

Thus in the wider sense, Italian occupation of Valona was a step, a long step, toward alliance with the enemies of Austria and Germany, an alliance which, if it had not immediate value, was still certain to exercise an influence later. The Italian voice in any European areopagus hereafter was likely to be raised for Anglo-French-Russian rather than Austro-German views.

More than this, the prospect of Austro-German victory hereafter might force Italy to join in the present war. For if it were conceivable that victorious Germany and Austria would forgive the desertion of August, it was unthinkable that they would permanently permit Italy to profit at their expense and bring home the greatest naval prize a Mediterranean Power could now desire.

Italy still desired the Trentino and meant to have it, but she could get it only at Austria's expense. She longed for Trieste, and this, too, was Hapsburg. She now took Valona; her influence in Albania, henceforth, must mount. In her own peninsula she had thousands of Albanian subjects. The great Crispi was of Albanian descent. Hereafter her voice would prevail at first perhaps only about Valona, but

later at Durazzo, at Scutari, in Berat. All this meant Austro-Italian rivalry, jealousy, quarrelling. It must also mean growing Franco-Italian friendship.

At the outset of the war Austria and Germany were said to have offered Italy Algeria, Tunis, Corsica, Savoy, Nice, for her adherence to the Triple Alliance. But all these tempting offers failed to enlist Italy. First, because Anglo-French fleets were bound to control the Mediterranean, and Austria and Germany could offer no protection against them. But beyond this, the sympathy of Italy was with France and England, not Austria and Germany, and in the twentieth as in the nineteenth century the enemy of Italy for Italians remained Austria.

For the future, then, Italian influence seemed bound to be exerted against Austria. Yet there were certain perils that would have to be met. When Greece occupied Northern Epirus in 1912 Italian opposition was as violent as was Austrian protest against Servian and Montenegrin operations about Scutari and Durazzo. Then Italy maintained that Greece was, in fact, an ally of the Triple Entente, a friend of the opponents of Italy.

Thus, despite French effort, Greece was compelled to surrender districts Greek in population along the Adriatic from Corfu to Chimara and inland about Argyrocastro, Delvino and Koritza. These she was now reoccupying. What remained to be seen was whether Italy would now acquiesce or insist upon a second evacuation of Epirus. This she presently

did although only after Greece gave assurance that her occupation was temporary.

In the same way Serbia and Montenegro had planned to annex Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Slavonia. But Dalmatia is Italian Irredenta. Ragusa, Spalatro, Zara, are ancient Venetian towns; the islands of the east coast are Italian by name at least. So Italy was likely to oppose Slav advance along the Adriatic, as she had Greek. Indeed, in all this district the Slav is the real rival of Italy and is slowly pushing the Italians out of the coast cities. Slav ambitions are sure to have Russian support, and differences between Italy and Russia are only less likely than between Italy and Austria.

Yet at the moment the Italian occupation of Valona was unmistakably a step toward closer relations between Italy and the enemies of Germany and Austria. In the same fashion Italian and Greek territorial expansion seemed certain to have a potent influence in Rumania, which had "lost provinces" claiming her attention, almost compelling her intervention.

CHAPTER IX

A NEW EASTERN QUESTION

WITH the entrance of Turkey into the Great War, the Eastern Question was also thrown into the melting pot of war which already held the other great problems of a century of European history. The British journals which asserted that a general liquidation of all European differences, another settlement like that of the Congress of Vienna, was now assured, when statesmen should again replace soldiers, perhaps hit off most exactly the consequence of Osmanli participation.

To justify Enver Bey's decision for war was simple. For more than a century Russia had been the hereditary enemy. Russian aggression had swept away all the ancient Turkish possessions east of the Pruth and north of the Black Sea. Russian support for the Serb and the Bulgar had resulted in the driving of Turkish rule from the Danube to the very shores of the Bosphorus. But even there Russian advance had halted rather than terminated. Constantinople remained the goal of Romanoff ambition. To plant the cross over St. Sophia was the dream of Nicholas II as it had been of Peter the Great.

Victorious in the present conflict Russia could

have Constantinople. Twice when her soldiers were almost within sight of that city British intervention prevented the capture of the town. The Crimean War, the arrival of the British warships after the Treaty of San Stefano, these were the two checks that held back the Czar. But now the British were allied with the Russians, the chance that England in the hour of triumph would oppose Russian ambition to have the city of the Sultans was slight.

For the Turk, then, there was little choice. The fact that German ambition had its own designs, that Asia Minor was included in the grandiose scheme of Pan-Germanism was unmistakable. But even if Russia and England should be beaten they might be depended upon to back the Turk against such aggression. Against victorious Russia there was no promise of protection.

Again, if Russia were the immediate enemy, England and France were only less so. British occupation of Egypt definitively deprived the Turk of his finest province. France in Algeria and Tunis weakened Moslem power. To save Stamboul, to regain Egypt, Tunis, Algeria — even Tripoli — to restore the ancient Mediterranean Empire of Mohammed, this was necessarily a real and vital part of the dream of every Turkish patriot.

So much for Enver's justification. Now as to its effect upon the present conflict. What nations would it affect at once and how? First, as to the neutral nations, these were Italy, Rumania, Bul-

garia and Greece, to all of whom the Turkish decision was of vital importance.

For Italy the position was this: If Turkey reconquered Egypt, Italy's hold in Tripoli would become wholly precarious. All that she had won with so much effort, in blood, in treasure, might prove practically valueless. Italian rule in Tripoli at the most would be reduced to the empty possession of a few coast ports, to a foothold in Lybia wholly analogous to that Spain has held in Morocco for four centuries.

Again, Italy had already taken steps to establish her influence in Albania. But, if Turkey succeeded in restoring her military power, nothing was more inevitable than that she would endeavor to regain her lost provinces in the Balkans. And of these Albania, with its Mohammedan population, promised to be the easiest to reconquer.

Finally, it is Austria, not Russia or France or England, which is Italy's rival in the Near East. If the Austro-German alliance were successful, its next aim would naturally be to assert an industrial as well as political supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. Under Turkish rule Salonica might become the eastern gateway of the two central Powers. Servia and Montenegro would pass to Hapsburg rule and Italy be outstripped in the race to the Near East.

All these circumstances combined to exercise a powerful influence upon Italy. Her own African

province was now imperilled by the Holy War provoked by the Sultan's religious agents. Like France and England she was bound to oppose any effort to restore Ottoman rule on the African shore of the Mediterranean. Here all her personal interests were identical with those of England and France, while in the Balkans and along the Adriatic she was the rival of Austria and Germany.

As to Rumania, the situation was less serious. Her ambition to redeem Austrian and Hungarian provinces inhabited by Rumanians still stood. In addition she was bound to view with apprehension any alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey, because in the Second Balkan War she seized Bulgarian territory and must expect attack if Bulgaria shared in a victorious alliance with the central Powers. As long as Bulgaria remained neutral, she could afford to stay out, but the desire for Transylvania and Bukovina was unmistakable, the sympathy of the masses of the people was plainly with the Allies and the Turkish decision seemed destined to strengthen the hands of those seeking to send Rumania into the ever widening conflict.

Bulgaria remained the storm centre of the Balkan situation. In the Second Balkan War, Serb, Greek, Rumanian and Turk had combined to deprive her of the fruits of her splendid victories. Greece, Servia and Rumania had taken from her lands populated by Bulgars. Russia, in Bulgarian eyes, betrayed her at the critical hour. "Call us Tartars, Huns, any-

thing but Slavs," were the bitter words of one Bulgarian general at Bucharest. It was easy then to see how Bulgarian resentment at recent wrongs might provoke participation with Turkey in the war.

Yet the gains and perils of such a course were unmistakable. It was conceivable that Bulgaria might regain Macedonia, occupy Monastir, Ochrida, Kavala, take Salonica. But it was equally possible that Turkey, with the consent of the Austro-German statesmen, might insist on possessing all her ancient provinces. On the other hand, if Bulgaria joined with the Grand Alliance she could hope to regain Adrianople, advance to the Enos-Midia line again. She might also reasonably expect to receive Macedonian concessions from Servia, if Servia should acquire Bosnia.

If Bulgaria remained neutral, Turkish troops could not join the battle in central Europe. If she joined the Austro-German alliance, the combined Turkish-Bulgarian armies might presently be in Servia endeavoring to join hands with the Austrians across King Peter's little State and thus open a way for Turkish Army corps to appear in France or in Western Galicia.

As to Greece, like Rumania, she was bound to Servia in an alliance to preserve the *status quo* created by the Treaty of Bucharest. Victorious Turkey would inevitably reclaim the Ægean Islands held by Greece, would demand and obtain Salonica, if Bulgarian claims were rejected. Besides all Greek

history, all Greek sympathy, bound her to France and England, her champions over a century of suffering.

Such briefly were the major circumstances of the new crisis in the Eastern Question created by the Turkish decision to ally herself with Germany. Such in the larger view were the possible ways in which Turkish participation might affect the Balkan States and Italy.

For the Turk it was clear the final hour had come — defeated he must now quit Europe — go back to Anatolia, conceivably lose Arabia, Syria, the Valley of the Euphrates, certainly surrender his half of Armenia. Even the primacy in the religious hierarchy of Islam might be lost to the Sultan. Victorious, he might hope to hang on a little longer, to fortify himself on the jealousy of great nations for a few more years. But his choice, the choice made for him by Enver Pasha was plainly between immediate ruin if Russia should conquer and ultimate dissolution if the Pan-German dream were realized. Naturally and quite reasonably Enver decided, urged by his German advisers, his hand forced by German warships, to face the immediate peril.

CHAPTER X

THE DEFENCE AND FALL OF KIAO-CHAU

WHILE the battles in Flanders and Poland were occupying the attention of the whole world the news from the Far East pointed to the approach of the end of one of the most romantic of military feats, the defence of Kiao-Chau. No page in all that will recount the heroism and devotion of German, or indeed any soldiers in the Great War is more certain to endure than that which tells of the long protracted defence of a fortress, not against an army or a fleet but against a nation.

As a measure of German spirit Kiao-Chau was far more satisfactory than any European battle. The splendid courage of the contemporary advance of the boy conscripts along the Yser in the face of machine guns and magazine rifles at point blank range had earned the tribute of the British historian of the daily campaign events. But behind these boys was the whole weight of German military power, the stimulus of recent victory and the expectation of future decisive success.

For the defenders of Kiao-Chau there never was any such driving force. The moment that Japan, with her great resources, her army which had con-

quered Russia, her fleet which made her supreme in the East, threw her lot in with the Allies, the fate of Kiao-Chau was determined. It became thereafter merely a mathematical question, the prospective defence; a mathematical question involving simply the problem of how long a few thousand Germans, without hope of relief, with the certainty that neither supplies nor reënforcements could reach them, could keep their flag flying in the face of the military power of a nation larger than France and recently the conqueror in a tremendous war.

From such a conflict, too, it might well have been expected that all but the few soldiers actually charged with the test would have shrunk, that these would have contented themselves with a formal, a brief and honorable resistance and then the surrender which would not have impugned their courage or brought disgrace to their flag.

Yet nothing of the sort ever entered the mind of the Germans of the East. First of all, before the Japanese investment began, stray correspondence told of the fashion in which from every corner and remote district of Asia, German men were turning back to Kiao-Chau. These were not soldiers, but civilians. They were not boys, for whom the prospect of battle, however hopeless, is a sufficient appeal. But young and old, weak and strong, this tide of men moved quietly but swiftly toward the threatened German port, their single place in the Asiatic sun.

Most of these men were old enough, sufficiently experienced, to know exactly what was to come. Kiao-Chau was not a Port Arthur. The garrison of the German possession was not a tithe of that Stoessel had in his Russian fortress. For months Stoessel could and did hope for reënforcement. But Port Arthur fell. The great forts that crowned the mountains of the Peninsula of Kwang-Tung crumbled to dust. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese moved on resistlessly to victory and many to certain death.

All this the Germans of the Far East knew. Once the Japanese lines closed about them, once Japanese army corps came up from the west and Japanese squadrons sealed the bay, there would be nothing to expect but a slow, steady, inevitable advance of the enemy, the pounding to pieces of futile forts. In the face of all this, of certain defeat, probable death, the response of the Germans in Asia was instant, unanimous.

And now for two months the flag of the German Empire had been kept flying on the forts of Kiao-Chau. Day by day Japanese troops had advanced. A nation against a garrison had made its inevitable progress. But only slowly. Day by day the Tokio reports had chronicled new destruction of defences, a closer approach to the citadel of German resistance, and yet for two months the stand of a handful against a nation had been maintained. Now the wireless of Kiao-Chau was silent and Chinese towns

no longer heard from the defenders but Kiao-Chau was still untaken.

It is difficult to exaggerate the moral value of the Kiao-Chau defence as it reflected the spirit and the determination of a great people. British statesmen and journals had delighted to tell the world that Great Britain was making war to save the German people from militarism, to bring independence to the oppressed Teutons. Was there ever a more complete, a more crushing answer to such cant than that supplied by Kiao-Chau, by the response of the Germans of the East to a call not to battle but to disaster, to a summons not to possible victory but to inevitable defeat?

In Europe, German military power still bulked large. German armies were still on hostile soil in the East and in the West. The great tradition of Prussian invincibility had been shaken but not yet destroyed, the great military machine remained supreme in its own land and as yet inexpugnable in France and Belgium.

Yet, even here, it was no longer possible for any but the wilfully blind to mistake the fact that it was not the machine that was now making German armies potent in an attack still continuing. The songs of the boy conscripts of 1914 were but the echo of the songs of those other boys of 1813 and 1814 who freed Europe from Napoleon and saved Germany from complete subjugation. It was now inconceivable that there could remain a single person

who could honestly believe that the German phenomenon which filled Europe was less than the complete, solidified, fused resolution of a whole nation.

Nor was it the German man whose courage seemed most striking in the scanty reports that came from Germany. As the women of our own Confederacy preserved an unconquerable spirit and unshaken devotion to the end, after the end, so now it was clear the women of Germany were giving all that their resources afforded. So the world heard of mothers who had sent four sons to the front and regretted that they had not more to send. Above and beyond all else the thing now to be observed by all men of varying sympathies and of no sympathies in this Great War was that a whole people, believing itself fighting for its existence, was making a fight which nations and races only make when they go forth to battle without reservation, without the smallest question or doubt, confident of victory but convinced that, victory or death, there was no honorable course but to fight.

Of this spirit the defence of Kiao-Chau was perhaps the most striking example. If the men who were giving their lives hopelessly, uselessly, as it would appear from any military consideration, contributed to bring to the world a little clearer vision of the spirit that animated the whole German people, the spirit without which they could not have contemplated the future fearlessly or continued the unequal struggle sturdily, they certainly deserved as well of

their own countrymen as those who won Sedan or those who marched to the sound of the guns at La Belle Alliance.

Kiao-Chau fell on November 6 to the combined strength of English and Japanese fleets and troops.

IN POLAND

CHAPTER XI

SLAV AND TEUTON

IN the history of the eastern campaigns September 1 had been a date of permanent interest. On this day Hindenburg had won his great triumph at Tannenberg, more than two corps of Russians had been destroyed, the invasion of East Prussia brought to an abrupt close, and a Russian retreat to the fortresses behind the Niemen made inevitable. But on the same day victorious Russian armies had entered Lemberg after a week of desperate fighting and the fall of Lemberg was to prove but the prelude to three weeks of uninterrupted Austrian disaster which was to end in the almost complete conquest of Galicia by the Czar.

The German advance into Suwalki Province, after Tannenberg, made a great noise in the German press at the moment, but, for the world, was utterly unimportant, since, while it proceeded, the great operations on the Marne, the Aisne, and in Galicia were going forward. In its relation to the subsequent fighting in the East, it was also of minor importance.

Once the Germans had cleared the East Prussian frontier, they entered a region of forest and marsh, the region which a century earlier had seen the beginning and the end of the Napoleonic campaign to Moscow.

While the Germans pressed forward in this region, along poor roads and away from their bases, the Russians concentrated behind the Niemen from Kovno to Grodno, presently took the offensive, defeated the Germans in the Battle of Augustovo about October 3. Following this engagement the Russians steadily came west and presently recrossed the East Prussian frontier, while the Germans retired behind the line of the Mazurian Lakes, southwest of which they had won the Battle of Tannenberg in September. Here the Russians were in turn halted and a deadlock ensued which was to last until February, with practically no change in position for either army.

In Galicia the campaign was much more important and the results far more considerable. On September 21 the Russians occupied Jaroslav. In the succeeding days they passed the San River, reached Tarnow on the Dunajec, fifty miles east of Cracow, surrounded Przemyśl, the last Austrian foothold east of the Dunajec. In the same time other Russian forces pursued the broken Austrian corps beyond the foothills of the Carpathians and began to climb the eastern slopes of the passes into Hungary. By September 30, not less than 25,000 of the 30,000 square

miles of the Galician Province, with above 8,000,000 inhabitants, were in Russian hands and a Russian force was threatening the Crownland of Bukovina to the south.

It had been the mission of the Austrian Army to hold the Russians in play until Germany should have "dealt with France." Now, October come, Germany had failed to dispose of France, and Austria had utterly broken down under the great burden that had been imposed upon her. If the Russian dash into East Prussia in August, which had proved so disastrous to German plans in France, had been a first indication of the fact that Russian mobilization had gone forward far more rapidly than had been expected, the conquest of Galicia had demonstrated to the satisfaction of Russian enemies, at the least, that Russia had been fairly well mobilized before the war opened.

In her present plight it was plain that Austria must now depend upon Germany for salvation. Not only were her armies routed, but they were disintegrating. Slav regiments were surrendering on all sides. Austrian generals were in disgrace. The whole military power of the Dual Kingdom seemed impaired. If the German and Hungarian speaking fractions were still loyal, still fighting gallantly, there could still be no doubt that the morale of the whole army was shaken. Nor was the Austrian situation less gravely compromised on the south, where the Serbians, victors in the great Battle of the Jedar in Au-

gust, were now in Bosnia and advancing toward Serajevo.

Against Austria there was now rolling up the whole weight of Russian military power. Out-numbered, routed, having lost vast supplies, an appreciable fraction of their artillery resources, the Austrians were now being forced back upon Cracow, which was the front door, not to Austria and Vienna, but to Silesia and Berlin. In addition, Rumania, her eyes fixed upon the millions of her fellow Latins in Bukovina and Transylvania, Italy, still yearning for Trieste, the Trentino, the Dalmatian Coast, began to show signs of casting their lot with the Allies. Finally, Turkey and Bulgaria, yesterday reckoned certain allies of the Austro-German Armies, had become quiescent.

Unless Austrian prestige were promptly restored, Russian invasion halted, turned back, it was now possible that the Balkan alliance might be revived to the detriment of Austria. Greece and Servia, by making cessions to Bulgaria of lands taken in the Second Balkan War, might free themselves of all menace, and the Greeks might stand again with the Servians. A similar arrangement between Bulgaria and Rumania might, at the cost to the latter of the Dobrudja morsel taken at the Treaty of Bucharest, release the Rumanian Armies for service in Transylvania, whither Russia now beckoned them with the promise of Bukovina as an advance payment.

By October 1, then, while Antwerp was yet un-

taken and the western struggle descending toward a deadlock, Germany was compelled to listen to Austrian appeals, to send to Austria scores of officers to reorganize the shaken Austrian armies, which henceforth became in fact a part of the German force, subject to the direction of the great German General Staff. She had in addition to send against Russia a new German Army, to strike a blow that might compel the Czar to abandon his Galician conquest and give Austria, freed from invasion, the time to reorganize her own armies and dispose of the Servian menace south of the Danube and the Save.

These were the circumstances and the considerations that led to the first German invasion of Poland, the initial operation in a campaign, which in the following months was to supplant the fighting in the West in the eyes of the world.

CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLE OF THE VISTULA

LOOKING at the map it will be seen that Russian Poland extends into Austro-German territory on a wide semicircle, something in the fashion of a fist pushed against a cushion. North and south, East Prussia and Galicia half surround the Czar's Polish kingdom. Because of this geographical condition Russian mobilization began, not at the frontier, behind the Warta, but behind the Vistula, east of Warsaw, covered by a circle of fortresses.

Further than this, although early Russian official statements talked blandly of an advance upon Berlin beginning at the frontier, which is less than two hundred miles from the German capital, it was a military fact that until Austro-German forces were driven out of both East Prussia and Galicia, no Russian advance through Poland was conceivable, because both flanks would be exposed. Accordingly, Russian mobilization having taken place east of the Niemen, the Vistula and the Bug, the first Russian advances were into East Prussia and Galicia and Austro-German troops were able to enter Poland in the first days and take Lodz, which was unde-

fended, Russian troops having, according to plan retired to the Vistula.

Austria having in September appealed to Germany for help, the Germans undertook a rapid march through Poland, moving on a front from Kalisz to Czenstochowa and following the main trunk lines of Poland, one of which led east to Warsaw from Kalisz, the other east to Ivangorod from Czenstochowa. Relying upon their great mobility, their wealth in automobiles, the better training of their troops, the Germans hoped to reach Warsaw before the Russians could concentrate sufficient troops to halt them. Bringing up the guns which they had used against Antwerp they hoped to reduce the forces of the Polish capital and capture it. In the same fashion the army moving against Ivan-gorod, which was made up both of Austrians and Germans, was expected to take that fortress. Finally, a third army, wholly Austrian, was to move north and east from the Carpathians and clear the Russians out of Galicia west of the San and relieve Przemyśl.

If this operation were completely successful, the Austro-German armies would then have cleared the Russians out of all the country west of the Vistula and of the San, which prolonged the Vistula line to the Carpathians. Holding the Vistula and its fortress, the Germans and their allies might safely resign themselves to a defensive war on the East, their front far within hostile territory and the Vistula of-

fering a magnificent line of defence. Politically, the conquest of most of Russian Poland would conceivably rally all the Poles to the two Kaisers and permanently carry German frontiers to the limits they had occupied after the last partition of Poland and before the Napoleonic wars.

But even if this magnificent result were not wholly achieved, it was almost certain that such a formidable drive at the unprotected Russian centre would compel the Russians to draw out of Galicia, to abandon their second invasion of East Prussia, to give Austria a chance to reform her lines and dispose of impudent and annoying little Serbia on the south. About October 1 this invasion was begun and the supreme command fell to Marshal von Hindenburg, the victor of Tannenberg, who now became the most conspicuous commander in the German Army.

For nearly three weeks this great advance moved forward prosperously. On the north, the left, made up of the best German troops, actually reached the suburbs of Warsaw, German aëroplanes dropped proclamations and bombs in the capital of Poland, the fall of the city was predicted by resident consuls and the civilian population began to flee. With equal celerity and success the Austro-German corps making up the centre of the great host reached the Vistula near Ivangorod and began to force a crossing near this fortress. Finally, in Galicia, the Russians were compelled to draw back behind the San, to give over the siege of Przemyśl, to relinquish all

immediate hope of besieging Cracow. At the moment the world was still dazzled with German triumph in the West and along the Scheldt, a far more considerable triumph seemed at hand in the struggle which was now known as the Battle of the Vistula.

Once more, as before Paris, the German design was thwarted. The same strategic combination, too, ruined it. For the Russians, desperately concentrating all their available reserves, were able at the critical moment to rush fresh masses through Warsaw, in whose suburbs German shells were now falling, and strike the unprotected German left, as the garrison of Paris had assailed von Kluck on the Ourcq and threatened to envelop the whole German host in France. By October 20 the entire German Army was in retreat, flowing back in a marvellously succinct and orderly fashion, making such a retreat as Frederick the Great had taught the world to expect from his Prussians in the eighteenth century.

As they withdrew, the Germans destroyed railways and roads, quickly threw off Russian pursuit and reached their own frontier in perfect condition and with unshaken morale. Less admirable, but on the whole quite as successful, was the retreat of the Austro-German forces from before Ivangorod. They had suffered more severely, but before a decision in their fight with the Russians had been reached had been compelled to withdraw to conform to the retreat of the Germans to the north.

Far less fortunate were the Austrians who had en-

deavored to redeem Galicia. They had reconquered this province west of the San and relieved Przemyśl. But on November 5 one fraction of this army was badly defeated at Sandomir and driven in on Cracow. Its retirement compelled the retreat of the other Austrian forces which had just made good the line of the San and they came south hurriedly across the Carpathians. Przemyśl was again invested. The Russian armies once more swept to the crests of the Carpathians, this time began to sift over into the Hungarian Plain, while other corps passed Tarnow and the Dunajec, the western limits of the first invasion, and presently approached Wieliczka within sight of the forts of Cracow.

In the same time, the Russian armies in Poland followed the Germans west and by November 12 had crossed the Warta and actually approached the German frontiers of Posen and Silesia and sent scouting parties into these provinces. The troops in East Prussia also began to show new activity and press west toward Koenigsberg, occupying Gumbinnen. At no time since the war opened had Russian fortunes risen so high, at no time had Russian high command displayed such real skill. Retreating as it had in the unhappy Manchurian days, the Russian Army had not this time lost the power, the Russian high command, the will to strike back at the decisive moment.

The first German effort to save Austria had thus failed. Once more Galicia was in Russian hands,

this time all but a thin strip about Cracow, itself in danger. Once more Russian troops had proven themselves superior to Austrian. A new stroke was immediately necessary and the German situation East and West seemed worse than ever in the whole war, for the defeat at the Vistula and the rapid retreat coincided with the costly and complete check along the Yser. Again it was to Hindenburg that the German people turned, and they did not turn vainly.

CHAPTER XIII

HINDENBURG TRIES AGAIN

FOR Americans, the best parallel for Hindenburg's second effort to save Austria by invading Poland is found in the Battle of Chancellorsville. In that Civil War combat, it will be recalled that Lee was hopelessly outnumbered by Hooker. He won his great victory, despite this numerical inferiority, by sending Jackson from his own right flank straight across the whole front of the Union Army and throwing him against the right and rear of Hooker, crumbling up the Federal wing and ultimately compelling the retreat of the whole force, still greatly outnumbering him, across the Rappahannock. This ended the second great advance upon Richmond and opened the way to the second Confederate invasion of the North. In the same fashion Hindenburg was now to relieve the Russian pressure upon German frontiers and carry the war into Poland.

To understand the German combinations in this next and critical campaign, it is necessary to fix in mind the "strategic railways" which now began to attract the attention of the world and made possible the German stroke. Looking at the map of Russian Poland, it will be seen that it resembles a gigantic

wheel, half its circumference or tire made by Austrian and German territory from East Prussia to Galicia. Warsaw, the capital, is situated approximately in the centre and serves as the hub of this Polish wheel.

From Warsaw three main railways radiate, the spokes of our wheel. The first, going northwest, reaches the Prussian frontier near Mława, whence it continues to Dantzig. The second goes nearly due west, approaches the frontier at Kalisz and crosses it just beyond this town, whence it continues west to Frankfurt and Berlin. The third runs southwest and reaches the frontier of Silesia east of Czenstochowa, whence it continues to Breslau. For convenience these three railways may be called, respectively, the Dantzig, Frankfurt, and Breslau lines.

The only other railroad of immediate interest is that which leaves the Breslau line at Skierniewice, fifty miles west of Warsaw, runs north, crossing the Frankfurt line at Łowicz and reaches the frontier at Thorn. This will be described as the Thorn line.


Now, at the points where all these four lines touch the German frontier,—that is, at the rim of the Polish wheel,—they meet German railroads which follow the frontier all the way, and for the purposes of our figure may be likened to the tire of the Polish wheel. These are the strategic railroads, the most important of which extends all the way from the Dantzig to the Breslau railroad.

The military advantage of these railroads of the

Germans is this: Russian armies advancing to invade Silesia, Posen, or East Prussia must move along the lines which have been described as the spokes of the Polish wheel. Once it was well committed to such an invasion a Russian Army moving along the Breslau line could only communicate and send reinforcements to another army moving along the Dantzig line, by sending troops all the way back to Warsaw, that is, up one spoke and down another. But the Germans, possessing the strategic lines along the rim of the wheel, could send their troops directly from Czenstochowa to Mlawa. Again, while the Russians would have to employ the railroads needed to supply the armies in the field for such a concentration, the Germans would be able to use lines parallel, not perpendicular, to their front, and not required for supplying their troops actually in the field.

A glance at the map of German territories just inside the frontier from Poland will show that the region is a perfect network of railroads, thus affording many lines by which to move troops to the front as well as parallel to the front, while Russian Poland, save for the lines mentioned, is practically without railways, and these had been almost completely destroyed by the Germans in their October retreat from Warsaw.

Thanks to their railways, then, the Germans possessed at the outset of the campaign a tremendous advantage. Having much smaller armies to use, they were still able, by moving them rapidly from



BATTLES IN POLAND

BLACK LINES SHOW THREE SUCCESSIVE FRONTS ON WHICH RUSSIANS
DEFENDED WARSAW IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER

one point to another along the rim to maintain a superiority of numbers at the decisive point for a considerable period of time, while the Russians were endeavoring, with inferior communications, to meet a German attack. Here is the key to the struggle.

What Hindenburg did was just this. The main Russian Army had reached the Warta and at points was across it and moving on Kalisz, to which the bulk of his own troops had come back from Warsaw. Leaving a small containing force here, he put his masses on trains and moved them due north along the frontier on the "strategic railways" already indicated and detrained them south of Thorn on a front which extended from the Vistula to the Warta. Thence he moved them rapidly into Poland, following the south bank of the Vistula and astride the Thorn-Skierniewice railroad. The Austro-German Army, which had come back from Ivangorod and stood at Czenstochowa, was also reënforced and sent northeast astride the Breslau railroad in the direction of Lodz and on the other flank of the Russian Polish Army.

The Union Army at Chancellorsville had been attacked on but one flank, the Russian was now threatened on both; unless it could get back in time to escape the two armies now moving on its flanks it was bound to be enveloped, cut off from Warsaw and the Vistula, possibly captured, probably routed. Since the Germans coming from Thorn were nearer Warsaw than the Russians when the drive began and

could be moved more rapidly, it was inevitable that they should get between the Czar's forces and Warsaw. By the time the Russians had reached Lodz the Germans were swirling around their right flank.

Substantially this had happened to the Federal right at Chancellorsville. To add to the gravity of the Russian situation, the Czenstochowa Army was now beginning to press around its left. But once more the enormous resources of Russia in numbers saved her from disaster. Gathering up all the garrison and reserve troops in Warsaw and the nearby fortresses, the Russians pushed a new army out from Warsaw which took the Germans in the rear. Thus by a sudden turn of fortune the Germans, who had half surrounded the Russians at Lodz, found themselves caught between the Russian troops in Lodz, and those coming along the Warsaw railroad and operating south of Lowicz and Skierniewice.

A few days before, Berlin had claimed a decisive victory. Petrograd now began to talk of a German Sedan. But German military skill met the crisis, the gravest for Germany in the war. While the troops in the Russian net cut their way out to the north and west, new troops were hastily brought from Flanders and France to the danger point and covered the broken corps as they emerged from the Russian vise. Some of the most desperate and costly fighting of the war took place at this stage. But when it had terminated, Russians and Germans faced each other in a double line across Poland from

the Vistula to Galicia, and the campaign resolved itself into a deadlock. The Russians, straightening out their line, evacuated Lodz and stood just west of the Warsaw-Cracow railroad.

The German offensive had thus failed to relieve pressure upon their armies in East Prussia and Galicia, and had won no decisive victory, although Berlin announced the capture of more than 100,000 Russians and a decisive victory. So far the offensive had been a frightfully expensive and relatively unprofitable effort, for the conquest of Polish fields and cities was without military value. It was necessary to continue and to devise some new plan of campaign. This von Hindenburg did, but not until he had called still more troops from the West.

The second plan was really a development of the first. The Russian troops drawn from Warsaw to save the Russians at Lodz were not very numerous. When the lines straightened out they became the right wing and stretched from the Vistula to Lowicz north of Lodz. By massing his new troops against this right, von Hindenburg might hope by sheer weight of numbers to force it back upon Warsaw, through Warsaw, and give his Emperor the Polish capital for a Christmas present. His success or failure would depend upon whether the Russians could concentrate enough troops at the danger point, and Russian means of transportation were incomparably less than the German.

Accordingly the German drive along the south bank of the Vistula continued, pushed the Russians back, until on December 20 they stood at the Bzura River, about twenty miles from Warsaw, in the last defensive position west of the city. This river coming north enters the Vistula a little west of Socharew, which is on the Warsaw-Lodz railroad. In addition to the river the marshes in this region make the position strong for a defensive fight. Meanwhile, from all available points reinforcements were being poured through Warsaw to the battle line. By the opening of the fourth week in December the campaign in Poland had also become a deadlock and the second drive at Warsaw had for the present, at least, completely failed.

In his second attempt to reach Warsaw, Marshal von Hindenburg had succeeded once more in carrying the battle line away from the German frontier. The invasion of Silesia, which had seemed imminent a month before, was indefinitely postponed. German troops occupied a wide stretch of Russian territory in Western Poland, but Warsaw had not fallen and the Russian offensive against Austria had not been checked. At the moment when the deadlock on the Bzura became unmistakable, Austrian armies were facing fresh disasters on the road from the Carpathians to Przemyśl.

It had by this time become plain also that Russia had elected to draw back from the German frontier,

to surrender some thousands of square miles of Polish lands, and to risk Warsaw itself, in the belief that Austria was now in a desperate state and continued pounding might take her out of the war.

CHAPTER XIV

SERVIA CANNOT BE CONQUERED

ON December 1 the fall of Belgrade warned the world that the fate which had overtaken the Belgian nation was now overhanging the little State, which had been the prime cause of the whole terrible conflict. Of itself the fall of Belgrade was of little military importance, but it served to confirm the private reports that had filtered through that the Serbs were now sunk to a state of almost complete exhaustion.

Before the Balkan Wars Servia was a State about the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined and had a population of 3,000,000, that is, less than Massachusetts. Montenegro, its neighbor, also peopled by Serbs, then contained perhaps 250,000 people. At the close of the second Balkan War the new Servia had nearly doubled its area and had now a population of 4,500,000. But of the added population only a small portion were Serbs.

When Austria declared war in July it is doubtful if there were more than 3,500,000 Serbs in King Peter's kingdom; that is, approximately the population of the American colonies at the outset of the Revolution. Against them was "awfully arrayed"

the Austrian Empire with a population of at least 52,000,000.

Yet in the opening days of the conflict Servia was the first of the Allies to win a great victory. At the Jedar in the third week in August four Austrian Army corps were routed, sent home across the Drina. The splendid achievement of the Serbs against the Turk at Kumanova, against the Bulgar at the Bregalinitza was repeated against the Austrian oppressor.

In the weeks that followed, Servian and Montenegrin troops flowed over into Bosnia, approached Serajevo, the bombardment of Belgrade was interrupted by the capture of Semlin by the troops of King Peter. Along the Adriatic the artillery of the allied fleet awakened echoes under the Black Mountain and it seemed certain that, Cattaro taken, the Serbs would at last acquire their "window on the sea." All through southern Slavdom, too, there was evident the stirring of sympathy with the victors of the Jedar.

But, September come and gone, it was plain that Austrian plans had undergone a complete change, due, it was said, to German suggestion. Political, not military, considerations patently demanded that Servia should be beaten down. If Servia were crushed Bulgaria might be enlisted on the German side by the proffer of the Macedonian sanjaks taken from Turkey in the Balkan War, assigned to Bulgaria by the Bulgaro-Servian antebellum agreement

and lost by Bulgaria in the second war. Monastir, Ochrida, even Uskup might be turned over to Ferdinand as the price of Bulgarian support and the Bulgaria of San Stefano created at last.

Turkey having joined the Kaisers, if Bulgaria could be bought and Servia crushed, the road would lie open from Berlin to Constantinople, to Asia Minor. From the North Sea to the Golden Horn and the Persian Gulf the Kaiser and his allies would then dominate central Europe and Western Asia. Rumania, hesitating, eager to "redeem" Rumanian millions in Austria, would be kept in line, forced to remain neutral at the least, possibly later enlisted by the prospect of a *pourboire* in the shape of Bessarabia taken by Russia after the Russo-Turkish war and mourned always in Bucharest.

On the other hand, victorious Servian advances in Bosnia, certain to be attended by risings of the Bosnia Serbs, the ultimate loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the capture by the Serbs of the railway that leads from the Save to the Adriatic and touches the sea at the entrance of the Gulf of Cattaro, where the Allied fleet was already stationed, this would mean an ultimate invasion of Hungary, a thrust from the South toward Budapest, timed perhaps to synchronize with a Russian raid across the Carpathians.

Rumania and Bulgaria, too, seeing Servia entering into possession of Austrian lands, urged by Russian and British intrigue, might well decide to cast their lot with Servia's champions and take from the Aus-

trian Emperor and the Turkish Sultan in Transylvania and in Thrace those provinces which to their own minds were needed to complete their Fatherlands. The Balkan Confederacy which crushed Turkey might thus be revived as an outpost and soldier of the anti-German combine, of the Grand Alliance.

Thus it was that by October Servian invasion of Bosnia ceased. Little by little it became clear that Austria was collecting a huge army, stiffened, it was frequently reported, by German regiments, and beating down Servian resistance, crushing her way through the frontier districts on the Servian side of the Drina. Slowly, surely, with something of the manner of the glacier, this Austrian advance moved, not south from the Danube, but east from the Drina, until it reached the line of the Orient Railway, which goes south from Belgrade to Constantinople and Salonica.

Once this line was reached Belgrade was indefensible. Its garrison was compelled to retreat to escape capture, and as it fell back it opened the highway of conquest, the Morava Valley, along which the Osmanli Sultans advanced until their banners stood before the walls of Vienna. Down this valley, too, in later centuries, the Turk has slowly retired, until now his Slav enemies had in turn reached the Chatalja lines in their advance.

A French war correspondent who was in the Balkans during the second war has given the world a

graphic picture of the Battle of the Bregalnitzza, which decided the fate of Bulgaria and disclosed the true spirit of Servia to an astounded Austrian audience. The night before the battle began Servian officers dined with Bulgarians; no war had been declared; the armies facing each other were still friendly, fellow victors of recent Turkish battles.

But just before daylight the Bulgarian Army moved suddenly forward, captured or killed the Servian advance guards, swept on and for some hours, advanced until they occupied a ridge beyond the Bregalnitzza which dominated the whole surrounding country. The purpose had been to crush Servian military power by an unexpected attack and terrorize a beaten enemy. They had built in the world, most strongly among their neighbors, a legend of Bulgarian invincibility; they hoped to make Bulgaria the Prussia of the Balkans.

The first onset found the Servians unprepared. There followed some hours of confusion; but about noon the Bulgarians in their newly won position saw the Servian masses descending the hills to the attack. Neither the momentary advantage won by the sudden breach of truce nor the Bulgarian reputation for military prowess had cowed the Serbs.

What followed had remained obscure to the world interested in results, not details. In sum, before this Servian advance halted, the Bulgarian armies were fleeing in two widely separated masses toward the frontier, the victors of Kumanovo had conquered

those of Lule Burgas and Servia had won Monastir and Macedonia.

The same spirit which won the Bregalnitz again surprised Europe when one week after the fall of Belgrade the victorious Austrians were routed at Valievo. The world had been fearful lest it should see another tragedy such as that of Belgium. Instead it beheld a scene that belonged to other centuries than our own. The white haired Peter rode before his troops welcomed with cheers by his broken regiments who rallied, returned to the charge, prevailed, and the Austrian hosts were fleeing back from Belgrade, from Valievo, from Servia. The Serbs had escaped a second Kossovo.

Aside from romantic circumstances what had happened in Servia was plain. When Germany launched her threat at Warsaw in October and the whole Russian line was compelled to go back, a huge Austrian force, thus released, had been sent south to overwhelm the Serbs, who from the time of their victory at the Jedar in August had maintained the fighting in Bosnia territory. It was the hope and the expectation of the Austro-German commanders that the Serbs would be crushed before Russian offensive became dangerous.

This calculation failed. By mid-November Russian armies were back in western Galicia, were across the Carpathians in Hungary, were threatening new raids toward Budapest and the prompt capture of Cracow. At this same time the Servian Army,

beaten, driven, was far back in Servian territory, and Belgrade seemed about to fall, did fall shortly. But the Servian spirit was unconquered, the army shaken but defiant.

With its work still undone, it was then necessary to weaken the Austrian army materially. Three Austro-Hungarian army corps out of seven were sent north to Hungary, toward Galicia by the Dukla Pass. But the four that were left were incapable of holding back the Servian Army, and having been routed were now in headlong flight. Belgrade, much bombarded, after a brief Austrian occupation was Serb once more.

There was poetic justice in King Peter's victory. All the terrible conflict had broken out at the signal of Austria, and the signal was the attack upon little Servia. Now, after five months Servia stood erect, there were new victories on her banners, new glories in her history, and her wonderful store of song and legend would be enriched by new and shining pages. But what stirred, what appealed, was the fact that another little people had fought for its life and had not failed, had dared everything and won, insured the future of a race which was great five centuries ago, and all through the night of Turkish dominion had kept a corner of light and liberty on the summits of the Black Mountains.

CHAPTER XV.

AUSTRIAN FORTUNES CONTINUE TO DECLINE

THE first Austrian offensive against Servia had collapsed at the Jedar on August 23. In the following two weeks the great disasters in Galicia and Russian Poland, the defeats of Lemberg, Rawaruska and Tomazov had shaken the whole military fabric of the Hapsburg Empire and sent the Austrian armies in flight to the Cracow and the Carpathians. From imminent ruin the Dual Monarchy was rescued by the first German invasion of Poland.

After this invasion had failed the Austrian Army which had followed the Russians east from Cracow was routed at Sandomir and lost over 50,000 in prisoners alone. A second army, which had relieved Przemyśl and reoccupied Jaroslav, was also beaten and compelled to retreat to the Carpathian passes, to retire beyond the Dukla Gap and following it the Cossacks for the first time entered the Hungarian Plain and spread ruin in the upper waters of the Theiss River. To check this invasion, it was necessary to recall the troops, who were at the point of destroying Servian military power, and their withdrawal opened the way for the great Servian triumph about Valievo, which cost the Austrians another

50,000 men, vast supplies, forced the surrender of Belgrade and roused Francis Joseph and his countrymen to an outburst of wrath, which no Russian victory had evoked.

When Hindenburg attempted his second invasion of Poland, designed largely to relieve the Russian pressure upon Austria and give this empire time to reorganize, a new effort was made by the Austrians themselves to reconquer their lost Galician province, relieve Cracow, now almost surrounded, break the iron ring, which had again closed around Przemyśl. Three separate armies were employed in this new effort, one striking east into Poland from Cracow and on the flank of the German Army, which had moved from Czenstochowa against the Russians in Lodz and shared in the Russian victory there, pushed the Russians north and east of the city of Cracow, until they halted behind the Nida, fifty miles east of Cracow. On either side of the Nida, Russians and Austrians now faced each other in a deadlock precisely similar to that at the Bzura.

At the same time a second army pushed east from Cracow toward Tarnow and the upper reaches of the Dunajec River, while a third, strengthened by the troops withdrawn from Servia, moved north through the Carpathians. The objective of both these armies was the Russian right flank, which rested on the foothills of the Carpathians. At the same time the garrison of Przemyśl warned of the approach of

a relieving force, began a series of sorties in the Russian rear.

Unhappily for the Austrians these converging movements were badly timed. In consequence, the Russians retreated behind the Dunajec, in the face of the force coming from Cracow and there halted it, while they sent their main force against the Austrians coming up from Hungary and totally defeated them on the Galician side of the Carpathians along the southern trunk railway, which follows the foothills of the mountains about thirty miles south of the main Cracow-Lemberg line. At the same time the Przemyśl sorties were repulsed with little difficulty.

Thus, at the moment when the German advance through Poland had been halted at the Bzura, the Austrian at the Nida, and across the whole of Poland between the Upper and Lower Vistula two parallel lines of trenches faced each other, Russian armies were again crossing the Carpathians into Hungary, were driving west toward Cracow and the relief of Przemyśl had again been abandoned. Austrian fortunes were patently at a lower ebb than ever before. To make the case more serious, a fresh Russian Army was sweeping through Bukovina, Czernowitz had fallen, the road to Transylvania, through the Borgo Pass, seemed open to Russian advance.

This Russian army returning to the crownland of Bukovina, from which it had been driven some weeks earlier, furnished a new incentive to the Rumanians

to join the enemies of Austria and reclaim lost provinces. Petrograd renewed its offers and efforts at Bucharest. London and Paris were filled with rumors of speedy Rumanian intervention. Once more Europe buzzed with reports of an immediate downfall of the Dual Empire.

This time it was Hungary that appealed to the Kaiser. Count Tiza went to Berlin and saw the German Emperor. Then Berchtold, the Common Minister of State for the Dual Empire, resigned and was succeeded by Baron Burian, an Hungarian. In this change was seen the deliberate effort of Austrian and German statesmen to meet the Hungarian discontent. Here also was a measure of confirmation of the reports that the Hungarians had become dissatisfied with the long series of disasters that had overtaken their troops, that they viewed with grave apprehension the patent possibility of an invasion from three sides, from Servia, from Rumania and from Galicia, whence Cossack cavalry were already flowing into the valleys of the Ung and the Latorze.

There was no mistaking the request Hungary had made of Germany, if indeed request were not too mild a word. Austrian resources having now proven insufficient, the Magyars asked that German troops be sent to the Carpathians and to Transylvania, that the Kaiser, in addition to all the heavy tasks now laid upon him, should assume the responsibility of holding the eastern and southern gates of Hungary, of overawing Rumania, conceivably of

undertaking a new "punitive" expedition into Servia.

Without such help it was now fair to believe, and the neutral world did believe, that Austria-Hungary might succumb to the series of blows that had fallen upon it, make a separate peace — and there were rumors that there had been *pourparlers*, at Petrograd — might quit the struggle, which had been so full of disaster, so devoid of glory and advantage for Francis Joseph and his subjects. Twice German operations in Poland had failed to divert Russia from her Austrian campaign, it was now necessary for Germany to defend her ally, not in Poland, but in the Carpathians.

It was at this time, too, that the neutral and Allied press were filled with rumors of riots in Prague, in Vienna, of disorders in Agram, of processions clamoring for peace in Budapest itself. However exaggerated these reports were, at least there was no mistaking the fact that Austrian fortunes were still declining, had reached a perilously low ebb and the whole campaign in the East had resolved itself into a duel between Czar and Kaiser.

CHAPTER XVI

TURK'S PROGRESS

ON November 17 the Holy War was proclaimed at Constantinople with all the ceremonies which attend this solemn and famous appeal to the followers of the Prophet throughout the world. Only two years before this same proclamation had momentarily stirred the apprehension of the great nations of the globe. A generation earlier it would have troubled the rulers of three continents. From the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Morocco to Mindanao, there would have been a considerable repercussion. India, the Malay Peninsula, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, the Sudan, would have borne testimony in violence to the vitality of the Prophet's creed.

If now the Jihad carried less instant menace, if, in fact, it fell dead from the very moment of the proclamation, the explanation was to be found in the Young Turkish Revolution. Futile as was this amazing outbreak in the forwarding of its purpose to bring the West to the Near East, to establish the gospel of constitutional government and religious tolerance in the Ottoman Empire, it did shatter the

most potent of all the remaining forces for survival in the Turkish Empire, the fanaticism and religious solidarity of the army.

For, in its prosperous hour the Committee of Union and Progress, on the march from Salonica to Stamboul, enlisted Jew and Gentile, Moslem and Christian, Albanian and Bulgar, Turk and Greek. All the inextricable tangle of Macedonian peoples was united in the advancing host, fraternizing on the eve of what was to be the new dawn in the Ottoman Empire. At last Christians were admitted to the ranks and stood shoulder to shoulder with the Anatolian levies of the Sultan.

Thus in a single hour there was destroyed the whole policy of Abdul Hamid, the policy which he had managed to preserve amidst all the storm and stress of European intrigue and Balkan disorder, the tradition of Abdul's great predecessors, who at the head of hosts bearing the green banner and fortified by the magnificent promises of the Koran had penetrated to the walls of Vienna and conquered all of southeastern Europe.

The Young Turks, on the contrary, had put away fanaticism. Their long exile had been spent in Paris, their generals had been trained in Berlin. The cynicism of the West had destroyed their faith, their own heritage of race had prevented their absorbing anything but the thin veneer of the civilization they now championed.

The effect of "liberal" ideas upon the Turkish

Army was shown at Lule Burgas and Kumanovo. No longer were the armies of the Sultan driven forward to battle by the tremendous impulse of faith, which had characterized their earlier conquests. No longer did the calm resignation of their religion sustain them in defeat, hold them to their trenches and to their work as in the less happy days of Plevna. On the contrary, while the Christian contingents deserted to the enemy on the battle-field, the Moslem fraction gave way to panic and to indiscipline and well nigh destroyed the great reputation of their army, which two centuries of disaster had hitherto left unshaken.

After Lule Burgas the Jihad was proclaimed. But how could it influence soldiers still commanded by German officers, how could it affect people who had already perceived the invasion of the West in the ideas of those who still controlled the destinies of their nation and their race?

Between 1912 and 1914 the situation had only worsened. Now the Jihad was proclaimed not against all races and tribes outside of Islam, not against the infidels, who were the foes proclaimed by the Prophet. On the contrary, Germans and Austrians were expressly excluded from the proclamation, as allies; Italy, as a neutral. In fact, when the Turkish troops charged to the old and stirring cry of "Allah-il-Allah," the orders would be given by a Prussian officer. The "sword of the Prophet" had been exchanged for the artillery of Krupp.

In Turkey the call of the preachers of the Holy War might still have influence. But was it conceivable that the Moslems of India would rise to the word of a Turkish "Commander of the Faithful," rejected as a spiritual primate by most of them, to free the Mohammedan world from the tyranny, the intolerable and humiliating yoke of the Christian, when for them the immediate consequence might be merely to exchange a British for a Prussian master?

The Arabs from Suez to Tlemcen might stir at a call to free themselves from the British, Italian, or French masters, to restore the ancient glories of the Caliphate, to bring back to Kairuan the splendor and the spirit long fled. But why should they respond to a call, which was in fact merely the voice of the Sultan reëchoing the notes of the Prussian bugle, the Austrian trumpet?

Taken at its maximum, there was no mistaking the peril for France, for Britain, for Russia, with their millions of Moslem subjects, of a Holy War preached as all similar wars had been preached for centuries. Three hundred millions of Mohammedans in India, in the Philippines — for a corner of the possessions of the North American Republic is covered by the mantle of the Prophet — in Egypt, the very keystone of the British Empire, in all the provinces of French Africa, far down in the Great Desert, where year by year Mohammed is still sweeping before him the idols of the black races and repulsing the missionaries of Christ, might by their response im-

peril all that colonial governors and explorers had achieved in years.

But to have force, this Jihad must strike at the Americans in Jolo, the Italians in Lybia, the Austrians in Bosnia; indeed, at the very Austrian and German officers who were the driving force of Turkish armies, the commanders and masters of the descendant of the Sultans, who reigned in empty state on the Golden Horn.

And just here the Jihad broke down, the "Holy War Limited" lost its power. The failure was prompt and complete. In India there was heard the voice of the head of the Mohammedans of that great empire admonishing his people to remain faithful to their British sovereign, to turn their backs upon a Sultan sold to a Hohenzollern. In Egypt an economically contented population waited passively against the time when the Turk might pass Suez, until that time giving no sign of readiness to heed the voice of Constantinople. Algeria and Tunis multiplied their contingents of Arab and Kabyle troops in northern France. In sum, the Holy War had failed.

A month later, on December 17, there came an answer to the proclamation of Constantinople, uttered in Cairo. Here there was proclaimed a British protectorate over Egypt, the Turcophile Khedive, a fugitive in Constantinople was deposed, a friend of England placed on his throne. On the political side this step deprived the Sultan of the shadowy sover-

eighty over some 12,000,000 people and definitively terminated the rule of the Osmanli in Africa. Algeria in 1830, Tunis in 1881, Tripoli in 1911, and now Egypt in 1914, these were the milestones in Turkish ruin in North Africa; Morocco, the last free state of Islam in North Africa, had been divided between France and Spain in 1911.

But it was the religious rather than the political aspect of the Egyptian annexation which promised more permanent interest. Whatever the outcome of the war in Europe, the reorganization of the Mohammedan world with the elimination of the Sultan from his position of primacy now seemed inevitable. Constantinople seemed certain to return to the empire of Christ; was it not probable that Cairo would resume its ancient glory as the home of the Caliph? For even the most ardent champion of the German cause could find little in the situation in December, less in that of succeeding months, on which to base any hope that the Osmanli could reassert their control in the valley of the Nile.

Not only this, but growing Turkish disaster promptly forecast a time when the possession of the sacred places of Islam might be wrested from the Osmanli. For many centuries the French interests in Syria had been predominant. From the days of the Crusades French tradition had lingered in the Holy Land. The population of Syria had long been restless, anxious to acquire, if not freedom, at the least autonomy. Hence the world now began

to prophesy a partition of the Turk's empire south of his Anatolian stronghold, to expect a Syria, independent or a French protectorate, which would intervene between the Turk and the home of the Prophet.

Once the war was over, then, it seemed certain that the Turkish Empire would sink to the level of a minor State, eccentric to the Islamic world, separated from Mecca; that the prestige and power of the Sultan gone, he would lose his ascendancy in the Mohammedan world. His title to the Caliphate rests upon a shadowy claim of transfer in the sixteenth century; under Ottoman control the glory of the Caliphate has steadily declined. Arab contempt for the Turk has been at all times supreme.

A British Army was already in the valley of the Euphrates, coming north; a Russian Army, moving south. Bagdad, Damascus, the province of Syria, even Mecca and Medina, seemed almost certain to be lost, as military operations from Suez, Busra and Kars proceeded. No Christian Army would venture to assail the holy places of Islam, but the smallest eastward march of British armies, gathering at Suez, would cut the Mecca railroad, in fact the life line of the Osmanli in the Mohammedan world, and leave it to the Arabs of the Yemen to reconquer Mecca and Medina.

It was idle to attempt at this time to forecast the changes that were now bound to come in the Mohammedan world. Certainly there was not the

slightest reason to suppose that the religion of the Prophet would decline. Nowhere in States long held by Christian Powers had there been the slightest promise of such a change. What seemed inevitable was that, after four centuries and a half, the supremacy of the Turk in Islam was soon to come to an end. Whether he would be replaced by an Arab, whether Cairo or Mecca would supersede Stamboul as the political capital of Islam, this was wholly problematical.

But at a time when the attention of the world was fixed upon the battle-fields of Europe, it was now necessary to note that far removed from these struggles there was beginning one of the most momentous revolutions in world history, affecting the condition of more than 300,000,000 who still recognized Allah as the "One God and Mohammed as His Prophet." Beside this, changes in the map and dynasties of Europe might well prove insignificant in human history.

Politically Islam had long been on the decline. It had shared the misfortunes of the Turk in three continents. But on the religious side it had continued its conquests, retained the allegiance of its followers. It had continued to send its missionaries into the Dark Continent where they had steadily vanquished those of the Christian faiths.

The possibility of a Mohammedan reformation had long been foreseen, discussed, expected by those familiar with the Near East. But the first step had

everywhere been recognized to be the elimination of the Turk. What the Young Turkish Revolution had begun in 1908, it was now clear that the Great War of 1914 was continuing, hastening.

On January 4 came the third phase in the Turk's progress toward ruin. On that date three Turkish corps were overwhelmed and well-nigh destroyed by the Russian armies in the Caucasus. Not alone Turkish military strength but German supremacy at the Golden Horn were shaken by this tremendous disaster. The fact was that these three corps had been sacrificed to German not Turkish necessity. German strategy had again brought Turkish ruin.

An offensive of any serious dimensions by Russia in the Caucasus was next to impossible while her own territories were invaded in Poland and her campaign against Austria was reaching a climax. For Turkey there was left time to equip its army, bring up its masses, fortify its Asiatic frontiers. A move against Egypt was both a simpler military operation and, if it had any success, likely to have useful effect at home and in the whole Islamic world.

On the other hand, German and Austrian interests were to be served only by such an attack upon Russia as might compel her to deflect corps from Poland and Galicia to her more imperilled provinces. Such a deflection would give Austria a breathing spell, temporarily restore the balance in the East, and gain time for the Austro-German armies.

Accordingly the Turks, directed by Germans, were

driven into the difficult and dangerous region of the Caucasus, compelled to campaign in midwinter, obliged to fight in advance of complete preparation. Now they had met complete disaster, which could not fail to react upon German influence at Constantinople, for it was by no unanimous, patriotic national impulse that the Osmanli entered their third war in four years. In point of fact the war was precipitated by the German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau*, flying the Turkish flag and keeping their German crews, which went into the Black Sea, bombarded Russian ports and damaged Russian shipping. The sending of the ships was unknown to the Turkish cabinet, and in fact Turkey was at war with the Triple Entente by an act of aggression on her part before her government was aware of it.

The main figure in the Turkish cabal which gave the nation to Germany was Enver Pasha. Through his influence the Turkish Army was turned over to the Germans, the Turkish fleet became in truth a German fleet, and under its guns Constantinople was helpless to resist the decision of Enver to cast his country's lot with the Kaiser.

But from the outset the war had been unpopular, had aroused a little applause solely because there was a local belief that Egypt would be regained, that the Greek islands, Salonica, the "lost provinces" of Europe might be reconquered. As against this there must be weighed the immediate growth of discontent in the army as German methods and discipline re-

placed the easy-going Turkish ways and the chief army of Islam became a weapon of a Christian State, administered by Christians.

Go back to the first Balkan War, and it will be recalled that the army which was routed at Lule Burgas was a German-trained force. The whole world accepted the Turkish disaster of that war as a blow to German military prestige. In the army itself there was endless discontent, grumbling; in the world at large there was recognition of the failure of the Germans.

Yet despite all this misfortune, German influence again achieved supremacy in Constantinople. Thanks to Enver, the constant friend of Germany. The Turkish Government again turned to Berlin for its officers, and Liman von Sanders came to the Bosphorus to take up the work which von der Goltz had undertaken and failed at. All through these months, however, there had been and there remained a strong anti-German sentiment in Turkey. England had some friends, France many, in the ranks of Turkish statesmen.

Accordingly the great defeat which had now overtaken Turkish arms had an almost incalculable effect in Constantinople. Three of the best army corps had been well nigh destroyed, not in restoring Turkish provinces, not in serving Turkish ends, but in a frantic and fatal effort to weaken Russian attacks upon Germany and Austria by invading Russian provinces in Asia Minor.

Since Germany still controlled the Turkish fleet and Constantinople was at the mercy of its guns, it was premature to predict the downfall of Enver. A refusal of some of the armies to obey their German officers, a military rising within the army in Asia Minor and in Syria, was on the other hand wholly conceivable, although it did not immediately follow. But France, Russia, and England had their agents at work henceforth to pull down Enver's government.

Meantime the last possible temptation to Bulgaria to join Turkey vanished. Not impossibly she might presently move, but if she did it would be to retake Adrianople, lost when she was attacked by Rumania, Servia and Greece. Not impossibly Turkish necessities in Asia Minor might presently make the conquest as easy as the Turks had found it two years before, but it was not until the Allied fleet attacked the Dardanelles in February that the Near Eastern situation became acute.

In Rumania and Greece the effect of Turkish disaster was not different, although dynastic influences still successfully combatted national aspirations. But henceforth in Italy, in Bulgaria, in Greece, in Rumania, the cause of the Allies mounted, if armies were not sent against the enemies of the Grand Alliance, if the enemies of the two Kaisers were still unsuccessful in enlisting new nations, the sole hope for German influence in Athens, in Rome, in Bucharest, in Sofia, was that intervention might be postponed, if not prevented.

Already the Holy War had failed, the expedition against Egypt was destined presently to meet with a decisive repulse, the invasion of Persia had ended in retreat. German influence on the Golden Horn remained paramount, thanks to German warships and German commanders on Turkish ships, but Turkey day by day marched toward the gravest crisis in her long history of afflictions. European intrigue had once more caught the Osmanli in its toils. He had become the soldier of the Kaiser and seemed destined to precede Austria as the victim of the Great War.

CHAPTER XVII

GIOLITTI'S STATEMENT

IN early December the Italian parliament reassembled amidst the noisy demands of many Italian patriots that there should be prompt action by the Government looking toward a declaration of war upon Austria and the "redemption" of Italian-speaking provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But more immediately interesting than the clamor which for many weeks was to fall on deaf official ears, was the statement of Ex-Premier Giolitti, explaining the diplomatic situation in recent years and disclosing the fact, long suspected, that Austrian attack upon Servia had been prepared far in advance of July, 1914.

For four months now the world had been busily engaged in discussing "scraps of paper," militarism and navyism, Bernhardt and William II, but here at last, from the public utterance of a responsible Italian statesman, necessarily informed of the inner history of the relations between the members of the Triple Alliance, it was unmistakable that the Great War was not an accident, a catastrophe suddenly precipitated by unforeseen circumstances, that it did not represent

a bankruptcy of diplomacy, but rather the fruition of plans long laid.

In 1913, in August, 1913, that is just after the victories of Servia and Greece over Bulgaria, Austria informed her allies, Italy and Germany, of her purpose to attack Servia. The delay between August, 1913, and July, 1914, was explicable as due to the situation in which Austrian armies were found, to the attitude of Germany, to the influence of Italian and other advisers. Whatever the cause for the delay, the assassination of the Archduke removed the last restraint. What she had resolved to do in 1913, Austria did in 1914.

It is easy to characterize this Austrian decision as a wanton resolve, as a piece of international violence indefensible on any ground. Yet it remains to examine the situation in which Austria found herself and the alternative left her when at last the Slav neighbor on her southern marches emerged from two wars victorious and in Belgrade the disintegration of Austria was the open design of all patriotic Serbs.

For a century Austria and Russia had been rivals in the Balkans. Carlyle in his life of Frederick the Great finds such justification as he can for his hero in the matter of the partition of Poland by pointing to the fact that save for this arrangement Austria and Russia would have fought over Turkish provinces.

At the Congress of Berlin, Austria and Great Britain united to prevent the creation of the Greater Bulgaria provided in the Treaty of San Stefano. At

that time and thereafter for many years Serbia was the soldier of the Austrian Emperor in the Balkans, Belgrade purposes were made in Vienna.

Thus for twenty years Austria and Russia intrigued against each other in the Balkans, but neither was able to obtain a decisive advantage over the other. This state of balance was broken in 1903 when the King of Serbia, in fact the tool of Austria, was assassinated. His successor, King Peter, represented the Nationalist element, whose purpose it was to create a strong Serbia, deriving her inspiration from St. Petersburg, not Vienna.

Serbia having passed over to the enemy, Austria had now to consider the possibility of a pan-Serb movement in her border provinces, in Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia, that might follow the course of the Italian *risorgimento* of the last century, itself the natural consequence of the territorial gain made by Sardinia at the Congress of Berlin.

To meet the situation Austria began a campaign of repression at home, and abroad in the Balkans she supported Turkey. Against Serbia she directed a tariff war which deprived the little State of all market for its agricultural products and temporarily ruined the country.

When the Young Turks seized control of the Ottoman Empire and threatened to reoccupy Bosnia, held but not owned by Austria, Vienna replied by the annexation of Bosnia. Against this Russia protested. Serbia appealed, but backed by Germany, Austria's

will prevailed and 2,000,000 Slavs, Serb by race, were annexed.

To this stroke Russia replied by the diplomatic campaign which resulted in the creation of the Balkan Alliance, the war against Turkey and the victories of Kumanovo and Lule Burgas, which crushed Ottoman power in Europe. Austria in her turn replied by proclaiming Albanian independence, by refusing to permit Serbia to gain a foothold on the Adriatic and by encouraging Bulgaria to attack Serbia, thus precipitating the second Balkan War.

But when, with the assistance of Rumania, Greece and Serbia crushed Bulgaria, deprived her of her Macedonian and Thracian conquests, Austrian diplomacy was bankrupt. Despite all her efforts Austria had seen created on her southern frontier a Servian State, wholly Russian in sympathy, determined to get Bosnia, Croatia, Slavonia, to create a Greater Serbia on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

After the Treaty of Bucharest there was left to Austria no choice but war or the inevitable disintegration which centrifugal influences on all her frontiers insured. Not alone the Serbs and Croats, but the Italians of Trieste and the Trentino, the Rumanians of Bukovina and Transylvania, the Ruthenians of Galicia, were now looking forward to the day when the overthrow of Austria would permit them to enter the rank of their brethren in Italy, in Rumania, in Russia.

It was possible, if Austria could crush Serbia,

eliminate for a generation at least this soldier of Russia on the Danube, she could repair her own shaken structure. It was inevitable, if Servia remained to grow stronger, now increased in territory, population and prestige, that in the end Austria would again be attacked as she was in Italy, this time with the Russian Czar playing the rôle of Napoleon III.

Russia, on the contrary, having created Servia, supported her in all her campaigns, insured her in her conquests, would probably support Servia in such a war as Austria planned. This was the risk. On the other hand, in 1908-9, in the Bosnian time, Russia had yielded to German menace. It was impossible for Vienna to believe that London and Paris would support Russia on the Servian question.

However great the peril, it was plain now that as early as August, 1913, Austria had determined to risk all by attacking Servia. Giolitti's statement merely served to confirm all previous evidence which indicated that the Great War was the inevitable consequence of the First and Second Balkan Wars — it was a struggle of Austria for existence.

There never was any possibility of peace in Europe after the Treaty of Bucharest unless Russia consented to surrender her position as the protector of Servia. For Austria to permit Russia to continue in the rôle was to consent to her own ruin. Apparently Austria wavered in 1913, but after the Sarajevo crime could hesitate no longer.

That Germany knew of Austria's resolution had

always been plain; that she consented to it was equally certain. But her alternative was to see Russia dominant in the Balkans; Austria, her one sure ally, slowly or swiftly destroyed by internal racial rivalries stimulated by Russian intrigue and design. For Germany, too, there was little real choice.

Go back to all the White, Yellow and other colored papers, and it will be seen that the whole question of world peace turned upon whether Russia would resign the rôle of protector of Servia or not. If she declined to resign a war was inevitable, and she did decline. What resulted was a war for the preservation of Austria.

But what could now be said of German diplomacy, which, advised as early as April, 1913, of Austrian purpose, was unable with a whole year of leeway to prevent the coalition of all the Great Powers save Italy against her ally when the inevitable blow was struck?

CHAPTER XVIII

PRINCE VON BÜLOW'S MISSION

ALMOST coincident with the announcement of Giolitti a second turn in Italian affairs attracted the attention of the world. Sent by the German Emperor himself, Prince Bernhard von Bülow, former Chancellor of the Empire, arrived in Rome to undertake the difficult and almost desperate mission of holding Italy neutral, if in fact, it should prove impossible by such promises and bribes as he might offer to bring her back to the camp of the two Kaisers.

Prince von Bülow's labors stretched over many months, gradually changing from an effort to win Italy to a determined effort to keep her neutral. All through the long winter months the diplomatic struggle at Rome continued, taking a turn for the worse, viewed from the German standpoint, as spring approached and Anglo-French battleships began their bombardment of the forts of the Dardanelles.

In the initial stages what was most interesting was the attempt of the German diplomat to turn Italy west rather than east, to persuade her to give over her dream of acquiring Austrian provinces, of taking Trieste and the Trentino and concentrate her efforts on regaining old Italian territory now French: Nice,

Savoy, Corsica. Thus, on December 2, Rome announced that Prince von Bülow had actually pledged German support for such a programme and in addition had thrown Tunis and Algeria into the bargain for good measure. Italian statesmen had then to make a decision certain to be momentous in all future Mediterranean history. A generation before Bismarck had made France and Italy rivals and playing on the Tunisian string had erected the Triple Alliance, now a successor of the Iron Chancellor sought to use the same device.

When at last Italy had earned her unity, achieved her geographical integrity in Europe, it was natural, it was inevitable that Italian statesmen and scholars should look across the narrow seas to that coast which was once Rome's most fruitful colony, to that city and state which, while Carthage lived, had ruled the Mediterranean.

Algeria was already French. Half a century of labor by the soldiers and the colonists had laid the foundation of the greatest of all French colonies, still struggling then, now become prosperous, the seat of splendid cities, the centre of that New France which extends from the Mediterranean to the Congo. Even before 1880 it was apparent that France had inherited the title of Rome to all of the African provinces from Bona to the Muluya.

But there remained Tunis, with the great naval base of Bizerta, with the fertile lands which had once been the granary of Rome, strewn with the most won-

derful Roman ruins outside of Rome. To Tunis, too, Italian emigrants were going by the thousands, Tunis city had its Italian quarter, its Italian banks and press. In the decade between 1870 and 1880 Tunis was in fact an Italian colony in all but title.

All this promise of a "Greater Italy," a "restored Rome," was wrecked when at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck approved of the French plan to join Tunis to Algeria and Waddington returned from the German capital "with empty hands but with Tunis in my pocket." England, newly possessed of Cyprus, also assented, and in 1881, after a brief invasion the Treaty of Bardo brought Tunis definitively within the French sphere.

What Bismarck had expected happened. All Italy was moved to wrath by the sudden frustrating of her plans. Hatred of France replaced the affection which had come with French service at Magenta and Solferino. Italy promptly turned away from France, in due course of time entered the Triple Alliance, and for twenty years France and Italy fought tariff wars and newspaper wars and Germany possessed on the southeastern frontier of France an ally whose army paralyzed French military effort along the Vosges.

After thirty-three years, however, it was now possible to see how much France had made of her acquisition of 1881. Tunis was a model colony. Railroads and highways connected all the important cities. From the frontier of Tripoli to the Algerian line new

industrial and agricultural developments were visible. The olive groves so famous in antiquity had begun to reappear in lands long regarded as forever sterile. Tunis had become a European town, a rival of Algiers, with splendid modern buildings and parks. Sfax and Sousse had harbors and docks. Bizerta now rivalled Toulon and commanded the route from Malta to Gibraltar.

More than this, Tunis had received a French stamp. Italians still outnumbered the French two to one, but the proportion was annually lessening. French schools, a French press, were steadily exercising their influence. In another generation it was plain to perceive that Tunis would follow the example of Algeria and become not quite French, but that French-African thing which all travellers in Algeria have recognized as a more energetic, progressive race than the Latin north of the Mediterranean. French possession of Morocco, if it could be maintained, insured a great New France from the Syrtes to the Pillars of Hercules, insured that France could remain a great power and a world force, despite the slackening of her birth rate and the state of balance in her European condition.

This, then, was the critical moment for French Africa. Italy was the only conceivable rival who could supplant France in North Africa, and to North Africa the most glorious traditions beckoned the Italians. Twenty years ago such an opportunity would have aroused the whole Italian nation. The

invitation of the Kaiser to reclaim Tunis, to regain in Europe, Nice and Savoy, the birthplace of Garibaldi, and the cradle of the ruling house, would have been irresistible.

But twenty years had changed the direction and temper of Italian ambition. In that time Italy had slowly moved away from the Triple Alliance and toward the Mediterranean Powers, toward England and France. The conquest of Tripoli, to be sure, gave her a foothold in Africa, but it gave her also new responsibilities and perils. At this very moment Arab rebels were in the fields, her garrisons demanded reënforcements.

To join Austrian and German forces might conceivably enable this Triple Alliance to defeat Anglo-French fleets in the Mediterranean. But if it did not, then Tripoli would be lost, Italian cities and coasts exposed to the storm of naval bombardment. Sicily and Sardinia would be isolated, Italian commerce destroyed, Italian credit ruined.

The real change in Italian ambition had come with the steady growth of apprehension as to the eastern situation, as to the future in the *Ægean* and the Adriatic. Not even the exasperation of the moment at France over Tunis had availed permanently to obliterate the longing to see the Italians of Austria "redeemed" the Trentino, Trieste and Dalmatia reunited to the Italian peninsula.

More than this, Italy had perceived that the advance of Austria along the Adriatic coast toward Al-

bania, toward Valona and the similar descent through Servia to Salonica alike imperilled immediate Italian safety on the Adriatic and ultimate Italian ambition in the Near East, in Asia Minor. In sum, having to choose between the rôle of Rome and of Venice, the hatred and distrust of Austria had prevailed, and long before the Great War opened it was plain that Italians had set their face toward the Near East and abandoned the dream of replacing France on the shores of Africa Minor.

It was then safe to forecast that the latest bid of the Kaiser would be rejected. Great Britain, France, and Russia would doubtless have to concede to Italy the right to hold Valona, to exercise dominant rights in Albania, to retain Rhodes and the Dodecanese in the *Ægean*, to recognize her rever-sionary interests in most of Dalmatia, to honor her claim to the Trentino and Trieste; but this price would not be excessive. No vital interest of any foe of Germany would be compromised by such concessions.

As a consequence of von Bülow's failure, French supremacy in North Africa seemed assured. For the critical years before the French stamp should be irrevocably set upon Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, French occupation would be undisturbed. Already there were a million Europeans in these lands, two-thirds of them French citizens. Another generation would unquestionably see the final triumph of

French influence and culture in a land already restored to European influence and commerce.

For this the whole world might well be glad. A generation ago it was customary to sneer at French colonial methods, to forecast a French failure in Africa as the sequel of failures in Asia and America. But that time has passed. Algiers ranks with the finest of British colonial capitals in prosperity and surpasses all in the charm which the French are able to impart to their cities at home and abroad.

Three quarters of a century ago a great Frenchman forecast that the future of France would be in Africa. The twentieth century had done much to confirm the prophecy. All the splendid promise would have been annulled if Italy had listened to German promises and endeavored to create a new Alsace-Lorraine on the Mediterranean. If the temptation had been great, the wisdom of Italian rejection was unmistakable and the profit for the whole world enduring.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

JUST before Christmas the French Government printed the most interesting of all the official records of diplomatic activities in the last weeks of July. The great, the unique service of this French Yellow Book was that it disclosed diplomacy actively and competently at work, at work at the precise task diplomacy is supposed to deal with, and not at the task of preparing a case to satisfy the moral sense of neutral mankind or to justify the actions of a nation which distrusts its own witnesses before the "court of civilization."

Read the British White Paper, and from start almost to finish it is plain that the ministry of Great Britain, the whole diplomatic machinery, was devoted to amending the verities and improving the morals of Europe, to avoiding ineluctable war, not to preparing the British nation for what was inevitable from the first moment of the Servian crisis.

Shaw is wholly right when he extols the clairvoyance of Sazonoff, who from first to last, while giving every proof of patience and moderation, did not conceal his conviction that only war could come. Shaw is wrong when he ascribes this virtue to

Sazonoff alone. Jules Cambon at Berlin was at all times quite clear in his own mind as to what was to come, was in fact clear a year ago, when he sent to his government that remarkable document which is the first chapter in the Yellow Book.

In 1913 the French Ambassador at Berlin perceived certain things. He discovered a state of mind in German officialdom and out of it. He saw that this state of mind could mean but one thing and he told his government so. His observations were confirmed by others in the service of the French government. Their reports are now a part of the public record of the Yellow Book.

French diplomacy as early as 1913, then, observed certain signs. These signs meant war between France and Germany. Russian diplomacy made similar discoveries. This latter fact is unmistakable in all that Sazonoff said after the Servian crisis began.

Go through the whole collection of official documents the French now submitted, and the outstanding fact is that at all times French diplomacy was abreast of the truth. It was not deluded, put off its guard, led up the side alley of humanitarianism. Of all the Great Powers France had most to fear from a general war. Precisely in the same way it was France which was best informed at all stages, was able to act always in the daylight, was able thus to avoid all wavering, all hesitancy, all irresolution.

Reading the record thus supplied by the French

government, there is patent the fact that the day the Austrian government despatched its ultimatum to Belgrade, official France and official Russia knew that a general war was to follow. This was because Russian and French diplomacy had envisaged the fact that there was in Germany a state of mind. To the French and Russians it might seem a spirit of aggrandizement, of deliberate determination to dominate Europe. To Germany it did seem merely the natural consequence of perils impending, forced upon a peaceful nation. But the European fact was this state of mind.

All this British diplomacy refused to recognize, British statesmanship refused to accept. Thus for a whole week we have the eager, feverish industry of Sir Edward Grey. Every capital in Europe was the scene of British effort to solve what was insoluble, because there was never any conceivable basis of agreement. Austria accused Serbia of incendiarism in Austrian territory, assumed the right to deal drastically with the incendiary, refused on the request of Russia to let the offender off with a reprimand, an empty gesture of menace, knowing full well that it would be but the prelude to more fires. Russia insisted on the right to regulate the dealing of a neighbor with an adjacent nuisance.

Short of permitting Russia to assume the full charge of her Balkan affairs, Austria never could recognize Russian pretensions to protect Serbia. It was not necessary for Austria to raise the question,

she did not need to deliver an ultimatum. But Austria having done this, there was no chance at any time under any circumstances of composing the trouble unless Russia renounced a right she had assumed as the "Big Brother Slav" to protect the little Slav from the consequences of his own acts, not in the specific case of the assassination of the Archduke, where his alibi was impressive, but in his general campaign to "redeem" Servians in Austria.

British diplomacy all the time busied itself with an effort to persuade Germany to urge Austria to yield to Russia, to modify its demands upon Serbia. British diplomacy was aghast at the tone of these demands. Sir Edward Grey rightly described them as without precedent. They were meant to be. Austria's house had been set on fire. German diplomacy was quite as ready with the suggestion that England tell Russia to keep her hands off, to let the little pyromaniac be duly punished by Germany's friend.

In all this, neither German nor British diplomacy would recognize the fact. Each deceived the other, but in what was vital both deceived themselves. French diplomacy, on the contrary, neither deceived nor was deceived. At the proper moment France and Russia assured each other and the world of their solidarity. The French ambassador at Rome obtained the all-vital assurance from the Marquis di San Giuliano that Italy would stay out of the war. The French ambassador at London laid before Sir

Edward Grey the statement of views, not a declaration of purpose, be it understood, that France and England had exchanged long before, covering the existing situation.

It was of utmost importance both for France and for Germany to know what Great Britain would do, and it was plain all through the critical week that Great Britain herself did not officially have the remotest idea of what she would do. Yet up to the very last moment Germany was satisfied that England would stay out, and France never, during all the anxious hours, seemed to have the smallest fear that her neighbor across the Channel would prove disloyal. French diplomacy was right. It was informed about this as about all other things. It recognized that there was in London, as in Berlin, a state of mind.

The truth of course is that there never was the smallest doubt that England would join in a general war if Germany attacked France, or in any way, save under direct provocation, went to war with the Republic. Most well-informed Englishmen knew it, had known it without acknowledging it, for ten years. The German realized this now and raged because his own state of mind was being generally exploited and the British state of mind disguised, concealed behind details and circumstances he realized were incidental and fortuitous.

No one has described this British state of mind so well as Shaw. But what is useful to note now is

that the French understood it. Their allies, the Russians, saw it through their eyes and understood it. France and Russia acted steadily with this knowledge. Germany misunderstood it. German diplomacy failed to grasp the fact, wholly misunderstood Sir Edward Grey's activity. Hence that panic of Berlin when England at last acted on her state of mind. Hence the subsequent hatred of England, a hatred based on the fact that Germany misunderstood England's mind and believed that England misunderstood her own interests, the most impossible of all contingencies.

Thanks to the Yellow Book it was now perceived that French diplomacy and statesmanship misunderstood neither the British nor the German state of mind. Knowing the British state of mind, France knew that England was bound to fight Germany, but not until she had endeavored to prevent a war that was not preventable. Hence France patiently shared in all the efforts of Sir Edward Grey. Knowing the German state of mind, she was aware of the certainty of the failure, but that Germany might have no second Ems warrant for war, she observed every diplomatic convention with almost pathetic fidelity.

In July the Germans believed what they did not know, because it was pleasant; the British refused to believe what they knew, because it was unpleasant. But French diplomacy from the very start recognized the fact, terrible as it was for France.

That is why later, when Briton and German were filling the world with their explanations, the Frenchman had nothing to explain. Being a Latin, what he had long foreseen did not surprise him.

CHAPTER XX

HALF A YEAR OF THE GREAT WAR

MARKING as it did the end of the first half year of the world conflict, February 1 was a natural and convenient point from which to review the progress of the campaigns to that date. Such a review necessarily loses weight from the fact that it was colored by reports of recent events which were still incomplete, frequently inexact. Its real value, so far as it possesses any, is rather to be sought in the fact that it presents a picture of the opinion of a contemporary world upon a struggle still going forward. History will necessarily reject most of the judgments of that hour, but historians may find not wholly valueless the statement of how neutrals and belligerents viewed the struggle at the first half mile post.

In any review of the military achievement of the great nations who for half a year had waged a struggle greater than any in written history, it was necessary to point out in advance that in this period the great successes, conquests, victories had been with the Germans. Measured by what they had to do, by what they expected to do, it was possible to estimate failures, it was natural to see the points at

which German military strategy, strength, had broken down. But viewed as a feat of arms, the thing the German soldiers had done in the first six months was rivalled only by what the French Revolutionary soldiers had done against Europe in arms more than a century before.

In August, German armies had overrun Belgium and entered France, winning at Charleroi, at Móns, at Cambrai, victories which in any other war would have seemed tremendous. In September, although the German advance had been checked and thrown back from the very suburbs of Paris, the invaders made good solidly that position stretching across northern France which they still held. At the same time a Russian invasion of East Prussia had been crushed in the now famous Battle of Tanneberg and German territory cleared of invaders, as Alsace and Lorraine had been cleared by the crushing of the much advertised French counter offensive, which collapsed at Saarbùrg and about Mùlhausen in early August.

In October, Antwerp had been taken, the Belgian Army driven out of all but a tiny corner of the Kingdom, a British advance toward Ghent halted and thrown back to Ypres, while a first German invasion of Poland had reached the outskirts of Warsaw and compelled the Russians to abandon their advance upon Cracow and their campaign against the demoralized Austrian armies. November had seen the Germans, while retiring from Warsaw, able to

concentrate new and great forces along the Yser, to beat down every attempt of British and French troops to take the offensive, and only by a narrow margin fail to reach the Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk.

In December, German effort had been again in the East and once more Russian armies had been defeated, thrown back after the battle of Lodz, before which the invasion of Silesia seemed at hand. January came, the Germans held a quarter of Poland, practically all of Belgium, 8,000 square miles in Northern France, the home of some 2,500,000 Frenchmen. Against this there was to be reckoned Russian occupation of a corner of East Prussia, subsequently to be lost, and French possession of a morsel of Alsace.

Provinces containing at least 12,000,000 people, having an area of at least 30,000 square miles, towns such as Brussels, Antwerp, Lille, Lodz, St. Quentin, Liège were now solidly held by the Germans, who had reached the coast at Ostend and approached Warsaw at the Bzura.

As against this achievement only Russia had actually made progress in invasion. The armies of the Czar held at least 30,000 square miles of Austrian territory with a population of 9,000,000, and East Prussian lands having an area of 5,000 square miles and a population of perhaps 500,000. Lemberg, Czernowitz, Tarnow were among Russian conquests, which far overbalanced the lost districts of Poland.

France, for her part, save for a little gain in Alsace, had only loss. On her had fallen the heavy blow of German military strength. Germany now held more French territory than she had annexed in 1871, France had more "lost provinces" to redeem and after five months of effort she had as yet made little real progress in regaining them.

It was only abroad that Germany suffered, but there her loss had been heavy. In Asia her great port had been taken by Anglo-Japanese armies. In the Pacific her island holdings had vanished. In Africa the slow but sure extinction of her empire was going forward. Her flag had disappeared from the ocean. Her one fleet, which had kept the sea, had gone down off the Falkland Islands. But the fate of these colonies about the Seven Seas remained to be decided in Europe, to be lost or won in Flanders, in Belgium, in Champagne, in Poland.

To the future historian it is inconceivable that this first six months will not appear as belonging to the Germans, whatever the outcome of the war. What Napoleon did for so long the Kaiser had accomplished for these months; he had defied Europe, not merely held it at bay, but fought it outside of his own territory and won great victories on alien soil. After six months, too, there was as yet no evidence of the breakdown of German strength. In the field there had been no Leipsic. From official French and British reports there came the same testimony that the German armies continued to fight with the

courage, confidence, determination which they had shown when the road to Paris seemed open to them.

It was only when German necessity was weighed against German achievement that it became apparent what France, England and Russia had so far accomplished. All the German strategy was based upon a sudden, overwhelming thrust at France, the overthrow of that nation before Russia came up, the defeat of Russia in her turn and then the final "reckoning" with England. But at the Marne France had saved herself and Europe. From the terrible ordeal of August and September she had emerged upright, fencible. The 8,000 square miles of her territory that remained in German hands were an incentive to new effort, not a wound through which she might bleed to death.

Having failed to crush France, Germany had been compelled to turn east to throw back Russia, to clear East Prussia, to rescue stricken Austria. A second desperate drive in the West had been checked on the Yser and new demands had been made by Austria. Everywhere German resources had proved and were still proving adequate to hold what she had conquered, but nowhere in France since the third week in September had she made substantial progress. The campaign had fallen to a siege, the battle to trenchwork, the great German offensive had always been halted where it started since Von Kluck had recrossed the Aisne and Antwerp and Ostend had fallen.

Meantime Austria had steadily lost strength and confidence. Defeat after defeat had shaken the fabric of the Empire, Austrian provinces had been lost, Hungarian lands ravaged and threatened. Twice little Servia, prime cause of all the trouble, had terribly routed great Austrian armies and utterly destroyed Austrian prestige in the Balkans. Russian victory in Bukovina, too, seemed now to have brought Rumania nearer to the point of joining the war and to have terminated any chance that Italy or Rumania, or even sullen and bitter Bulgaria, would take the side of the two Emperors.

Equally disastrous had been the brief participation of Turkey. In the Caucasus Turkish armies had suffered new defeats comparable to Lule Burgas and Kumanovo; a brief dash into Persia had come to nothing. The Holy War had fizzled out. Egypt had so far escaped invasion and the Sultan's friend and former Khedive had lost his throne. At home in Turkey, as in Austria, the protest against war, the desire for peace, was making itself heard, while Turkish activity was a fresh incentive to Italy to join the other Mediterranean Powers and safeguard Tripoli forever.

Half a year after the Great War opened Germany stood almost alone; her Austrian ally had become a serious liability, German corps had to be deflected to the Carpathians, German resources were taxed to aid the Hapsburgs and quiet Hungarian anxiety. Before her stood three great nations,

not yet by any means at the height of their task, not yet at the maximum of their efficiency, but steadily, with unity, singleness of purpose, determination not to be mistaken, laboring to crush the Kaiser's armies. Sea power still remained with England. To the French army, which for six months had defended France, aided only by a small contingent of British, Kitchener's million was presently to be added. From Asia, from Africa, from distant colonies, France and England would pour in new native and Colonial troops in the next few months.

So far Germany had matched man with man, gun with gun. So far she had been able to make good her hold on most of what she had conquered. To dislodge her from Northern France and Belgium it now seemed would be the work of months, perhaps of years. To accomplish this millions of men seemed doomed to die as upward of 2,000,000 had already perished. But the sacrifice of German life was not merely an immediate loss, it was a victory for England industrially, while every month that the German flag was banished from the sea, neutral and British shipping laid new hold upon the conquests of Germany in peace.

For Germany there remained, in the minds of the world, at this date, the possibility that her enemies would tire, the people of the hostile countries grow weary of the blood price of conquest before her own. But not yet had there been anywhere the

slightest sign of it. On the contrary, in France, in Great Britain, in Russia the same spirit was unmistakable, the determination to have done for all time with the German peril, with German rivalry, to crush Germany as the North had crushed the South if need be. Rheims, Louvain, Scarborough, these were watchwords of the Western nations who were fighting Germany, and Russia found her driving power alike in the Pan-Slav spirit and in the realization that predominance in Europe and possession at the Golden Horn were the visible rewards of victory in addition to the title to Austrian provinces now occupied.

As the seventh month opened there was nowhere the smallest sign of peace. With all her real successes Germany had won nothing approaching a decisive victory. What her enemies had suffered was to them but an incentive to fresh effort, new sacrifice, greater struggle. So far as man could then see all that had happened had been little more than a prelude to the real struggle that was to come when General February should have followed Marshal January off the battlefields and campaigns were again possible.

With the spring it seemed conceivable that Germany would be able to make one more bid for conquest. What then appeared more likely, as the Kaiser was reported to have said in January was, that she would stand on the defensive, content herself with the holding of what she had won and make

the price of Allied advance so terrible as to "stagger humanity," make the Allies turn Belgium and Northern France into blackened wastes, into desert places by their struggles to rescue them. The victory, Marshal von Hindenburg had assured the world months ago, would be to the strongest nerves, and German nerves were as yet unshaken.

In the military sense half a year of war had only decided the question of whether Germany could crush France, Russia and England before they could unite forces. She had failed at the Marne, and with that failure that chance had passed. All that had happened since had been proof of how terrible the task would be to defeat Germany and regain what she had won in the early months of the war. So far the Allies had failed utterly in their attempts to do this since the Germans had taken their stand behind the Aisne. From September 12 to February 2 the advances and retreats in the West had been fairly equal, the lines but little changed, and as frequently to German as to Allied advantage.

In these six months German loss had been placed as high as 2,000,000 killed, wounded and captured, the Russian at materially less. France and Austria had lost more than a million each. Belgium and Servia together more than a quarter of a million and England more than 125,000. What was most appalling about this loss was the fact that it represented no actual progress toward peace. The

ranks had been closed up and more millions were waiting. If, after half a year, any contestant were ready for peace, save poor beaten Austria, there was still no proof, and Austria could not even make peace herself now.

SEA POWER BEGINS TO TELL

CHAPTER XXI

NAVAL OPERATIONS

IN the early days of the war the world had waited eagerly for a great sea fight. Salamis and Trafalgar were on the lips of all men in the first hours when the British fleet disappeared behind the veil of the censor and each edition of the newspaper reported heavy firing in the North Sea. But if such expectations were natural to the uninformed, naval authorities knew that the German war fleet was far too weak to seek any decision with the British. The considerable mass of German naval and military writing, the words of Reventlow, of Bernhardt himself, had foretold what the German tactics would be, had indicated that the Kaiser's admirals would seek by a process of attrition to wear down the British fleets until there might be some hope of victory in a naval encounter.

These tactics were soon in evidence. In September the loss of the three "Cressys" by submarine attack warned the British public of what was to come. Thereafter in a long and monotonous procession the *Audacious*, the *Hawke*, the *Bulwark* and

the *Formidable* were lost through mines, submarines or other attack. The passing joy of the triumph of the cruiser fleet in the Bight of Heligoland was silenced by the stunning disaster at Coronel, where the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, with Sir Christopher Cradock and 1600 men were lost on November 1 in an encounter with the German fleet, which had collected from all quarters of the Pacific.

This disaster was in due time amply avenged. On December 8, off the Falkland Islands, the *Gneisenau*, the *Scharnhorst*, the *Nürnberg* and the *Leipzig* were sunk, with their commander, Admiral von Spee, while the *Dresden* escaped to fall a prey to her pursuers several months later. This victory of Sir Frederick Sturdee, the greatest in British naval history since Trafalgar, did much to cheer the British at the moment of deep depression over land operations.

Meantime a new German attack startled the inhabitants of the British Islands. For centuries the attack of a hostile fleet had been practically unknown on their shores, but on December 16, conceivably in revenge for the defeat off the Falkland Islands, a squadron of German cruisers appeared off Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby and swept the shore with their guns, destroying many buildings and killing more than a hundred men, women and children. Thus did the Kaiser resume the famous practice of "cross ravaging."

Yet of all futile strokes, this proved the most conspicuous. The destruction was insignificant, but the fury of the whole British people was unequalled since Napoleonic times. The policy of "Schrecklichkeit," of terribleness, thus adopted served to fill recruiting stations and stir British anger, but of other effect there was none. It brought ultimate punishment, too, for while the aggressors escaped unscathed from Scarborough, a month later, on January 24, the *Blücher* was lost and several other ships injured in an attempt to repeat the exploit. In this encounter the British suffered from the injury of one cruiser, the *Tiger*, although German observers insisted that a battle cruiser had been sunk.

But in all these strokes and counterstrokes there was little of more than passing importance. More British warships than German were sunk, mainly because the German fleet kept to its cover, while the British patrolled the seas, but the loss of the Germans was far greater in proportion to their total tonnage than the British and the advantage of the British in numbers grew each month as more ships were commissioned. The loss of a dreadnought a month, as Winston Churchill publicly announced, could be endured without danger to British advantage, but apart from the *Audacious* no dreadnought was lost in the many months of fall and winter.

Above the trivial details of incidental engagements a single fact stood out. Slowly, steadily sea power was doing the thing which it had done before in the

Napoleonic time, in the days of the Civil War. At the very outbreak of the war the German flag had disappeared from the high seas. Half a million tons of giant steamships were tied up idle in New York harbor alone. The prize courts of England and France were busy disposing of the captures. One by one the raiders, the gallant *Emden*, the *Königsberg*, disappeared. The seas were swept clear of the few German warships at sea when the war broke out.

Meantime in the Mediterranean a similar cordon was drawn about Austria. Her shipping too vanished from the sea, her war fleet was shut up in the harbors of the upper Adriatic. Only through neutral ports could German manufactures reach the neutral world, only after examination could non-contraband goods shipped to Germany and Austria reach their destination and the time was in sight when this scanty commercial stream might be shut off. In addition thousands of Germans and Austro-Hungarians ready to serve, trained to bear arms but living abroad were prevented from returning home.

And while this was being accomplished British and French ships kept the seas. Into England and France there flowed an ever increasing flood of arms and ammunition made in neutral states, made chiefly in the United States. While the British and French fleets watched the North Sea and the Adriatic, ships of commerce of these nations still went back and forth. German products were shut away from markets in which they had become supreme. In Asia

and in South America, England and France planned the conquest of German markets that what had been temporarily lost during the war might be finally lost before peace arrived.

Even more important was the value of the control of the seas to the Allies for military reasons. An ever increasing British Army in France was supplied and sustained. New regiments and corps were put in the field. Indian troops were brought from the Far East, territorials sent to Egypt to replace regulars called to Flanders. The Suez Canal and the Flanders Coast were patrolled by warships, whose shells kept Turks and Prussian invaders at a distance.

In all this there was nothing spectacular, nothing which attracted immediate attention. Even the British themselves were at times tempted to grumble at what the navy had accomplished. Yet this was but a superficial criticism. In fact, sea power had done all that had been asked of it. More and more as the winter months went on, the world was to realize the fashion in which the grip at the throat of the Austro-German alliance, the grip of the fleet, was crushing and strangling these nations. Already they had become isolated from the world, whispers of the lack of materials for ammunition, copper for the making of shells, oil for the fuel for automobiles were beginning to be heard and a new cry of rage and anger over the vital question of food was presently to be heard.

Such, briefly was the work of sea power in the first six months of the Great War. The Kaiser had boasted that the future of his people was on the water and at the first round of a world war his flag had left the sea. Save for the submarine, he was shut up on shore, while his deadliest enemies, aside from occasional raids by air, dwelt in security beyond his reach and organized and delivered on European shores the armies which were to meet his war worn battalions in the Spring.

Beside these achievements the losses of the British fleet were insignificant, constituted a price infinitesimal in contrast to the profit realized. Slow but inevitable comprehension of this fact led presently to the change in German tactics that was to open a new phase in the Great War, in the history of all naval warfare, to involve the destruction of most of the precepts of international law, which had hitherto commanded at least the respect if not the complete obedience of mankind.

CHAPTER XXII

SUBMARINE WARFARE

IN January, Germany, not yet driven by any immediate pinch of hunger, but looking forward to the time when the new harvest must settle the question of whether the Fatherland, isolated by hostile fleets, could feed itself, adopted a policy which amounted to the seizure by the Government of all the stock of wheat in the country and the regular issuance of weekly allowances to the population. This was one more evidence of German thoroughness, of German system, the most stupendous experiment in nationalization of modern times, but it was naturally mistaken at the moment, and by the enemies of Germany, as proof of approaching starvation.

For Great Britain this German step opened a door which was welcome. Under all existing rules of international law wheat was non-contraband, or at most conditional contraband, subject to seizure by hostile fleets only when intended for the armies or officials of a national war. But since Germany had decided to commandeer all wheat, the British Government interpreted this as a warrant for seizing all grain bound for Germany, even though carried in neutral bottoms. In sum, England adopted a policy which

could have no other end than to starve the German population into submission.

By way of answer, Germany had recourse to the Napoleonic precedent and imitating the French Emperor's Berlin and Milan decrees, declared a blockade about the British Islands, for which she had no ships to make it effective. Relying upon her submarines she announced that after a certain date, February 18, these craft would sink all ships, not merely belligerent ships, which were found in the waters adjacent to the British Islands and included in the zones indicated in her declaration.

If the British programme had done violence to the well established principles of international law, the German was equally subversive of the first principles of humanity. Great Britain had threatened the property of neutrals, invaded their rights to trade in open waters and with nations while no blockade was proclaimed, but Germany had enlarged upon this by threatening to take the lives of those who thus ventured within the radius of her submarines.

To justify her course Great Britain, followed by France, had pointed to the German decree seizing grains. Germany in her turn found warrant for a more extreme policy in the fact that British ships were flying neutral flags, that British merchant ships, thus disguised, were being armed and thus prepared to destroy submarines, but chiefly in the fact that Great Britain by undertaking to seize grain, still to the German mind non-contraband, was seeking to starve

a non-combatant population into submission. To the protests of neutrals, to the dignified and determined protest of the United States she replied with a cool assertion that if the American Government could persuade England to rescind her Order in Council, lift the embargo on grain, Germany would make prompt and equal concession.

As between neutrals and belligerents the new policies opened up a whole new world of problems, problems that could not be settled without recourse to arms. The simple fact was that international law had broken down under the strain and as there was no power behind it to enforce it, a situation of anarchy was now to result. For the United States the question was one of vital principle. Admiral Mahan had long ago forecast that the conditions of naval warfare had so completely changed that a new code would be written by the naval power which was supreme in the next war. Substantially this the British now undertook to do.

Hitherto it had been sufficient for the sea power to proclaim and maintain an effective blockade. The North had done this in the Civil War. But with the coming of the submarine no blockade on the old lines was possible. To patrol the hostile coast with ships offering targets to the submarine was the height of folly. Yet in law without an effective blockade, the rights of the neutral were supreme. These rights both belligerents now undertook to set aside.

But from the very outset it was plain that the pro-

tests of the neutrals, the protest of the one great Transatlantic neutral, the United States, were to be academic. Aside from the possibility of the sinking of an American ship with its crew by a German submarine, the United States was determined not to resort to arms and this determination abolished all possibility of an extension of the war over this question. It became, therefore, one more point of contest between the belligerents, one more terrible circumstance in war daily becoming more frightful.

Faithful to their threats the Germans began on the day fixed by them to carry out ruthlessly their policy of submarine blockade. Day by day the cable reported merchant ships sunk by German submarines. At first the crews were warned and permitted to escape. But as the campaign continued, even this little concession to humanity was abandoned and the whole world was shocked in the last days of March by the sinking of the *Falaba*, a passenger steamer with a ship's company which included women and children, included also one American citizen.

For all this the German defence was clear and to the German mind quite satisfactory. Germany accepted the British embargo upon grain as the proof of a determination to starve her non-combatant population. She regarded this as a contravention of all rules of war and of humanity. England and France, on their part, were equally insistent that their own course was consonant with the dictates of humanity, while both peoples cried out against the drowning of

the women and children by submarines as a work of savagery unequalled in modern times and their press and public men demanded that the crews of submarines, when captured, should be treated as pirates. To this Germany responded with new threats of reprisals to be taken upon captives in German prisons.

As between the merits of the cases of the belligerents in this instance, it can hardly be the work of the mere recorder of contemporary events to pass judgment. What is most vital to note is the fact that in the first nine months of the war; that is, to May 1, the blockade failed of its purpose. The number of ships actually sunk was insignificant. The sacrifice of life was without compensating advantage to the Germans, who thus piled up one more terrible burden of hate and revenge without accomplishing the end for which they had risked so much in the way of reprisals, if they should lose the war.


But, if it failed in its primary purpose, the German submarine blockade had served to demonstrate how rapidly the Great War was degenerating into a conflict of unparalleled savagery. German troops burning Suwalki in answer to Russian offending in Memel, the growing disinclination to take or give quarter in the field, these were but additional signs of the fact that Twentieth Century War was, if any thing, more terrible than war of the centuries that preceded.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BATTLE OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

IN the second week in February, Russia suffered a defeat only comparable with that of Tannenberg in the history of the Great War. In August she had sent two armies into East Prussia, one moving west from Kovno upon Königsberg, the other north from Warsaw toward Allenstein. While Hindenburg had contained the first with a mere handful of troops, he had concentrated a great army about the second and destroyed it, just north of the East Prussian frontier in the famous Battle of Tannenberg. After this fight he had turned to deal with the second Russian Army, but this, by swift retreat, had escaped into Suwalki Province, where it halted German pursuit at Augustovo and presently flowed back to East Prussia.

From November to February this army had pushed slowly but steadily west. Along its front were the famous Mazurian Lakes, an intricate region of bog and lake, impenetrable in spring, summer and fall, but in winter, when the lakes and water courses were frozen, open to attack. By the first week in February the advance had passed Lyck and Gum-



THE BATTLE OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

A-A ORIGINAL RUSSIAN POSITION

B-B-B WHERE THE VARIOUS FRAGMENTS OF THE
DEFEATED RUSSIAN TENTH ARMY RALLIED

binnen, was approaching Insterburg, and Russian reports were again claiming the arrival of the time when the East Prussian like the Galician salient would be beaten down.

Instead Marshal von Hindenburg, gathering up all his available forces from Poland, from the home stations struck suddenly upon both the flanks of the Russian Army in East Prussia, the Tenth Army, as it was described in the mournful official bulletins that now came from Petrograd. The stroke culminated in the Battle of Mazurian Lakes.

At the moment when the blow fell the situation in East Prussia was something as follows: Two Russian corps were astride the Kovno-Königsberg railway line, just east of Insterburg. Three more were moving into the Lake District with the fortress of Loetzen as their immediate objective. Before them were two or three German corps, acting as screens for the grand concentration taking place in their rear and stubbornly resisting Russian advance.

The first blow fell upon the Kovno corps standing east and south of Tilsit. They were struck by not less than three new German corps at the same moment that their line of communications was cut by German cavalry making a brilliant raid to the north around their right flank. The remnant of this force extricating itself with difficulty retreated upon Kovno, evacuating East Prussia and leaving behind them a waste.

The second blow fell upon the army in the Ma-

zurian Lakes, which was assailed at the same moment by several German corps coming south upon their right flank about Lyck and several more breaking in upon their left about Johannisberg. The result was a complete rout and a demoralized flight. This flight continued through the Russian Province of Suwalki, with Grodno and Ossowetz as objectives. In the retreat, at least one Russian corps was completely cut off, surrounded, compelled to surrender in the region of Augustowo.

The marvel of this operation was the completeness with which the Germans accomplished their concentration without allowing the Russian commanders, spies or aërial scouts even a hint of the approaching storm. For the operation troops were drawn from the Bzura-Rawka front and their withdrawal covered by a violent offensive upon the Russian lines lasting for several days and reported in Russian official announcement as a great drive at Warsaw. From Alsace and from interior points in Germany troops were also brought up.

Yet not until the situation was utterly hopeless does the Russian commander seem to have realized his peril and then he could only save the fragments of his army. Exactly the same tactics had won Tannenberg, and in this earlier field the Russian commanders were equally ignorant of Hindenburg's concentration until their whole army had been enveloped and its destruction became inevitable. By way of contrast it is interesting to recall how promptly Ger-

man scouts discovered the transfer of Sir John French's army to Flanders.

Measured by the decisive engagements of the Nineteenth Century the casualty list of the Russians in the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes was impressive. Accepting the German figures, although these were subsequently challenged by Russian critics, the loss of 100,000 prisoners represented a total loss in killed and wounded of above 150,000. At Waterloo Napoleon's army was less than 90,000, his loss 40,000. At the opening of the Appomattox campaign Lee had 54,000 and less than 26,000 surrendered at the Court House. The French Army which Napoleon III surrendered at Sedan was about 125,000.

Yet German and Russian official reports agreed that the great disaster which the Czar's forces had suffered had nothing of the character of the earlier contests, each of which settled a war. In the present world war the Mazurian Lakes engagement was an incident. More than this, it was the third successive "incident" of this magnitude which had come to Russian arms. At Tannenberg in September, at Lodz in November, the German captures were equally large. But in each case the Russian resistance was not broken; new armies returned to East Prussia in October, reënforcements arrived in time to halt the victors of Lodz at the Bzura-Rawka lines in December.

Certain revisions in early judgments, however, the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes imposed. The prog-

ress of this brief and terrible campaign demonstrated quite conclusively that talk of a Russian advance to Berlin was as premature in February as it had been preposterous in September. Three times great Russian armies had approached or crossed the German frontier. Three times, aided by the splendid system of strategic railways, but equally by the marching capacity of the soldiers, the tremendous superiority of the high command and of the corps, division and brigade commanders, the Germans had struck the invaders, rolled them back with losses greater than the strength of the armies of the last century, and terminated the campaign far in Russian territory.

In the Civil War, Lee repeatedly achieved a similar result. The battles in the Peninsular campaign, Chancellorsville, the long battle from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor, were a demonstration of a similar skill in handling perfectly organized and disciplined troops on interior lines and taking the offensive with inferior numbers in the aggregate to put superior force at the decisive point. The advance to Richmond took four years and the distance was a quarter of that between the Silesian frontier and Berlin.

From the German point of view, however, the Napoleonic parallel is the best. What the Kaiser was now doing Napoleon did for ten years. Fighting in the enemy's territory, crushing the armies of states whose collective population far exceeded that of the French Empire, Napoleon finally succumbed. Austerlitz, Wagram, Jena, victories which to the future

may seem no more splendid than those of Hindenburg, proved ultimately of no avail.

For the moment, by the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, Germany cleared her frontiers. She seemed now free to turn many army corps westward to deal with new French forces and the advance guard of Kitchener's million in the spring campaign. She had won another splendid triumph which deserved the admiration of the world as a military achievement. But she had settled nothing, ended nothing. A new Russian force was already beginning to gather. So Napoleon won Dresden in 1813, but in the same year he lost Leipsic. As a single performance the latest German victory passed all qualification; but what fatally lessened its appeal to the imagination of the world was the fact that after it there came no promise of peace, truce, parley. For this the Germans justly held sea power responsible. The old Napoleonic duel more and more found parallel in contemporary Europe.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AT THE DARDANELLES

THERE was unmistakable appropriateness in the form the answer of the Allies to German triumph in East Prussia took. While the Berlin crowds were still acclaiming Hindenburg and his Mazurian victory, an Anglo-French fleet suddenly began the bombardment of the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. So Pitt had answered Napoleon's Austerlitz with the guns of Trafalgar, so England had been accustomed to answer land power with the proof of sea power for many generations.

Nor did the answer lose from the exchange of statements between Sir Edward Grey and Sazonoff. German journals had proclaimed that Russia was not merely beaten, at the limit of her strength for war, but also tired of a struggle in which hers were the sacrifices and the rewards were to be for her allies.

Now as if to give new volume to the thunder of Allied guns at the western water gate of Constantinople, Sir Edward Grey announced to the whole world a momentous and revolutionary change in British foreign policy. Answering the Russian Foreign Minister across the stretch of a Continent at war the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs asserted that

England was at one with her present ally on the question of a doorway on the open sea.

Three times in the last century Russia had seemed on the point of realizing the dream of Peter the Great — of restoring the cross upon St. Sophia and making Stamboul again the capital of the Greek Orthodox world — and three times England prevented it. France, still smarting over the memories of Moscow, associated herself with England in the Crimean War and paid the penalty in 1870. Germany backed Austria at the Congress of Berlin and lost Russian friendship. Austria turned from her Italian disasters and planned a new empire in the Balkans, and the Eastern Question became a duel between Vienna and Petrograd.

Looking back on the last half century, it is easy to perceive how fatal for the Balkans, for Europe, the Constantinople question was. Russia, having freed Bulgaria, having approached Constantinople and occupied San Stefano, dictated that treaty, which the Congress of Berlin tore up, to impose upon the unhappy Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks another generation of misery under Osmanli rule. England, in that shameful hour, "backed the wrong horse," and brought Cyprus and peace without honor back from the Berlin conclave.

After the Russo-Turkish War the Russians, influenced by German diplomacy, went east, to meet at last defeat and disaster in Manchuria. With the close of the Russo-Turkish War the Slavs turned

once more to the West, abandoned Asia for Europe, Port Arthur for Czarigrad.

The Young Turkish Revolution, the Bosnian incident, the Balkan wars, the assassination of the Archduke, these are the steps by which the European nations approached the great catastrophe. But in the meantime German intrigue in South Africa, her action in Morocco, at Agadir and Tangier had brought France and England close together and made the *entente cordiale*, in fact, a triple alliance.

After Fashoda, France and England made a general settlement, eliminated every point of quarrel. An Anglo-Russian settlement was inevitable when Germany backed Austria "in shining armor" after the Bosnia time. But an Anglo-Russian settlement was not merely an arrangement in Persia and north of the Himalayas — infallibly it extended to the question of Constantinople and the Straits.

Now France held Morocco, England had just annexed Egypt, the road of British Empire to the East was safe. For France, for England, to permit Russia to hold the Golden Horn was a necessary price for Russian support and sacrifice in the terrible period at the opening of the world war. To Russia, now suffering from defeat and natural discouragement, Sir Edward Grey's words were an incentive to fresh effort, to renewed loyalty to her allies — the prize of the world was now within her grasp.

It was too early to forecast the fall of Constantinople; the road from Kum Kales to the Golden Horn

was to prove longer than that to Tipperary of blessed memory, but it was not too soon to speculate upon the inevitable consequences of such an event, perhaps the most important in Southeastern Europe since, five centuries ago, the Osmanli passed into Europe by the Gallipoli peninsula, now the target of the Anglo-French fleet.

First of all, the collapse of Turkey would be immediate. Into the present war Turkey had been dragged by German intrigue and the efforts of a few Turks, chiefly by Enver Bey. The war was unpopular with a people recently terribly beaten. To lose Constantinople and be driven back to Asia at last would be to sink into a state of anarchy and disorder. Cairo and the Caucasus frontier would be freed from menace, and Russian and English troops would be relieved for service on the European battlefield.

For Russia, for all the Allies, opening the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be of instant and immeasurable advantage. Russian grain crops would flow out, arms and ammunition would go back. Russia would emerge into the world, break the blockade of winter and the Kaiser.

For Bulgaria, now the storm centre of the Balkans, there would no longer be any choice but to cast her lot with the Allies and release Rumanian troops for the conquest of Transylvania. Her reward would be a return to Adrianople, to the Enos-Midia line, the reoccupation of Thrace, lost in the second Balkan war. Such an expansion of Bulgaria would force

Rumania to seek to preserve her Balkan superiority by "redeeming" the Rumanians of Transylvania.

As for Italy as a Mediterranean power she could hardly withhold her hand longer and see Syria pass to France, England acquire the eastern shore of the Red Sea, Russia come down to the Dardanelles, and not herself share in the division of the Near East. To remain neutral longer would be to find herself shut out of the Near East, denied her "place" in the new Mediterranean world when peace came.

The moral effect of the fall of Constantinople would far exceed that of the fall of Antwerp. As a military and naval achievement it would be as fruitful to the victor as Antwerp's capture was sterile. Antwerp was, as Napoleon said, "a pistol pointed at the head of England," but it was an empty pistol. Constantinople in the hands of the Turk was a noose drawn suffocatingly tight about the neck of the anti-German alliance.

It was Pitt who said after the Battle of Austerlitz, "Roll up the map of Europe." More and more as the Great War proceeded the prospect of a new map was growing. Meantime, Sir Edward Grey's words awakened an echo in Petrograd, drowning the music of Berlin's triumphal celebration of the victory of the Mazurian Lakes. England had paid the price of Russian support to the full — and no one could question that Russia had done her part. Indeed she was soon to give new and terrible proof of her powers of endurance.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPAGNE

LATE in January French and German official statements began to record desperate fighting in the Eastern Champagne. Le Mesnil, Les Hurlus, Souain, Beauséjour and Ville-sur-Tourbe appeared constantly in the day's news. Plainly a major operation was on foot in this region. Early in March the German official bulletins proclaimed that the Battle of Champagne was over, that it had ended in French defeat. Despite this assertion the fighting continued but with diminishing ferocity for many weeks.

A review of this campaign, the most serious undertaken by the French during the winter months, involves a hasty survey of the situation between the Oise and the Meuse as it developed after the great German invasion was halted at the Marne in the first days of September.

At that time three great masses of Germans were operating between the two rivers. The first, under Von Kluck, approached Paris and then went east and south. The second, under von Bülow, came south through Rheims, passed the Marne near Chalons and was defeated about St. Gond and Camp de Mailly. The third, under the Crown Prince, passed between

the Argonne and Verdun and was halted about Vitry-le-François.

As these armies retreated, the first took up the position behind the Aisne, north of Soissons and south of Laon; the second fell back until it occupied the northern forts about Rheims; while the third withdrew as far as Varennes, in the Argonne. When the retreat halted, these three armies established contact and occupied a front from the Oise, east of Noyon, to the Meuse, north of Verdun.

Von Kluck repassed the Aisne on September 11, and on the next day the British, following, took ground about Soissons, but were unable to advance. Three weeks of desperate fighting in this field resulted in a deadlock. On October 3 the British Army gave up its trenches to French reserves and entrained for Belgium, where it presently halted the German advance about Ypres.

The French troops who replaced the British pushed their advance against the Germans, made considerable progress west of Craonne, on the Laon road, but were finally heavily defeated in January, driven across the Aisne, and the whole offensive west of Rheims came to an abrupt close.

In the same fashion the early efforts of the French who pursued von Bülow's army from the Marne, were checked in the eastern suburbs of Rheims. This city had been a fortified place, surrounded by a circle of forts. In their great retreat, the French had dismantled the forts and evacuated them. The Ger-

mans in their turn occupied the easternmost forts, brought up heavy artillery and speedily halted all offensive operations in this district. From the second week in September, to May, the German line here was held solidly and German artillery still bombarded Rheims at will.

Having failed about Soissons and about Rheims, there was left to the French a third possibility. Between Rheims and the Argonne is the great plain of Châlons, familiar in history as the scene of the defeat of Attila. This plain, a long stretch of barren chalklands, is interspersed with scrub pines. Its chalky, sterile soil lends itself admirably to trench work. The hills so sharply contested do not rise over two hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country. The Argonne itself is a long range of low hills rising abruptly from the plain some hundreds of feet, perhaps ten miles wide, and thickly wooded, a military obstacle of very considerable value, as the Valmy campaign had proved.

Through the passes in this range run several highways and railroads, three of real value. The southernmost pass, that near St. Menchould, carries the Verdun-Paris railroad. Near its western entrance is Valmy, the scene of the famous Prussian defeat in the French Revolution. This road the French held. Some ten miles to the north is the second pass, that of Grand Pré. Possession of this had been contested by the opposing forces, but on May 1 it remained solidly in German hands.

Finally, some six miles further north, is Vouziers, at the western end of the upper pass. Through this comes the railroad from Sedan, one of the life lines of the Germans in France. Just south of Vouziers at Challerange, a branch line leaves the Vouziers-St. Menehould line and, turning west, touches the Rheims-Charleville railroad at Bazancourt, north of Rheims.

The object of French strategy in this operation was to move north until French troops crossed and cut the Challerange line, thus destroying one of the two lines of supply for the Germans about Rheims. At the same time occupation of Grand Pré and Vouziers would permit the French to interpose between the German Army before Verdun and that before Rheims, preventing direct communication between them and exposing the flanks of both.

Could the French advance be pressed home, the Germans before Rheims would be wholly separated from those before Verdun. At Vouziers the French would be north and in the rear of the army before Rheims and in a position to attack it in front, flank and rear and to threaten the Rheims-Charleville line near Rethel. The Germans would then be compelled to retire from Rheims and take a position behind the Aisne about Rethel. The Verdun army would in turn be compelled to give ground and make a new contact with the Rheims army by way of Stenay.

Another successful push would take the French to

the Meuse, near Sedan, and cut the main and the only connection between German armies in the West and those in the East, south of Namur. Hitherto the ability of the Germans to move their troops from Alsace-Lorraine to Champagne and Flanders had been the chief cause of the successive triumphs in foiling attacks on their communications. It was by such an operation that they drove the French out of St. Quentin and Péronne early in October and thus saved their whole position in France from the most dangerous of all the attacks made upon it to the present hour. But these were remote possibilities, to be hoped for but certainly not to be expected.

The sole object of German strategy was to hold the line between the Argonne and Rheims, south of and covering the Vouziers railroad. At the end of three months of battle there was still no reason to question the German claim that this line had been held. Such progress as the French had made north of Souain, of Le Mesnil, of Ville-sur-Tourbe had not yet covered the half a dozen miles between the French front at the beginning of the battle and the Vouziers railroad.

East of the Argonne a French offensive marching parallel with that west had made equally slight progress. In April the Grand Pré gap still remained in German control, with no indication that the French had any immediate prospect of winning the commanding position. In sum, while the French made slight progress east of Rheims, as they lost some ground to

the west, the whole Champagne operation from September to April was without immediate result. German lines still held, German artillery still bombarded Rheims at will. The German position in Northern France was solid.

But it was necessary henceforth to watch the Argonne operation closely — nowhere else along the whole German front in France could a successful offensive be so effective in so short a distance as between Souain and Vouziers. On either side not less than 250,000 men had been employed. German estimates of a French loss of 45,000 in this operation indicated how desperately the French had tried to advance. The key of the whole operation remained the Challerange-Bazancourt railroad. Toward this the French had advanced nearly a mile. They had carried the ridge above the valley of the Dormoise; their artillery fire reached the railroad but did not command it.

CHAPTER XXVI

ITALY'S TERMS

THE Anglo-French activity before the western gate of Constantinople awakened echoes in Rome, where Prince von Bülow was still struggling to persuade Italy to stay out of the conflict, having long abandoned his earlier endeavor to persuade the Quirinal to march with Wilhelmstrasse and Ballplatz. The first effect of the new operation was to call forth in the Italian press a more or less official statement of what Italy's price would be, accompanied by new signs of military activity.

No careful study of the map was required to demonstrate how excessive, how impossible, from the Austrian point of view, were these Italian demands. What Italy asked was the entire seacoast of Austria-Hungary. Two years ago Austria had intervened to deny Serbia a "window on the sea"; now Austria was called upon to surrender hers.

There were two different questions raised by the Italian demand: First, as to the character of the territory asked and the justice of the Italian claim. Second, as to the immediate and remoter political consequences if the Italian appetite were satisfied.

What Italy actually demanded falls into three dis-


tinct categories, the Trentino, Trieste and the Istrian Littoral, with Fiume and the Adriatic islands.

Accepting the Trentino as meaning the Italian speaking communities on Lago di Garda and in the middle valley of the Adige, there is every reason in the world why it should be Italian. The people are by race, language, sympathy, Latin. It was lost to Italy only by accident. While Austria holds it she holds the key to all of Northern Italy and Milan, and the whole valley of the Po is indefensible.

But Italy did not stop with the Italian communes. She also demanded Meran, Bôzen, the upper valley of the Adige and the whole valley of the Esak. Here the population is German. Geographically the country belongs to Italy, since it is south of the Alps. Strategically it would fortify Italy and give her a "scientific" frontier, but there could be no question of freeing Italians; rather it was an effort to enslave Teutons.

A similar situation exists in the districts about Trieste and in the peninsula of Istria. Trieste is quite as Italian as Genoa. Pola and the shore towns of Istria are equally so. But practically the whole hinterland is peopled by Slovenes, who are Slavs, not Latins, who prefer to be subjects of Austria to becoming Italians and who can be annexed only against their will.

The islands of the Dalmatian coast all bear Italian names. They belonged to the Adriatic empire of Venice and a portion of their population has been



ITALY'S TERMS

SHADED PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY DEMANDED FROM
AUSTRIA BY ITALY

Latinized. But in the main the people are Slavs; their natural alignment politically is with the Slavs of the eastern mainland, not with the Latins of the remoter shore.

Save in the districts about Trent and in Trieste, Italy not merely sought to redeem old Italian lands and liberate Italian speaking populations, now the reluctant subjects of a Hapsburg, she quite as patiently sought to extend her frontiers to include people of races as hostile to her as Austrian Italians are disloyal to their present sovereign.

On the political side the problem is even more complex. To cede the whole of the Austrian Tyrol south of the crest of the Alps would be an unimportant sacrifice for Austria, a price she could well afford to pay for Italian neutrality. But to part with Trieste, Fiume and the Istrian Littoral — this would be to sign her own death warrant, for it would deprive the Austro-Hungarian Empire of a door on the sea.

What would follow such a cession has long been recognized. Already Russia held most of Galicia. Bukovina and Transylvania have been marked by Rumania as her share in the Austrian estate. Bosnia, Herzegovina and Southern Dalmatia would go to Servia if the Allies won. The Austro-Hungarian Empire would then be an unnatural combination of two fragments ruled by races economically, politically, socially distinct.

In such a situation Hungary would be almost cer-

tain to seek her independence again. As for the balance of Austria, its destiny would lead to Berlin. Deprived of an exit on the sea, it would seek an outlet through German ports and follow Bavaria into the German Empire, thus adding 20,000,000 to the population of the Hohenzollern realm.

For Italy such a change would be fraught with instant peril. The 90,000,000 inhabitants of the new German Empire would look with natural impatience upon the thin strip of Italian territory separating them from the southern sea. Prince Bülow himself is reported to have described Trieste as a German lung.

Quite in the same fashion the destruction of Austria would drive Croatia and Slavonia into the new Serb state and thus erect on the eastern shore of the Adriatic a compact Slav state bound to be a rival of Italy, sure to seek to regain the Adriatic islands, held by Italy and obstructing the Slav window on the Adriatic. Such a state would, too, have the support of Russia, also become a Mediterranean state by the occupation of Constantinople and the Straits. In Northern Albania the Italians and the Slavs would clash as Greeks and Italians have in the South, and Italy might find herself faced by a hostile Balkan confederacy as well as an ambitious Germany.

Briefly, then, to obtain small territorial increases, Italy now risked, almost insured the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. She would gain perhaps 1,000,000 population, she would bring down to

her own border a new German Empire. In addition, by enslaving some thousands of Slavs, she would insure the unification of all the rest of the southern Slavs in a powerful and hostile state, certain of the patronage and protection of Russia.

As to Austria-Hungary, she could not cede Trieste, Fiume or the Istrian peninsula. For her the question was one of life and death. For Austria, Trieste is vital. Fiume is Hungary's only seaport. The Trentino she could cede, the islands of the Adriatic conceivably, but more she could not give and exist, and she would naturally choose to perish fighting. And against Italy Hungarians and Slavs, as well as Austrian Germans, could be relied upon to fight loyally.

Conceivably Italy had asked more than she would take. But all signs pointed in the other direction. So far as it was possible to see, what Italy had asked she could take by force of arms. The only actual restraint would flow from a recognition of the eventual consequences of too great greed now. This nations seldom consider when they can make immediate profits.

The passing of Turkey had long been discounted. Early in the Great War it began to appear that Austrian existence was in peril. Day by day fate seemed to have turned more and more against Francis Joseph, stricken in years and carrying the burden of unparalleled personal as well as national disappointments and griefs. Now Italy raised the question

which struck at the very life of the Dual Empire. If she actually drew the sword, as every sign suggested, there was the instant promise of the coming of greater changes than the map of Europe had known in many centuries.

But the striking thing about the new crisis was that it pointed to German aggrandizement, the making of a greater Germany, with German speaking Austria included. Defeated in the Great War, Germany might yet emerge a larger gainer than any of her enemies, able and certain to take vengeance on faithless Italy in her own good time and to retake Trieste and the Istrian peninsula, with the pendent Adriatic islands.

For centuries Europe had accepted as sound the old adage which asserts that if the Austrian Empire did not exist it would be necessary to create it to keep European peace. Italy had now proposed to repeal this statute of diplomacy, at her own great peril.

CHAPTER XXVII

BULGARIA ALSO STIRS

IN Athens the news of the Allied bombardment at the Dardanelles promptly produced a crisis. Venizelos, the great Cretan, who had piloted Greece through two victorious wars, now demanded that the Hellenic Kingdom placate Bulgaria by ceding Kavola and join the Allies, hoping to play the part Sardinia had played in the Crimean War and win for his state Smyrna and the Greek foreshore of Asia Minor. But to all this King Constantine, influenced by his German wife, a sister of the Kaiser, by shrewd suspicions as to the immediate outlook of Allied success, interposed a final veto and Venizelos resigned and subsequently announced his retirement from public life.

Not less considerable were the echoes made by the guns of the fleet in Sofia. Rarely had fortune played fast and loose with any people as it had with the Bulgars in the years that lay between the outbreak of the first Balkan war and the present hour in the general European conflict. In the opening months of 1913 a Bulgar army stood before the Chatalja lines, another invested Adrianople, a third had passed the Rhodo-


pians to reach the lower Struma Valley and occupy Seres and Kavala, a fourth held Istip, and the valley of the Bregalnitz was the frontier between Servian and Bulgarian in Macedonia.

Yet a few months later all the hard-earned profits of the first Balkan war had been lost. At the Bregalnitz the Serb had overwhelmed the Bulgar and sent the mass of the armies of Ferdinand across the Bulgarian frontier. To the south a Greek Army had prevailed at Kilis, cleared the lower Struma Valley, occupied Kavala. To the east the Turk had reoccupied Adrianople, while to the North the Rumanian hosts were approaching Sofia and Plevna.

By the Peace of Bucharest Bulgaria surrendered to Servia all of northern Macedonia save the little circle about Strumnitz; Monastir, Ochrida, Istip fell to the conquerors. To Greece she relinquished Kavala and her claim upon Salonica. To Rumania she yielded the lower corner of the Dobrudja, held since her liberation, one of the richest regions of the kingdom, peopled by many Bulgars and almost no Rumanians. To Turkey she ceded Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse, the towns she had captured, the ground she had watered with the best of her blood. Overwhelmed by numbers, Bulgaria sullenly laid down her arms but not her hopes. France after 1871 was not more determined to repossess herself of her lost provinces than were the Bulgars. But to the latter the chance seemed to be coming in two years instead of in forty-four. For at the present moment it

BULGARIAN CLAIMS

SHADED PORTIONS SHOW TERRITORY DEMANDED BY BULGARIA FROM
GREECE, SERBIA AND RUMANIA



seemed probable that Bulgaria could make her own terms with those who had despoiled her.

As it stood now, the Rumanians were eager to take up arms to redeem some 3,000,000 Rumanians dwelling in Transylvania and Bukovina. But for Rumania to send her army into the Carpathians and beyond them while Bulgaria, mobilized and unforgiving, watched the southern bank of the Danube, was too dangerous to be considered. A disaster to the Rumanian invaders would infallibly invite Bulgarian attack, Bulgarian invasion of the lands taken by force and without moral justification two years before. Hence Rumanian statesmen, Russian and French and British statesmen, had long been at work seeking to placate Bulgaria.

To all their suggestions Bulgaria had answered simply that she desired the retrocession of her lost provinces and her stolen children. Let Rumania, as a prelude and a fitting prelude to liberating Rumanians, free Bulgarians; such was the Bulgar demand. Some 3,500 square miles and 300,000 souls Bulgaria asked from Rumania; this was her response. Now and again the cable suggested her request had been granted. It was officially announced once from Petrograd that the cession had been agreed to, but the proof was still lacking.

Greece, too, had been eager to join her Servian ally, to whom she was bound by a treaty which also bound Rumania to uphold the terms of the Peace of Bucharest. For Greece an Austrian victory over

Servia would insure the loss of Salonica, of the Chalcidice, of Kavala. It would mean that Austria would come down to the *Ægean* and become the dominant power in the waters between Asia Minor and the African shore. But to avert the peril she could do nothing, while the Bulgarians awaited her first misstep to repass the Rhodopians and approach Salonica. Like Rumania, she was immobilized by Bulgaria, and Servian disaster, which was her own disaster, would threaten all that she had recently achieved in restoring the Hellenic world.

From Greece Bulgaria asked the retrocession of the region between the Struma and the Mesta, assigned to her by the preliminary agreements which were destroyed in the second Balkan war. Kavala is the natural port of Sofia, the only good harbor between the Struma and the Maritza. Its people are Greek, but the hinterland is Bulgar and Turk. Without it Bulgaria has no good harbor on the *Ægean*; with it, she has a future rival to Salonica. Venizelos had agreed that Bulgaria should have this in 1913. In 1915 he urged it again and resigned when his advice was rejected.

Between Serb and Bulgar the outstanding difference was Macedonia. Before the first Balkan war Servia and Bulgaria drew a line across the Turkish territory of Macedonia from Ochrida to the point where Servia, Bulgaria and European Turkey all met, west of Kustendil. North of this line Turkish territory was to be Servian. Uskup, Prisrend, Och-

rida, Dibra were to fall to King Peter. South of it was to fall to Czar Ferdinand; Monastir, Istip, Prilip and Veles were included in the Bulgarian sphere. But when Austria forbade the Serb to take northern Albania and win a window on the sea at Durazzo, Serbia renounced the bargain, claimed and took all of Macedonia, the valley of the Vardar to Guevgehli, and Bulgaria was compelled to accept this sacrifice at Bucharest.

Of all the losses, that felt most keenly by Bulgaria was the Macedonian. For years her teachers had prepared the way for her soldiers. The *comitajis* had patrolled, the Bulgarian patriots had organized Macedonia from the Lake of Ochrida to the Rhodopians. The people spoke her dialect. At the Treaty of San Stefano this region had been assigned to the Bulgar, and in Bulgarian hearts the frontiers of that rescinded treaty are a living fact. From Serbia, therefore, Bulgaria asked that the old bargain be fulfilled. Until Monastir and Istip were returned, Bulgaria would have none of Servian appeals for sympathy or aid.

Were the Austria-German alliance to get the upper hand, to disclose any promise of victory, Bulgarian troops would be in New Serbia without delay, would come south into New Greece to seize the lands that for some months in 1913 they held and mean to have again. Only Austrian failure had restrained Bulgarian action; this and the knowledge that she would again have to face the attack of Rumania, eventually

of Russia, still feared, although all affection, all trust, had vanished.

But the guns of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles changed the situation for Bulgaria, as for all the nations in the Near East. The thought of the day when the Turk would retire from Europe opened a new horizon for Ferdinand and his people. In 1912 and 1913 they had conquered Thrace to the Chatalja. The Bulgarian frontier laid down at London ran from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea. It included Adrianople, retaken for the Turk by Enver Pasha, when the last regiment of the Bulgar garrison had been hurried west to meet the victorious Serb and Greek on the Bregalinitza and the Struma.

Now the whole situation was reversed. If Constantinople fell, the Turks north of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be cut off from supplies and reënforcements. Conceivably all troops would be withdrawn to avoid such a catastrophe. Then Bulgaria, in her turn, could send an army to seize an undefended Adrianople, could resume the Enos-Midia frontier, or even claim all European Turkey save the Constantinople and Gallipoli Peninsulas. Such a reconquest, approved by the anti-Teutonic alliance, without whose approval it would be an empty and evanescent triumph, might satisfy Bulgarian ambition, if to it Rumania added the Silistria strip and Servia the Istip district.

In any event the possession of the Straits by the Allies would give them a commanding position in

their dealings with Bulgaria; it would give them also the resources with which to purchase her neutrality, if not her alliance. Without firing a shot, Ferdinand might regain three quarters of his lost territory and perhaps all of his lost glory.

Such was the situation of Bulgaria. Such were her demands. Until some of them were granted, she held two of her recent conquerors immobilized and constituted a deadly peril to the third if the fortunes of war turned against its allies. Until the hour when the warships of the sea powers lay off the Golden Horn, she held the key of the Near East; even then she must be reckoned with, must be placated. The fact that most of her claims were just did not make her position less commanding or less assured of a hearing.

But Bulgaria satisfied, Constantinople taken, it was plain that a new situation would arise. Then the reconstitution of the Balkan Alliance might be possible. Bulgarian, Rumanian, Serb and Greek, nearly 25,000,000 of people might unite to defend the Balkan peninsula, alike against Austrian and Russian. With such an alliance the Eastern question, if it did not disappear, would pass into a new and less dangerous phase. Austro-German ambition would be halted at the Danube and the Save, Servian, Greek and Rumanian armies might presently be seen in Hungary and Bosnia. And if this happened who would believe that Italy could longer wait, since only those who fought could hope for reward?

CHAPTER XXVIII

NEUVE CHAPELLE

ON October 13, while his advance into Flanders was developing, Sir John French had attempted to turn the Germans out of La Bassée by a flank move to the north between that town and Lille. This venture failed and henceforth throughout the winter La Bassée remained in German hands. That town covered the railroad lines to the east between Lille and Douai and Lille and Valenciennes. Situated on a low hill, hardly more than thirty feet high, rising out of the level plain, with the La Bassée canal at its foot, it was a commanding position, which had been fortified strongly and become impregnable to direct attack.

After the Battles of Flanders in November, the British Army was far too exhausted to undertake any new offensive. Reënforced first by French and later by English troops it narrowed its front, fortified its position and held the line from Ypres south through Armentières to the point where it made contact with the French line west of La Bassée. Despite occasional attacks this line was undisturbed for nearly four months after the great conflicts of October and November.

But in the second week in March, when new regiments had been brought from England, the advance guard of the long promised million of Kitchener, and after an enormous concentration of artillery, the English made a sudden and spectacular leap forward, a new effort to turn the Germans out of La Bassée by an attack across the fields which had been traversed in the earlier advance of October. This attack coincided with the French attack in Champagne and was made after the French had discovered that troops on their front had been drawn from Flanders, thus weakening the Germans facing the British.

The attack was made on March 10 over a front of a little more than four miles. The objective was the little village of Neuve Chapelle at the intersection of several highways the most important leading north from La Bassée to Armentières. The attack was preceded by an artillery engagement described by all witnesses as the most severe of the Western war. More than three hundred British cannon suddenly opened on the narrow front. The village of Neuve Chapelle disappeared as if by an earthquake. The German trenches were swept and levelled by the terrific blast.


When the way had been prepared some thousands of British infantry swept forward, carried the German trenches, cleared the ruins of the village, pressed on for more than a mile from their starting place. In some corners the Germans still offered stubborn resistance supported by machine guns, but

over much of the front they surrendered. Their trenches had been turned into shambles, the slaughter, as described by British official reports, was terrific. The English reported that they buried nearly 3,000 dead Germans and took nearly 2,000 prisoners. The total German loss was estimated by the victors at about 20,000, the German figure was 6,000.

For the next two days the victors had to content themselves with hanging on desperately to the ground captured, while the Germans made repeated counter attacks, which finally broke down, but not until there had been fighting more severe than anything since the Battle of Ypres. By March 12 the struggle was over and the British held their new front, north and east of La Bassée, which was still unshaken. For this little victory the British "butcher's bill" had been 13,000.

In both the British and the French official reports and press the Battle of Neuve Chapelle made a considerable noise. For the first time the superiority of Allied artillery, claimed for several months, was definitely established at a point of contact. For the first time in many months, too, a real, if inconsiderable gain had been made by an Allied attack. A German attack upon the British line at St. Eloi, South of Ypres, which had held out promise of success had been halted on the opening of the Neuve Chapelle operation, a sign that German reserves were beginning to fail.

On the other hand the casualty list was a sobering



THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPPELLE

TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY BRITISH BEFORE THE BATTLE
IS SHOWN BY LIGHT SHADING

TERRITORY GAINED BY THE BATTLE IS SHOWN BY
DARKER SHADING

evidence of what was to be expected if the Germans were to be turned out of France and Belgium by direct attack. In an engagement, which was of only local importance and ended with nothing but local success, the British losses were more than twice those of the British contingent at Waterloo. The Germans, on their own statement, lost more than the Prussians in that decisive battle, which cost Napoleon his throne. At its close the German line was still unbroken and the position of La Bassée as strongly held as ever. Four square miles had been won and lost at the cost of some thirty thousand in killed, wounded and captured by the two armies.

British reports, too, conceded that German prisoners, although somewhat shaken by the violence of the artillery attack, showed every sign of confidence in ultimate victory and not the smallest indication of any decline in discipline. The fury of the counter attack made by the Germans a few hours after the British assault was unmistakable and wherever there was a chance of resistance the Germans held on with grim determination.

Something of the British enthusiasm over their triumph in a battle "bigger than Waterloo," as the press described it, was lost when Sir John French, in reporting on the engagement a few weeks later, conceded that English troops had fallen to their own artillery and a failure of the commander of a British corps to put in his reserve, of various other officers to follow instructions had materially reduced the profit

of the battle. "Some one had blundered," was the frank confession of the British commander-in-chief.

Of itself the Battle of Neuve Chapelle hardly deserved the attention it attracted. But there was one aspect that made it of more than local interest. Already the question of the probable points at which Allied attack would break out in the spring was commanding world-wide interest. Taken in connection with the French fighting in Champagne, the British advance at Neuve Chapelle possibly foreshadowed later activity. It is from this angle that the action invited scrutiny.

In such a scrutiny it was necessary to examine the geographical conditions and the railroad circumstances of the German position in France. Roughly speaking, this position might be described as two sides of a triangle, which had for its base the Franco-Belgian frontier from a point north and west of Lille to another due north of Verdun. The apex of the triangle was at Noyon, less than seventy miles from Paris. Oddly enough, the strongest part of the long German line was precisely that which was nearest to the French capital. Thus from Noyon north to the Somme and again from that town east to Rheims, the German line ran along the crest of the Champagne hills. East of the Oise it was solidly based upon the French forts of the La Fere-Laon-Rheims system, from Noyon to Péronne it was equally strongly protected by the forts and trenches

which the Germans had erected on the hills west of the Oise.

All attempts to force the portion of the German lines from Noyon to Rheims had terminated in January, when the French were driven down the first slopes north of the Aisne and across that stream. West of the Oise and south of the Somme the French had made no progress since October first, when they were swept out of St. Quentin and Péronne by a German counter-offensive. But at Neuve Chapelle, between Arras and Lille, and east of Rheims between that city and the Argonne, the Allied troops had recently been engaged in very serious operations.

The explanation of these operations is found in the examination of the railway lines on which the Germans depended for their existence in northern France. The larger number of these railroads are found fairly close to the sides of the triangle described. Thus an advance by the Anglo-French forces on a front from Arras to Lille would very shortly begin to cut and cross railroads of utmost importance to the Germans. East from Arras a thirty mile advance would take the Allies to Valenciennes, destroying all the main German railway lines save the Maubeuge-St. Quentin road, and would drive a wedge between the Germans in France and in Belgium.

Such a success would almost inevitably turn the Germans out of the Champagne hills and throw their

front back almost to the frontier. This advance in the main would be made over level plains, while to the south the country is rough and would give the defenders far greater advantages, and to the north the forts of Lille bar the way. The extreme German advance post was at La Bassée. The Neuve Chapelle fight was an effort to turn the Germans out of La Bassée by outflanking them.

A glance at a map will show that the two Allied operations, that from Flanders and that from Champagne, if pushed ahead far enough, would actually meet at Namur. Such an operation might be likened to the closing of a pair of pincers. Each step, too, would be accompanied by the elimination of a railway line necessary to some part of the German front. Briefly, then, this was the plan of campaign to which the Allied efforts during the winter pointed. It was also the plan of campaign which satisfied the questions of geography and railroads most completely. But neither in Champagne nor in Flanders did the great efforts of the Allies yield any but local advantages.

CHAPTER XXIX

IN ALSACE

TO complete the record of the operations in the West during the winter months it is now necessary to glance at the campaign in Alsace, a minor operation, viewed from the standpoint of the neutral world, but one which attracted much notice in the French press, met with a moderate degree of success and had an immense appeal to the French people, as it represented the reconquest of a morsel of the "lost provinces" and the promise of the eventual liberation of all Alsace-Lorraine.

In August a French army moving east from Belfort had taken Altkirch, reached Mülhausen, been soundly beaten there and driven back. After much fumbling, incompetence, failure, General Pau had taken command and captured Mülhausen. But all this local success proved useless when the French army was routed before Saarburg and the invasion of France made necessary the recall of all available troops to defend the fatherland. Subsequently a German siege of Belfort was undertaken, five corps of Austrians and Germans, with heavy artillery arrived before the forts, but Austrian disasters com-


pelled the abandonment of this operation before it was actually begun.

In September and October German forces flowed over the Vosges and approached Epinal, driving before them French troops who had earlier in the war crossed the passes of the Schlucht and the Bonhomme and descended the valley of the Bruche. Only one tiny fraction of Alsatian territory remained in French hands and this was the upper portion of the valleys of the Thur and the Doller, in which are situated the towns of Thann and Masmuenster.

In early January there began to be noted in this section fresh French activity. Flowing down the Thur Valley along the great road which crosses the crest of the Vosges at Bussang, just north of the Ballon d'Alsace, French troops began to attack the Germans, holding the hills just east of Thann. These hills commanded the entrance into the plain of Alsace of the highway and the railroad, which follow the valley, east of the Bussang Pass.

At the first the French met some success. They approached Sennheim (Cernay), occupied Anspach and Burnhaupt, in the plain and opened the road which follows the foothills of the Vosges from Belfort to Sennheim. Mülhausen was now little more than ten miles east of the point held by the French advance guard.

But once more German reënforcements were brought up in time. The French were driven out



FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE

A HARTMANNSWEILERKOPF

B STEINBACH

of the plain and back upon Thann. Burnhaupt and Anspach were reoccupied by the Germans, who fortified themselves at Steinbach, at Uffholtz and in other villages in the first hills of the Vosges thus preventing the French from debouching into the plain. About Steinbach there raged one of the severest of the minor combats of the war, the French troops consisting of the famous *Chasseurs Alpins*, the picked troops brought from the southeastern frontier.

Steinbach was ultimately captured by the French but by this time the Germans had fortified Hartmannsweilerkopf, a considerable summit to the northeast, commanding the Thann valley and just south of the Gross Belchen, the highest mountain in the whole Vosges range. This height was taken and lost by the French in January and not until late March were the Germans again driven from this vantage point. In the meantime heavy snows had covered the mountains and brought the whole campaign to a practical halt.

But the Germans by no means resigned themselves to the permanent loss of Hartmannsweilerkopf and in late April, coincident with their attack upon Ypres they again stormed this height up which the French had carried artillery, by efforts recalling those of Napoleon in transporting his artillery over the Alps. Once more German bulletins proclaimed the success of the defence in Alsace and French statements con-

ceded the reverse, while French troops retired to the Molkenrain, a dominating height to the west.

German possession was again short lived. One day later a new French attack swept up the slopes, broke in upon the victorious Germans and evicted them from their trenches. After this incident French and German official communications waged a protracted battle, the Germans denying, the French asserting the capture of the height. Finally an Associated Press correspondent was brought from Paris to confirm French claims. Yet the fact seemed to be that, while the French held the summit, German trenches on the slopes were still maintained, as French trenches had been held, when the French lost the summit.

The bitterness of the fight, both by bayonet and by bulletin, for the possession of this mountain was perhaps the best indication of its actual value, the change and change-about of masters is the clearest indication of the fashion in which the campaign in Alsace was being contested.

While this campaign was proceeding General Joffre crossed the Vosges. Addressing the citizens of one of the little Alsatian towns now reconquered he spoke with an assurance and frankness wholly out of keeping with his reputation for taciturnity. To his audience he gave the unqualified pledge that the French return was for all time, that they were now re-united to France forever. A similar speech was made by President Poincaré a few weeks later, when

he, too, visited the corner of Old France that had been "redeemed."

But on May 1 the French were still held at the edge of the Vosges and were unable to deploy in the plain. Sennheim, Anspach, Burnhaupt were still in German hands. So was Altkirch to the south, between Belfort and Mülhausen, which had been fortified anew by the Germans. North of Thann the French held the Schlucht Pass and the Pass of the Bonhomme, west and north of Colmar respectively, but here the Germans occupied the upper valleys of the streams that lead from these passes to the Alsatian Plain. North of the Bonhomme the Germans were still solidly posted in French territory west of the Bruche Valley about Ban de Sapt and not far from St. Dié.

The winter campaign in Alsace was variously explained by military commentators. As an operation to fortify French position in the Southern Vosges it was successful. As a move to open the way for a spring eruption into Alsace and across the Rhine into South Germany it was less completely successful, but had resulted in marked progress, and the occupation of several advantageous positions. Perhaps the simplest explanation was to be found in the phrase attributed to General Joffre, who was reported to have said that he was, as yet, "just nibbling" at the German positions.

This policy of "nibbling" had, according to French and British official statements, compelled the

Germans to retain large numbers of troops in their Western armies, which might otherwise have played a decisive part in the Eastern campaign.

As to the prospect of any immediately successful spring "drive" in Alsace, Swiss reports of German fortifications about Mülhausen, Colmar and Altkirch were plain discouragements to French optimism. Early in the winter the French had reached positions from which they could see the spires of Mülhausen, but every week saw the strengthening of the lines that lay between them and the city that had already twice slipped through their hands in the course of the present war.

CHAPTER XXX

DEFEAT AT THE STRAITS

IN the early days of the Dardanelles operation the Allied fleets made rapid and cheap progress. Headed by the *Queen Elizabeth*, one of the newest of British ships, whose 15-inch guns outranged the Turkish batteries, French and British ships forced the entrance to the Straits, levelled the forts on the two promontories at the mouth, spread destruction among the batteries which protected the shore of the Troad. Preceded by mine sweepers they penetrated some ten miles inside the Straits. In the meantime other ships from the Gulf of Saros bombarded over the narrow Gallipoli peninsula and reached the Turkish forts at the narrows by indirect fire.

But this was only the first and easiest step in forcing a road to Constantinople. A dozen miles east of the entrance to the Straits the channel narrows to little more than a mile in width and in a winding course between high hills the water in the Straits runs swiftly against the advancing ships. Since these waters were mined every demand that could be made for caution was imposed by the mere geographical conditions.

Could the Allied ships pass this point, win through

the ten miles of narrow channel, pass Nagara, the famous Abydos of antiquity, where Leander and Byron swam the Hellespont, the way to Byzantium was practically open to them. For, while the Turks had fortified some islands in the Sea of Marmora, these works were slight and could offer little serious opposition. Beyond these lay Constantinople wholly defenceless against any attack from the sea.

After a month of deliberate bombardments, in the third week of March the Allied fleet attempted to force the channel, relying upon the apparent success of their guns in silencing the Turkish forts. The result was an immediate and grave disaster. The French battleship *Bouvet*, with more than 600 officers and men was sunk by a mine, literally blown out of water and destroyed. Two British battleships, the *Irresistible* and the *Ocean* shared a similar fate, although most of their crews were saved. Their destruction was attributable to gunfire. Also the French *Suffren* was put out of the fight together with several other British ships.

The effect of this disaster upon the Dardanelles operation was instant. Although Allied bulletins spoke cheerfully of an immediate resumption of the attack and new ships were sent from France and England to resume the work, the lesson had been too severe to invite repetition and by April 1 the bombardment of the forts had become a long distance operation and all hope of forcing the Straits without the aid of land forces had disappeared.



THE DARDANELLES

BLACK LINES SHOW TURKISH FORTS

UNDERLINED NAMES INDICATE PLACES WHERE ALLIES
LAND TROOPS

CROSS MARKS POINT WHERE ALLIED SHIPS WERE SUNK

If the moral effect of the opening of the attack on the Dardanelles, upon the Balkan States and upon Italy had been great, it was impossible to exaggerate the counter effect of this disaster. Greece settled back placidly to await a more promising time for casting her lot with the Allies. Bulgarian bands once more began to invade Macedonia and threaten Serbia with a war on two fronts. German officers in Constantinople, von der Goltz, notably, issued statements proclaiming that the forts of the Dardanelles were impregnable and the Sultan, himself, invited war correspondents to visit him that he might express to them his confidence in his forts. Not even the appearance of a Russian fleet at the Bosphorus served to counterbalance the triumph of the Turks.

Yet it was unmistakable that the Allies had not abandoned their operation, for presently came the report of the arrival of French troops in Egypt, at Lemnos and at Tenedos, the advance guard of an army which covered by the guns of the fleet was to be landed on the Gallipoli peninsula and seizing the town of Bulair, where the peninsula is narrowest, cut off the forts on the European side and capture them. General d'Amade, the French conqueror of the Morocean Shawia in 1911, was assigned to the command of this army, which had been organized at Bizerta in Tunis and was reported to contain British as well as French native troops.

But for the time being sea power had met with a considerable reverse. The loss in warships was

heavy, but not vital. The French and British ships actually sunk were old, had become mere platforms for heavy guns and of little value in the battle line, but for the loss there had been no corresponding military advantage. What was worse, there had been a prompt diminution in prestige at the precise point where the Allies had been most anxious to demonstrate their strength and to enlist the Balkan neutrals.

A bombardment of Smyrna, accompanied by a summons to the Vali to surrender was equally fruitless. Smyrna held out. Neither in that city nor in Constantinople was there any attempt on the part of the Christian population to assist the enemy. The prestige of Enver Pasha, shaken by the disasters in the Caucasus, was temporarily at least revived by the victory of the forts of the Dardanelles.

The policy of the Allies was now clearly revealed. Austria and Turkey, being palpably more vulnerable than Germany, it was against them that the efforts of the Anglo-French fleets and the Russian army were being concentrated. But although both had been severely tested, had met grave defeats, they still endured and were heartened by the victory at the Straits, which permanently stilled the Allied hope that Easter might be celebrated by Christian service in St. Sophia. To the Allies the affair at the Dardanelles was more serious than anything that had happened since the coming of winter, save only the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, and that had been

without consequence beyond local losses. Once more Turkey had proved how premature were all projects for partitioning her provinces and the Crescent still supplanted the Cross at Stamboul.


THE COMING OF SPRING

CHAPTER XXXI

PRZEMYSL

IN March 22, Przemyśl facing starvation surrendered to the Russians: 117,000 men, 3,000 officers, including nine generals, and one of the great strongholds of Europe were the Russian booty. In addition nearly 30,000 Austro-Hungarian troops had perished in the long defence. Four army corps were thus accounted for in a surrender unequalled in Europe since Sedan and Metz deprived France of her two field armies in 1870.

In taking Przemyśl the Russians achieved by far the greatest Allied triumph on the offensive side of the war. The French victory at the Marne, the Anglo-Belgian victories along the Yser and about Ypres, the Russian success in holding the line of the Bzura-Rawka, these were of utmost importance, but counted solely as defensive battles. Only the earlier Russian victories before Lemberg, at Rawaruska and Tomazov and the Serbian successes at the Jedar and Valievo could be compared with Przemyśl and this overbore them all.



PRZEMYSL AND THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS

BLACK LINE SHOWS RUSSIAN FRONT

SANOK EXTREME POINT OF AUSTRIAN ADVANCE TO RELIEVE PRZEMYSL



Like the fall of Antwerp, which it naturally recalled, the surrender of Przemysl solidified the position of an invader in a conquered province. Against 10,000 square miles of conquered Belgium was now to be set more than twice as large an area in Galicia. Again, the German achievement, thanks to the escape of the Belgian Army, had been devoid of considerable military consequences, while the Russian conquest seemed bound to have far-reaching effects.

To the armies of the Czar, Przemysl was a far more serious menace than Antwerp had been to those of the Kaiser. The Belgian fortress was on the flank of the German communications and could be contained by a small force. But Przemysl is squarely on the main trunk railroad, between Lemberg and Cracow at its intersection with a branch line coming north out of Hungary over the Lupkow Pass. The city lies in the San Valley encircled by hills. Five miles from the centre of the town was the nearest of the outer forts. The circumference of the outer line was perhaps twenty-five miles.

While the city held out, the Russian armies in Galicia were compelled to detach corps to deal with the unconquered fortress in their rear, and their lines of communication were broken by the Austrian garrison's command of highways and railroads vital to the invaders and commanded by the heavy artillery of the Przemysl forts. As Grant at the siege of Vicksburg was threatened by Johnston's army in his rear, the Russians about Przemysl were menaced by

Austro-German advances along the Carpathian crests.

Looking back over the progress of the siege, it will be seen how great was the value each side attached to Przemyśl. In September, when the Russians swept west along the Lemberg-Cracow railroad after their great victories, Przemyśl was invested. For more than a month the Czar's generals made desperate attacks and sacrificed thousands of men in vain.

This failure compromised the whole Russian situation in Galicia, and when the Germans made their first drive at Warsaw, Russian armies west of the San and north of the Carpathians were obliged to retreat to escape being caught between two fires. The fortress was thus relieved and all Galicia west of the San reconquered by the Austrian troops.

The defeat of the Austrians at Sandomir early in November led promptly to a new investment. Before December 1 the iron circle had closed about the fortress and the city was once more besieged. Later in December, when Hindenburg had won Lodz and was approaching Warsaw, a new Austrian offensive directed from Cracow and from Hungary in a converging drive upon Przemyśl was undertaken and having approached Sanok, twenty-five miles from the outposts of Przemyśl, ended in complete disaster. As it turned out, this defeat settled the fate of the fortress. Military critics estimated that with a garrison of 55,000 men, Przemyśl could have held out indefinitely. But three times that number had been

thrown into the town and like Metz the Galician fortress had succumbed to hunger within the walls rather than to the foe without.

Early in February one more determined effort was made by the Germans, who then went to the aid of their Austrian ally. Coming east and north into Bukowina, coming south and east from Cracow, coming north over the Dukla, Lupkow and Uzok passes, great armies endeavored to penetrate Galicia and relieve Przemysl. This was the last and most desperate effort, save for a final sortie of the garrison in the closing hours of the siege, which resulted in a casualty list of over 10,000 chiefly among the Hungarians.

For the world at large the interest in the Przemysl siege lay in its contrast with that of Antwerp. Under the fire of the German 42-centimetre and the Austrian 30-centimetre guns defences of the Belgian city had crumbled in seven days. More than twice as many weeks were needed to reduce the defenders of Przemysl, as for the defence, they remained unshaken to the end.

The fact was that Russia wholly lacked the heavy artillery which German forethought had provided. The circle of nine detached forts about the Galician city, crowning the ridges in a semi-circle, the highest over 700 feet above the valley, reminiscent of the Brialmont system about Liège, of the French forts about Maubeuge, were utterly beyond the resources of Russian artillery.

At the very outset Russian high command recognized that the capture of Przemyśl by any other method than investment, by any other weapon than famine was impossible. Early in December there was drawn about the city a line of trenches, of field works, adequate to resist any sortie of the garrison, but destitute of any artillery that could batter a breach in the forts, which among European frontier defences were comparable only with those of the French at Belfort, or with those of the Germans at Metz and Strassburg.

As the Germans sat down before Metz in 1870 to wait until hunger should compel Bazaine to capitulate, the Russians in turn encircled Przemyśl. The circumference of the Austrian circle of defence was perhaps twenty-five miles, the Russian little less than double. In their lines the Russians attempted no siege work. In December, when the Austro-German relieving army came over the Carpathians a sortie of the Przemyśl garrison brought the beleaguered army within twenty-five miles of the relieving army, but the sortie was then driven in.

In the closing hours of the siege the food of the garrison was exhausted, dogs sold for \$5, cats for \$2. A British war correspondent who entered the town with the victorious army furnished the world with a circumstantial story of the extreme suffering of Austrian soldiers, unpleasantly contrasted with the well fed condition of their officers. All accounts agreed that resistance had ceased only when hunger

had become general. A Twentieth Century audience, now accustomed to sieges of the German sort, was thus treated to an investment wholly comparable with that remote siege of Alesia, in which Cæsar, by the same method conquered Vercingetorix and Gaul.

The very character of the final incidents of the siege was a final evidence of the cause of the surrender. One by one the Austrian forts, still unbreached by Russian artillery were blown up. In point of fact the Russians were taken by surprise and the Austrian work of destruction was complete before it was fully appreciated in Russian lines that the end was at hand. The forts destroyed, the bridges over the San blown up, their heavy guns wrecked, the Austrian commander finally raised the white flag, after a resistance of four months, during which, until almost the last day *aëroplanes* had maintained the communications between the garrison and the outside world.

The fall of Antwerp relieved a German Army, which pushed rapidly forward to reach the Channel ports. The taking of *Przemysl* released an even greater Russian Army. To what point it would be directed was a matter of conjecture. If it were transported directly west toward Cracow it might drive the Austrians west of the *Dunajec* in upon Cracow and threaten the front of the whole Austro-German force in Poland from the *Nida* to the *Bzura*. This was the plan generally expected and might easily have compelled the evacuation of Poland.

On the other hand, this force, more than 250,000 strong, might be sent due south to the Carpathians. With its arrival Austrian forces along the Carpathians would conceivably have to go back over the mountains and once more a Russian host might sweep down into the Hungarian Plain, this time freed from any apprehension for their communications.

Finally, the army which had taken the last Galician fortress east of Cracow might be sent south into Bukowina to complete the reconquest of this crown land and by a subsequent invasion of Transylvania persuade the wavering Rumanians to cast their lot with the enemies of the two Kaisers.

It was to the Carpathians that the Russian General Staff decided to send its newly released corps, and long before they appeared in the passes it was plain to the whole world — neutral and belligerent — that whichever of these three courses followed, the consequences would be grave for the Austro-German alliance.

Whatever the military consequences, the moral effect of the Russian success could not be exaggerated. It was sweet solace to the nation which was defeated at Lodz and the Mazurian Lake. It gave additional emphasis to the sound of the Anglo-French artillery before the Dardanelles. It awakened new and uncomfortable echoes alike in Ballplatz and Wilhelmsstrasse. In Bucharest and in

Athens it served to counterbalance the effect of the Anglo-French naval reverse at the Straits.

A few weeks before German press bureaus had announced that Russia, beaten to her knees, her strength exhausted, was ready to abandon the struggle. The Russian answer came as a rude demonstration of the futility of such claims. *Przemysl* will be in Russian history a fair counterpoise to Port Arthur; the most considerable Russian success in Europe since Plevna.

CHAPTER XXXII

ST. MIHIEL

BY April 1 the fighting in Champagne and Flanders had dropped to the level of mere incidental bombardments and insignificant local attacks and counter-attacks. But Allied activity in the West had broken out at a new point and French troops were desperately attempting to beat down the famous German salient of St. Mihiel.

Coinciding as it did with the great battle raging in the Carpathians, this contest along the heights of the Meuse and in the Woëvre was recognized as timed to prevent the deflection of German troops from the West to the East to support the hard-pressed Austrians and as an evidence of the growing synchrony between the movements of the three great Allies lacking in earlier months. The Battle of Champagne had been pushed at the moment when the fate of Przemyśl was in the balance and had held German corps rooted to their western positions, Neuve Chapelle had been a similar demonstration at the same time and for the same purpose.

More and more Germany was being put upon the defensive, more and more her enemies were demon-

strating their possession of superior numbers. Neuve Chapelle, Champagne, and now the fight for St. Mihiel, with the renewal of the advance in Alsace contemporaneously reported, were accepted as proof of the opening of a spring campaign, not by a general offensive from the Jura to the North Sea, but by attacks at widely separated points, with the purpose of fixing German troops in their positions and preventing a repetition of the successful transfer of German corps from point to point, made with such effectiveness in earlier months.

Of itself, the St. Mihiel operation was less considerable than that in Champagne, though not less bloody or severely contested. In September, while the fighting between the Marne and the Aisne was still in progress and the German drive to Paris was not definitely terminated, the German garrison of Metz made a sudden and successful attack upon the barrier of forts connecting Verdun with Toul and covering the Nancy railroad to Paris. Moving southwest from Metz up the valley of the Rupt de Mad, the one natural break in the wall of hills separating the Meuse from the Moselle, the Germans destroyed Fort Troyon, but failed to occupy the ruins, which were gallantly held by the garrison. But they did subsequently succeed in capturing Fort Camp des Romains, the strongest fort between the permanent defences of Toul and Verdun.

Fort Camp des Romains commanded the crossing of the Meuse at St. Mihiel, and once it had fallen the

Germans bridged the river and moved west toward the valley of the Aire. At this time German forces were north and west of Verdun, and there was grave danger that this new force moving west would join hands with the troops interposing between Verdun and Paris, complete the encirclement of this fortress and presently reduce it as Maubeuge and Liège had been reduced. This would have given the German armies in Champagne a short and direct road to Germany leading under the guns of Metz, a few miles east of Verdun, and would have threatened the rear of the French armies defending Nancy.

Fortunately for the French, the German defeats which now followed in quick succession terminated the immediate menace of the St. Mihiel movement. First the Germans in Champagne and west of the Argonne were driven to the north of St. Menchould and the Verdun-Paris railroad was freed. Then the St. Mihiel column was defeated along the Aire and thrown back to the Meuse. Finally the fighting in Flanders made such a demand upon the Germans for troops that they were obliged to draw upon the St. Mihiel force, and the operations in this region promptly fell to the level of a siege, which they had maintained until the coming of April.

While no longer a source of immediate danger, the German position at St. Mihiel constituted a continuing menace to the French. Fort Camp des Romains, high above the Meuse, not only controlled the crossing of the river but also the Toul-Verdun

railroad. The Germans armed it with heavy artillery and made it a spearhead thrust through the eastern barrier forts. They thus held a narrow corridor, hardly ten miles wide at its broadest point, straight through the French bulwark — an avenue for attack, if the Germans were ever again able to take the offensive.

After some more or less desultory efforts to break this German wedge the French turned their attention to Flanders and then to Champagne. North and west of Verdun in the Argonne and to the west they steadily pushed the Germans back until they occupied solidly the whole circle about Verdun and had made a German investment and bombardment of this fortress impossible. But before they could venture to take the offensive in other fields it was almost imperative that they close the gap in their line of barrier fortresses.

This they now undertook to do, and in the first week of April were engaged in attacks upon two sides of the Verdun-St. Mihiel-Pont-à-Mousson triangle. On a twenty-mile front from Pont-à-Mousson to Apremont, just south of St. Mihiel, they pushed north. On a narrower front from the heights of the Meuse to Fresnes, parallel to the first and hardly ten miles distant, they pushed south through Les Eparges and Combres taking the heights east of these towns by storm in one of the most desperate struggles of the war on April 9. A third movement east from Verdun made progress

about Etain, which is a third of the distance between Verdun and Metz. Half a dozen miles of advance along this line would bring the French to the battlefields about Mars-la-Tour, where the defeat of Bazaine decided the Franco-Prussian War.

The Germans, actually enfolded between the two French lines moving north and south, and closing like a pair of shears fought desperately to hold their narrow corridor from Metz to St. Mihiel down which they had constructed a railroad from the rail head at Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel. St. Mihiel itself, dominated by Fort Camp des Romains, had been made by German fortifications practically unsailable. But if the French thrusts north and south were successful the Germans at St. Mihiel would be cut off from Metz and ultimately compelled to evacuate their position or to surrender.

The present French effort, even should it succeed, would not open the way to an invasion of German territory. It would not deprive the Germans of control of any important line of railroad. The forts of Metz and Thionville would bring the French to a prompt halt, once they had crossed the Orne and reached the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. On the other hand, as a defensive move, as an attempt to close a dangerous breach in their own lines, the French attack was of greatest importance. Once the St. Mihiel position were taken and the trenches were carried south from Etain to Pont-à-Mousson,

French troops could be sent to other points, where the real offensive might be expected.

The weakness of the German position lay in the fact that it was a salient, open to attack from two sides and if narrowed much would be subject to cross-fire. Its strength lay in the roughness of the country, which had made it possible to fortify strongly; the nearness of Metz, which enabled the Germans to bring up heavy artillery and reënforcements without delay, and the proximity to the permanent forts which protect the base.

The capture of St. Mihiel, with Fort Camp des Romains, would close to the Germans one more road to Paris. It would mean that between Switzerland and the old Luxemburg frontier the French defence had proven itself indestructible. It would corroborate all that German statesmen said of the military necessity to invade France through Belgium, since it would prove that the eastern barrier fortresses could not be broken. But it would not lead to any more serious consequences than the bombardment of the outlying defences of Metz. The Germans had prepared to defend this great fortress in the trenches as the French had held Verdun, preventing the 42-centimetre guns from coming within range of the inner forts.

After three weeks of desperate fighting, the St. Mihiel operation dropped to the level of a mere local conflict. Like the Champagne engagement it dimin-

ished rather than died out, the bulletins continued to report fighting in the Forest of Le Pretre, north of Pont-à-Mousson and in the Forest of Ailly, north of Flirey.

But despite local successes, real advances on both sides of the salient, the French had so far failed to compel a German retreat. The more ambitious purposes of their strategy had been effectively blocked by German resistance and German concentration in this section seemed to promise a postponement, if not a permanent check to French hopes. In its results the St. Mihiel operation was to be compared with that of Champagne, the test of its value only measurable by comparative lists of casualties, which were, of course lacking.

Despite French claims, there was no reason to deny the Germans credit for success both in Champagne and about St. Mihiel, for in both places they had held their ground, with the loss of some trenches and positions. In neither place had a French "drive" actually penetrated the hostile lines. Such breaches as had been made, and here the reports of the two nations differed, had been closed promptly and completely. If the French held the heights of Les Eparges against many German counter-attacks, which proved their importance, the Germans held St. Mihiel solidly on May 1.

CHAPTER XXXIII

IN THE CARPATHIANS

THE collapse of the Austrian advance in November, the defeat at the Vistula, followed by the retreat through Przemysl to the Carpathians, had compelled Germany to intervene once more on behalf of her ally. In February new German formations appeared along the Carpathians and the Russian advance through the passes was halted, thrown back. Moving east from Cracow, north from the Carpathian crests and northeast through Bukovina, the Germans undertook one more of their famous enveloping movements, but with little actual success.

From Cracow the advance reached the Dunajec before Tarnow and came to a complete halt. In the Carpathians the Russians gave ground and retreated to well-selected and strongly fortified positions on the Galician side in the upper valleys of the San and the Stryj, covering the forces that were investing Przemysl. Henceforth for many weeks a terrific struggle went on in these mountains, the Russians on the defensive giving new evidence of their well-established tenacity and endurance behind entrenchments.

In Bukovina the German aid was more fruitful.

Practically all the crownland had been overrun by Cossacks, who had approached the Borgo Pass, and Russian triumph in this province had awakened uneasiness in Rumania. But with the arrival of German corps on their front the Czar's forces were driven precipitately across the Pruth, Czernowitz was recaptured, Austro-German columns approached Stanislau and Halisz and occupied Kolomea, troops coming east along the Budapest-Czernowitz railway joining hands with those who came north through the Borgo Pass from Transylvania.

As a political campaign this demonstration in Bukovina was completely successful. Rumania became passive, trainloads of wheat held up by the Rumanian government were released for German and Austrian destinations, arms and ammunition again flowed through Rumania to Constantinople. On the eastern front February was one of the most successful months in the war and a new evidence of the tremendous resources of Germany in men and a further evidence that Austria, much beaten upon and frequently defeated, was still unconquered.

But March came, the situation changed rapidly. Despite German success at the Mazurian Lakes, Russia still sent hosts of fresh troops to the Carpathians, her armies slowly pushed west again toward the crests of the passes and the Austro-German attack in Eastern Galicia and on the Bessarabian frontier of Bukovina died slowly down. Finally the surrender of Przemyśl wholly changed the face of

the eastern campaign by releasing at least four Russian corps, removing all threat of attack in the rear and freeing the hands of the Czar's generals for a new drive at Hungary, as the fall of Antwerp had released German corps for the advance to Calais.

For Americans the parallel between the siege of Przemyśl and Vicksburg was illuminating. While Austrian armies were advancing in the Carpathians and Przemyśl garrison held out, the situation of the Russians was like that of Grant before Vicksburg with Pemberton in his front and Johnston in his rear.

The analogy was then complete, the outcome identical. What the Mississippi was to the North, the Cracow-Lemberg railroad was to the Czar's armies in Galicia. With the loss of Vicksburg the Southern military frontier recoiled to the eastward. Grant resumed his campaigning at Chattanooga, the Grand Duke Nicholas continued his campaign in the Carpathians. From Chattanooga Sherman moved south to Atlanta and the "March to the sea" followed. Could the Russians cross the Carpathians, there would be a new parallel.

With the corps thus released Russia instantly began her long promised advance through the Carpathians and the battle in these mountains took on a new character. Immediately new demands were made upon the Germans for help by the Austrians and still more German corps were hurried to the threatened Hungarian frontier, to hold the narrow isthmus-like ridge of the Carpathians separating the

Hungarian from the Galician Plain, much as Panama divides the Atlantic from the Pacific.

By way of illustration the two American continents may be compared to the masses of mountains, the one separating Bukovina from Transylvania, the other the several ranges south of Cracow, known as the Tatra. Between these two masses of mountains, the Tatra rising nearly to 9,000 feet, the others to 6,000 and made up of successive ridges, is the narrow isthmus of the Central Carpathians separating the Hungarian from the Galician Plain. At the lowest and narrowest point in the Central Carpathians, corresponding perfectly to Panama is the Dukla Pass. And against this point the Russian drive was now beginning to beat.

The simplest fashion to illustrate the passes of the Carpathians, for the control of which Germany, Austria and Russia were now fighting their most desperate struggle of the war, is to use the figure of the hand. Lay the four fingers on the table, and theoretically they are pointing south, that is, from Galicia toward Hungary. The forefinger will then represent the Dukla Pass, the middle finger the Lupkow, the third finger the Uzok and the little finger the Beskid. Through the Dukla Pass goes the best highway from Hungary to Galicia, through the Lupkow the railroad from Budapest to Przemyśl, through the Uzok a light railway connecting Budapest with Lemberg, and through the Verecke the main trunk line from the Hungarian to the Galician capital.

Of the four passes the Dukla is the lowest, its highest point is less than 1700 feet above sea level; hardly 500 above the plain at Przemyśl, the Beskid, the highest, is less than 3000. [The mountains through which they lead are under 6000 feet. On the Galician side the passes lead from the headwaters of the San, the Stryj and the Dneister; in the Hungarian territory they meet the headwaters of the Laborcz, the Ung and the Latorze, which are affluents of the upper Theiss. From the crest of the mountains to the Hungarian plain at the foot of the passes is something over twenty miles. The plain itself is above a hundred miles wide, and runs north and south from the Carpathians to the Danube and opens west toward Budapest.

By the second week in April the Russians had passed the summit of the Dukla and approached Bartfeld in Hungary, the terminus of a railroad leading south through the large city of Kassa, fifty miles distant, to Budapest, which was 210 miles from the Russian advance guard. East of Bartfeld the Russians were across the Lupkow and occupied Mezo Laborze, which is on the Hungarian side of the mountains. Further to the east they were still to be north of the crests but advancing. Such was the nature of the country that the continued advance from the Dukla would uncover the rear of all the other passes, and unless the Russians were presently checked here, Austrian retirement from all passes would be inevitable.

In four columns, then, three following railroads and one following a national highway, the Russians sought to burst into Hungary, their attempt recalling the famous and successful campaign of Wellington in the Pyrenees a century before. Already there were certain perfectly clearly defined consequences of Russian success. An examination of these, demonstrates why the battle of the Carpathians had become not only one of the most important in the present war but might prove a decisive battle in Austrian history.

First of all, Russian success in the passes would enable the Czar to deploy his hosts on the Hungarian Plain on a front of at least a hundred miles, with no other obstacle between them and the Magyar capital than the Theiss river, which twice crosses the Russian road. More than this, it would enable the Czar to loose his Cossack hordes to sweep over the great granary of Austria, carrying destruction on all sides and ending all chance of a successful harvest in the districts upon which Austria as well as Hungary was now depending for her food supply.

Given control of the railroads and the passes behind them, the Russian foothold in Hungary could hardly be shaken. The lines might be checked, the advance thrown back at various points, but the wall of the Carpathians was sure to be fortified promptly. Over these passes, too, in ever increasing numbers the Cossacks, the Turcoman and the other irregular Russian cavalry which had so far found little to do in

the struggle against the German masses and the Austrian mountain positions, would flow steadily.

Russian success at the Carpathian passes would necessarily compel the abandonment of the Austrian campaign in Bukovina, the evacuation of that crown-land and the ultimate relinquishment of Transylvania. This would follow the seizure by the Russians of the railroad crossing the Carpathians from the upper Theiss to the Pruth by Joblonitza Pass to the east of the Verecke Pass. This railroad would be at the mercy of the Russian invaders when they had pressed their advance only a few miles west and south of the point where the Budapest-Lemberg railroad enters the Hungarian Plain at Munkacs. It was by this railroad that the Austro-German army now operating south of Stanislaw and Halisz had been sent into Bukovina and was being supplied.

Such an evacuation of Bukovina would be followed by a new Russian invasion, which would overflow into Transylvania by the Borgo Pass and once more incite Rumanians to action. Such a retreat, too, would mean a final surrender of Bukovina as well as eastern Galicia, because it would give Russia control of all the railroads leading from Hungary to the Austrian provinces.

But the effect of the Russian victory would not end with the evacuation of Bukovina and eastern Galicia. Several hundred thousand Austrian troops were still covering Cracow along the Dunajec in Galicia and the Nida in Russian Poland. The retreat of those

troops would be a signal for a new Russian advance, but the advance would be toward Cracow and Silesia. These Austrian troops were covering the frontiers of Germany, not Austria, hence a successful push into Hungary by the Russians would inevitably compel the recall of these troops to defend the Hungarian capital.

Upon Germany would then fall the whole burden of defending her frontier from the Vistula at Cracow to the Baltic. Far too little credit had been allowed the Austrians for what they had accomplished for their allies there, but the usefulness of their service would be disclosed once they were recalled. With their withdrawal it was not too much to forecast that the whole German line would be drawn back to the Wartha, Lodz and the Bzura-Rawka front abandoned, and the fruits of the winter campaign surrendered.

In a word, the collapse of the whole Austro-German offensive in Poland, of all Austro-German offensives in the East, would, it now seemed, follow a decisive victory of the Russians in the Carpathians, which could be followed by an invasion of Hungary, an invasion in such force as to endanger Budapest. The German campaign in Suwalki, the Austro-German campaign in Bukovina, would have to be abandoned to the insistent demand from Budapest for men and for artillery to defend the fields of the Magyar kingdom, the wheat fields so valuable to the two kaisers in the coming harvest.

As to the political consequences, some of them at least could hardly be questioned. Rumania would be face to face with the last chance to occupy Transylvania and claim Bukovina. Spring might give King Peter's Servian armies sufficient new life to push north of the Danube to join the Russian invaders. Italy, perceiving the approach of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, might also find her hand forced or her profit made sufficiently certain and cheap to tempt her to action.

To go back a century, something of the same moral consequences that might follow a Russian victory at the Carpathians did actually follow the victory of Wellington over Soult in the not dissimilar Battle of the Pyrenees. The entrance of a hostile army into France, the occupation of a considerable region of the Empire was the first signal for internal disaffection. All the opponents of Napoleon took courage and began to make their voices heard. In Bordeaux there were prompt evidences of a royalist reaction, the first symptom that the French nation was no longer united against the enemies of the great Emperor and unlikely to repeat the national uprising of 1792.

The arrival of a Russian army in the Hungarian Plain might have a similar effect upon the Hungarian people, who had borne the burden of the Austrian campaigns, suffered incalculable losses in all the heavy defeats. Time and again as the war progressed, ever more and more unfavorably to Austria the sug-

gestion of a separate peace made by Hungary was heard. By such a peace Hungary might hope to retain Transylvania, marked out by Rumanian patriots as their share of the spoils, might even hope to hold Fiume and a window on the Adriatic.

Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, London, Paris, all the belligerent capitals perceived the meaning of the new struggle. The conflict at the Dardanelles lost the world stage to the battle of the Carpathians, because in human history the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy seemed a larger thing than the final exit of the Turk from Europe, and the fate of Austria was patently at stake. After the fall of Antwerp Germany made one final effort to retrieve the defeat at the Marne and "dispose of France." Russian strategy after Przemyśl was not different.

Between the battle of Flanders and that of the Carpathians the analogy was complete, and on the outcome the whole world believed in early April that the destiny, perhaps the existence, of a great power depended. This belief was strengthened by the fact that in the first days of the fight while Russian advance was unmistakable Petrograd and Rome, alike, buzzed with rumors of an Austrian application for a separate peace. The rumor was frequently and officially denied, but, at the least it was significant of the estimate placed after Austrian fortunes.

The Carpathian fighting entered its later and more desperate stage in the first days of April. By the third week the Russian advance, after having made

notable progress, passed the crest of the range at Dukla and moving down the Hungarian slopes west of the Lupkow, came to a halt. The battle line now rested *à cheval* on the Carpathians. West of Lupkow the Russians were pushing south to threaten the communications of the Austro-German forces north of the Carpathians at the Uzok and Beskid Passes. The Austro-German troops, on their part were endeavoring to strike the communications of the advancing Russians with Lemberg and Przemyśl.

Berlin and Vienna reported that the Russian campaign had been definitively checked. Petrograd claimed that the weather, rains and floods had compelled cessation of effort. The truth, perhaps, lay between the two. What was important to recognize was that Russian advance had come to a complete halt, a temporary deadlock had ensued. The decision now would belong to the contestant able to take the offensive first with the largest reënforcements. This Germany was already preparing to do and the troops which were to make her great May counterstroke were already massing east of Cracow along the Dunajec, on the flank of the whole Russian position in the Carpathians.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE THIRD CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW

RUSSIAN reports of new artillery operations by the Germans about Ossowetz in the second week in April drew attention again to the most ambitious of the later German strategical ventures in the East, a venture which was suspended rather than abandoned because of weather conditions in March.

Conceivably the new activity foreshadowed a final attempt to get Warsaw and take the line of the Vistula as a permanent defensive position in the East.

Look at any good sized map of Russian-Poland and it will be seen that some fifty miles south and east of the German frontier and following it is the Petrograd-Warsaw railroad. South of this and converging upon it is the Moscow-Warsaw railroad. These railroads are the life-lines of the great Russian Army defending the Polish capital, on the Bzura-Rawka line, a few miles to the west.

On two occasions the Germans had attempted to take Warsaw by an advance from the west. The first time they were defeated almost within the city limits and driven to the frontier. The second time they were brought to a halt at the Bzura River, in December, and held there from December to April.

Late in February they made a third attempt to get to Warsaw, and this time they planned to move south from East Prussia and cut the Petrograd-Warsaw and the Moscow-Warsaw railroads east of Warsaw. This would compel the Russians to evacuate Warsaw and go back from the Vistula to the Bug. The Germans would then hold the Vistula line from East Prussia to Galicia, and holding it could send troops to France and to aid the Austrians.

When this drive began the Tenth Russian Army was in East Prussia, strung along the Mazurian Lakes from Lyck to Gumbinnen and slowly working west toward Insterburg. This army was defeated, completely routed and driven east and south toward the Petrograd-Warsaw railroad.

To reach the railroad, however, the Germans had still to break through the Niemen-Bohr-Narew barrier, a series of forts and fortified towns stretching from Kovno to Novo Georgiewsk on a broad semicircle 250 miles long. This barrier followed the eastern and southern banks of these rivers. Between the rivers, swamps and forests make the country difficult for military operations, and whenever roads or railways crossed the line the Russians have constructed forts. Kovno, Grodno, Lomza, Ossowetz, Ostrolenka and Novo Georgiewsk are among the most considerable of these.

The Germans advanced in three columns, the first toward Grodno, the second toward Ossowetz, the third upon Novo Georgiewsk. The first actually

penetrated the line at Grodno, but under pressure fell back upon Suwalki and Augustowo, where it still stood. The third, followed the Warsaw-Danzig railway and after taking Przasnysz, half way between the German frontier and Novo Georgiewsk, was driven out of it by Russian corps called up from Warsaw. The other, the central column, approached Ossowetz, covering the point where the railroad from Königsberg to Bielostok passes the Russian barrier line of the Bobr.

Heavy artillery, the famous 42-centimetre guns, were brought up, and Ossowetz was bombarded for many days. But presently Russian official reports noted the withdrawal of the artillery and the whole German offensive ceased. The pause was interpreted as meaning that weather conditions, the coming of the spring thaw, had prevented pushing the attack.

The new activity might mean that the weather conditions had sufficiently improved for the Germans to risk one more drive, one more effort to take Warsaw. Like the operations of February, the present operation would then be an attempt to cut the Petrograd-Warsaw and the Moscow-Warsaw railroads. At Ossowetz they were within twenty miles of the former.

It was equally conceivable that the Germans were merely attempting to draw Russian attention from Galicia and to force the Russians to divert to Northern Poland troops that might give the deciding blow

in the Carpathians. Pressure in the North might easily compel a slackening of Russian effort far to the south.

But if Ossowetz was a mere demonstration, then at its close it would be necessary to record the failure of the last German winter operation in Poland. This campaign had two objectives: first, to destroy Russian military strength, as the August and September campaigns aimed at "disposing of France"; second, if Russia could not be crushed, to get Warsaw and the Vistula line, and, having conquered Poland and obtained an admirable defensive position, to go west in the spring.

Two great victories, the Mazurian Lakes and Lodz, the Germans won, but they were defeated and checked at the Bzura. Their losses had been terrific, and they had neither won a decision nor acquired the Vistula line. Indeed, their best efforts had been insufficient to prevent the capture of Przemysl by the Russians and the advance through the Carpathians.

The operation against Ossowetz, then, was of real interest to the whole world audience, whether it proved to be one more tremendous offensive drive or collapsed, and in collapsing demonstrated German failure in the East, after one of the most colossal campaigns in military history.

Almost at the same moment that the fighting in the Carpathians came to a standstill, the news of the German offensive about Ossowetz dropped out of the official reports. Weather conditions, the spring

floods in the swamps and rivers of this marshy district, were sufficient explanation. More plausible was the growing conviction that Germany was here taking a defensive position, a view supported by rumors of the construction of trenches just east of the German frontier. The troops which had made this campaign were already beginning to re-appear in Galicia on the Dunajec and the Carpathian front.

Even if German troops assumed the defensive on the front of the Russian barrier, there remained the chance that they might attempt a raid into the Courland, between the fortress of Kovno and the Baltic. Here was the only point at which there was an interruption in the line of parallel trenches from the sea to Rumania. Through it Russia in March had made a successful dash to Memel. Through it was to come in May the German raid to Libau. Meantime Russia could claim success in having repelled a serious thrust upon the Niemen-Narew-Bohr barrier, which, had it succeeded would have compelled the evacuation of Warsaw.

CHAPTER XXXV

JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING"

IN the opening weeks of the Great War the chief difference between the battles of that time and of the past was in size. Waterloo had been fought on a front of four miles, Gettysburg of less than ten, even the Franco-Prussian War saw no impressive expansion of the battle fronts. But the Battle of the Marne was a struggle — or a series of struggles — extending from the environs of Paris to the Argonne, considerably more than a hundred miles.

From the contest on a tremendously broad front the battles almost imperceptibly dropped to the level of trenching contests. Again there was at the outset plain resemblance to Civil War precedent, to the famous Lines of Torres Vedras, behind which Wellington stood in the Peninsular War. Lee before Richmond fought in trenches for many months.

The development of the battle line in France from the Oise, to the Somme, to the Lys, to the Yser, may be compared with that of the parallel trenches of Lee and Grant from Petersburg to Five Forks. The main difference was that while Lee, having insufficient forces and unable to get reënforcements, was obliged to stretch his line so thin that Grant finally broke it

and compelled the evacuation of Richmond, both the Germans and the Allies were able to bring up sufficient men to defend each new extension of the line.

The climax in this trench operation came at the Battles of the Yser and of Ypres. Here the Germans were patently repeating Grant's Five Forks tactics. With overwhelming forces they attacked the thin Belgian and British forces on the Allied left, as Grant had similarly attacked Pickett on Lee's right. In Flanders the thin line held, the Germans were unable to pass the flank of the Allies.

The character of the struggle in the West again changed with the end of the two Battles of Flanders. With one wing resting on Switzerland, the other on the North Sea, both German and Allied lines were now safe from all flanking operations and the battle fronts had reached their maximum extension. Henceforth it was impossible to have recourse to any of the familiar methods of manœuvring an army out of a position. There was left nothing but the costly and hazardous frontal attack against entrenched opponents.

From November to February, partly because of weather conditions, partly because the Allies were still lacking in numbers and heavy artillery while the Germans were diverting their reserves to the East, there was little activity on the Western front. But in February, for the first time, there began to develop the new style of battle, which presently became familiar to all who read the war despatches.

The first example of this new style battle was in the Champagne. Here, on a front of about a dozen miles the French concentrated some six army corps, about 250,000, and an enormous mass of heavy artillery. Against the Germans, holding a low ridge, rising out of the monotonous Plain of Champagne less than 200 feet, they directed terrific artillery fire. Under cover of it they advanced slowly, beating off counter attacks until they had occupied the whole ridge, but their advance in a month did not average a mile on their active front.

The second example was far more illuminating. Having made a similar artillery concentration at Neuve Chapelle, the British suddenly opened a furious bombardment upon the Germans before them in the village of Neuve Chapelle, destroying the village, wrecked the German trenches and then occupied them before the Germans could recover from their confusion. The mission of the artillery in such an operation is first to reduce the enemies trenches, then to build up a wall of fire between the enemy's reserves and their trenches, which have been shelled, under cover of which the infantry can advance.

At Neuve Chapelle this method was followed, but unfortunately for the British the zone of fire between the German trenches and the German reserve was badly calculated and their own advance checked by the fire of British artillery. Once the British had taken the German trenches they followed the tactics of the French in Champagne, organized them and

prepared for a counter attack. [This came with great promptness and for several days the fighting was desperate, but in the end the British hung on to their gain.

Now in both the fighting in Champagne and about Neuve Chapelle, there were patent results of great strategic advantage to be gained if the Allies could actually break through the German lines, that is, both the front and the reserve trenches. But in both cases they failed utterly in this.

Such advantages were to be expected only in case of overwhelming triumph, of success beyond any reasonable expectation. In addition there was another end sought. In these struggles, in the French campaign about St. Mihiel, the British at Hill 60 in Flanders, which followed, the Allies were plainly adopting the familiar Grant policy of attrition, that General Joffre had rechristened "nibbling."

For Grant and for the Western Allies the problem was the same. The time had now arrived when the numerical advantage of the Allies in the West was decisive and bound to grow. With 600,000 British troops in France, with the Belgian Army reorganized, with French military establishment at the maximum of its possible strength and efficiency, the Germans were outnumbered, not temporarily but permanently, since the Russian campaign in the Carpathians was making new demands all the time upon them for men and guns.

Thus, if the Allies could keep up sustained pres-

sure from Switzerland to the sea and in addition in local actions, which in reality were battles on larger scale than Nineteenth Century history records, make the German loss equal or greater than their own, they must in time wear the Germans down to the point where their lines, like Lee's about Richmond, would become so thin that the Kaiser's generals would have to choose between retreat to a shorter line and disaster due to the breaking of the lines.

As the Allies now possessed a superiority of heavy artillery and what was even more vital of ammunition, their commanders reckoned that this policy of attrition could safely be pursued. Thus at Neuve Chapelle the loss of the British up to the time the German trenches were actually occupied, was greater than that of the Germans. But German counter attacks made in the open and in mass formation under artillery fire, were, if British "eye-witness" reports are correct, much larger, and the German loss 20,000 against 12,000 for the British.

In addition, the French operation compelled the Germans to send to Champagne reserves about Neuve Chapelle and this permitted the British to make their attack. The French offensive in the St. Mihiel region was followed by a successful British advance at Hill 60, in Flanders, suggesting another deflection of German reserves, which weakened the line in front of the British, with similarly costly consequences.

Without accepting the reports of the Allies as to

their achievements too completely, it was possible to accept what they attempted as indicative of their strategy. [To force the fighting, to kill as many Germans as possible, at least a number equal to their own losses, to play the Grant game of "attrition" on a stupendous scale, this was what Joffre and Sir John French had now undertaken.

One more advantage the Allies had and a great one. Such battles as were now fought demanded enormous supplies of ammunition. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle cost the British more ammunition than the whole Boer War. Here the Allies were able to draw upon the neutral world, upon the United States mainly, to supplement their own stocks. Russia, too, could draw on Japan and the United States by the Transsiberian. But Germany, shut in by the blockade, compelled to manufacture her own ammunition to meet Russian as well as French, British, Belgian and neutral production, lacking in copper, obliged to supplement Austrian as well as German supplies seemed bound in the end to face a shortage of ammunition, conceivably before there was any lack of men.

Looking over the whole contest in the West, from February to the approach of May, it will be observed that the Allies followed a consistent plan. Champagne, Neuve Chapelle, Les Eparges, Hill 60, were all battles of the new style, each was marked by immediate local success followed by tremendous counter attacks, in which German losses must have been

great, even if no greater than those of their more numerous enemies. The German tactics in the Second Battle of Ypres, were an example of the " nibbling " battle in all its details.

Such, briefly, was the new style battle, as it was now being fought in France and Belgium. By adopting it the Allies seemed to have resigned any plan for any " Spring Drive." Rather they appeared to have settled down to the method by which Grant destroyed Confederate military strength, to the strategy of Wellington in the Peninsular. Unless these plans were abandoned it now seemed inevitable that the summer would be the bloodiest in modern history, while the actual change in the battle lines in the West might be inconsiderable, if German resources in men and ammunition could last until autumn.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

MEASURED by the noise it made in the press the Second Battle of Ypres for the moment rivalled the first. Estimated in terms of Nineteenth Century warfare more men fought in it than in Waterloo or Gettysburg, the casualty list probably exceeded either of these earlier conflicts. Compared with the French offensive about St. Mihiel, the British at Neuve Chapelle, it was more completely successful as a local triumph.

Yet, while the press of the world was still forecasting another "dash to the Channel" one more advance to Calais, the German offensive had come to a halt, was defending itself, successfully to be sure, against counter attacks. But so clearly had the world grasped the issues of the month's battle between the Lys and the Sea in November, that any German operation on these fields was bound to have a definite meaning for it. This more than all else explains the exaggeration which accompanied the German move in Flanders.

The true measure of the operation, however, must be sought in the extent of German effort, the duration of the conflict, the numbers actually engaged

and incomplete as were the contemporary reports, as yet, it promptly became plain that the later engagement was insignificant compared with the earlier. In October Germany came within an ace of destroying Anglo-Belgian armies in Flanders. Napoleon at Waterloo was no nearer to success at any moment than the Kaiser several times at Ypres. But in the second battle the Germans by a surprised attack carried several miles of Allied lines away in a powerful drive and this drive was promptly beaten down, as British reserves arrived. In this respect it was Neuve Chapelle over again.

What was Germany's purpose, then, if she was not aiming at the Channel ports? The answer is simple. For months her lines in France had been recoiling slightly or holding on with grim tenacity. She had been on the defensive and the fact had made a profound impression upon her own people, upon her enemies, upon the whole neutral world. There was necessary to her some shining exploit, some success that would fill the press, hearten her soldiers, make answer to Allied guns at the Dardanelles, strengthen the hands of her ambassadors in Rome, Athens, Sofia and Bucharest. It was time to win something again.

In Poland the weather precluded any considerable operation, while it permitted the temporary release of German troops on the East Prussian frontier. In the Carpathians a stroke was being prepared, but the nature of the country prevented a

quick decision. In Flanders, however, where Germany had suffered severe defeat in the autumn a local success would impress a world, familiar with the earlier conflict, arouse new hopes in German hearts, restore the confidence of the German soldier and civilian.

As the present war was now being fought a local success was practically assured to the contestant who was willing to pay for it in men and in ammunition. To concentrate an overwhelming force at a given point, to gather a tremendous amount of artillery and suddenly deluge a narrow front with artillery fire, then to follow with a rush of vastly superior numbers, this had been the secret of Allied operations in the West, it was the meaning of Joffre's "nibbling."

In all cases successful advances had been stopped within two or three miles. One line of trenches behind another now stretched across the country. In October and November the British about Ypres had no time to fortify, they were caught almost in the open fields, compelled to face largely superior numbers, almost overwhelmed. But they had held on. Since that time they had spent months in fortifying, in drawing second and third lines behind the first. That Germany could do in April what she had failed to do in November with every chance in her favor was not conceivable, probably never entered the minds of German commanders.

What was attempted was this. Artillery was con-

centrated, some two or three corps transferred from the East, skilful and secret preparation made for an attack. The use of gas, the one wholly novel feature of the fight was but an extension of the idea of the great British cannonade at Neuve Chapelle. It was a new detail in the war of "terribleness," but in keeping with the main principle of "nibbling" operations.

{The point selected by the Germans for their attack was the part of the Allied line held by the French west of Ypres, between the British salient about Ypres and the Belgian position at the Yser. In the earlier battles this portion of the line had not been seriously attacked. But British success in taking Hill Number 60, on the eastern side of Ypres, had barred their approach effectively, while the flooded country north of the Yser still prevented German advance in this quarter.

The attack was made in the afternoon of April 22 and thanks to the use of gas and to the severity of the bombardment it was even more successful than that of the British at Neuve Chapelle. The French line collapsed, the survivors retreated for nearly three miles to the canal. By their retreat they uncovered the flank of the Canadians, who held the ground just to their right and the German advance swirled round this exposed flank and at the same time beat upon the Canadian front. Momentarily the situation suggested that of the British at Le Cateau, of Rosecrans at Chickamauga.

But despite terrific losses and necessary retreat, the Canadian division preserved its front. Had it broken the whole western side of the Ypres salient would have gone and Ypres would have been lost. For two days the Canadians, gradually reënforced, contested their ground, retreated a little, counter attacked and again withdrew. Meantime the French were reënforced, aided by the Belgians. Finally the German advance was stopped just south of the canal and the French, taking the offensive, regained all but two bridge heads on their side of the canal. As for the Canadians, they ultimately came back to a new line, conforming to the French, made contact with their allies, hung on until British reënforcements came up and retired, giving their places to fresh troops.

By April 25 the German official statements were only claiming that their troops were holding conquered ground. The first rush was over. They had gained some three miles on a front of five. They had thrust a wedge into the Allied lines. They had carried out with far greater skill and success a manœuvre completely analogous to that of Sir John French at Neuve Chapelle. German tactical skill shone brilliantly by contrast, but they had been checked, thrown back a little from the extreme point of their advance, were again on the defensive, and once more, to judge by actual operations, outnumbered.

Such, briefly, was the Second Battle of Ypres, in-

contestibly a shining exploit, timed to weaken, if not to destroy the belief of the world that Germany was everywhere restricted to the defensive, that she had "shot her bolt." The point selected for the demonstration was excellently chosen with a view to the impression that would be made upon the world. Within necessary limitations it was one of the finest bits of actual fighting in the whole war, and it was planned with supreme skill, with a marvellous alertness to the moral as well as the military considerations involved.

By way of emphasizing this moral effect a daring attack was made upon the French occupying Hartmannsweilerkopf far off in Alsace and the hill was taken temporarily. German bulletins gave the impression of a general offensive from Switzerland to the sea, a complete change in the face of the war in the Western field. But Hartmannsweilerkopf was speedily retaken, no other German success of note was chronicled, the great offensive, temporarily at least, flickered out. As a consequence of great efforts and very grave losses Germany had actually taken a few miles of trenches in Flanders before she had been pulled down.

Given the enormous superiority of numbers possessed by the Germans in the First Battle of Ypres, the opening advantage she had won in the second would probably have meant the ruin of Sir John French's little army. But this was lacking, now she had only a momentary and fortuitous advantage,

quickly lost, when British concentration to meet the attack began. Such advantage as Germany held in the opening hours disappeared when time had been allowed to bring up reserves. But in November there had been no reserves, no second lines of defences. Thus in exposing a temporary weakness of her foe, Germany had actually disclosed his permanent strength and her growing weakness, temporarily obscured by the glamour of her exploit.

For the world the Second Battle of Ypres will perhaps be most memorable as it revealed Canadian courage, devotion, sacrifice. On the Canadians the storm broke with its full force and Canadian militia repeated the glories of British regulars from Mons to the Marne. Nor was Canada alone among British colonies to stand with the Empire. On the Gallipoli Peninsula Australian and New Zealand troops were at the same moment landing under fire. In South Africa troops of the Union were sweeping over the German colony, from which had come the agents of sedition a few months earlier. About La Bassée British Indian troops were winning new laurels. German professors had partitioned the British Empire, liberated British colonies and the Canadian contingent at Ypres had now answered German professors and German soldiers alike. In British imperial history the Second Battle of the Ypres will be memorable.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

IN the minds of all observers of the Great War May 1 had been a date marking more than a calendar division. Kitchener had been quoted as asserting that while he had no guess as to the date of the termination of the war, it would begin with May Day. But however apocryphal this legend, the solid fact that the conditions of weather, of soil, of roads would then be favorable to active campaigning established it as the time when the winter campaign would end, the summer operations begin.

In any review of this winter campaign it is natural to divide the résumé into two parts, the campaign in the West and that in the East. Turning first to the campaign in the West, the simplest and easiest method of estimating what it has meant is to return for a moment to the conditions existing when it opened, to the situation in France and Belgium on the morning of the fall of Antwerp and in the succeeding days.

Antwerp fell on October 9, when the German occupation began. In the next few days German invasion flowed over Western Belgium like a torrent released by the breaking of a dam. At the same

moment that a German force was closing in on Warsaw, the bulletins of all combatant nations reported the approach of the Kaiser's troops to the Channel, to Calais and to the cliffs of Boulogne, from which Napoleon had surveyed the British shores a century before.

Consider now what were the Allied preoccupations at this moment. From Switzerland to La Bassée the French army stood solidly in the trenches it had taken up after the German retreat to the Aisne. But in the desperate fighting at the Marne, in Alsace and in Lorraine French losses had been enormous. Efforts to outflank the Germans from the Oise to the Lys had been beaten down by superior German numbers. The process of reorganization of French armies had begun, but had as yet made little real progress. Equipment was still lacking to the soldiers, ammunition was as yet insufficient for immediate needs.

As for the British, a "thin red line" was just taking root in the salient about Ypres. After three months less than 120,000 British troops were in the field. On this little army, presently reënforced by the remnant of the Belgian army retreating from Antwerp, the great storm was just breaking in Flanders. For a whole month the world was each day to wait with excited interest to learn whether the jerry construction thrown across Flanders from the Lys to the Sea could bear the terrific burden that was being imposed upon it.

Its failure would not in all probability have meant the advance of new German armies to Paris, but it would have meant complete conquest, not alone of Belgium, but of Northern France. It would have meant the capture of the Channel ports, it would have meant fortifying German position in the West almost impregnably.

In sum, as the winter phase opened German armies were on the offensive in the West, as they were also advancing upon Warsaw in the East. Success or failure for their second great offensive hung in the balance for at least a month. The extreme limit of Allied effort consisted in rushing new formations, as they could be assembled, into the stormbeaten gap between Armentières and Nieuport, where, under the eye of the Kaiser himself, German military power was writing an imperishable page in the history of devotion and courage.

Now, to measure the distance between October and April, it is but necessary to revert to the April situation in the same fields. In that later time French offensives were being carried on in Alsace, about St. Mihiel, in Champagne. English forces were attacking north and south of Armentières. For months the German energy had been concentrated in the heavy effort to meet fresh Allied troops with numbers not equal, but adequate to parry dangerous thrusts from Alsace to Flanders. Everywhere on this broad front, too, ground was being lost, not much, not of decisive value, but actually the German line had been

recoiling slightly for a continued period of time. Neuve Chapelle, Les Eparges, Hartmannsweilerkopf, Hill 60, all marked recession under pressure, Ypres the single advance.

Read the German official statements for October and April and the transformation is instantly evident. In October each bulletin reports new advances, towns taken, districts occupied, the arrival at the sea, the approach to Warsaw. Until April 22 there appears the monotonous record of Allied advances checked, of French assaults that broke down under "our artillery fire." Prisoners once taken by the thousands are occasionally reported by the hundred. English and French claims, official reports of trenches taken are denied with extreme acerbity, but for the most part the denial and the staccato insistence upon ground held furnish the body of the reports.

We are then face to face with a complete change, a change that had come almost imperceptibly, by such fine gradations as to awaken no real comment when it had become absolute. Germany in the West from February to the latter half of April had been on the defensive. More and more her energies had been exerted, not to attack but to repel attack.

In the same time there is to be noted the change in the tone of Allied reports. In October British authorities concealed the figures of their miniature force in France. In April they announced that 600,000 British troops were in France, five times the number that met the Kaiser's drive at Calais. Heavy

artillery had been manufactured so rapidly that at Neuve Chapelle and Hill 60 British superiority could not be denied. Three quarters of Kitchener's million were now in the field, despite a casualty list which by May 1 could not be less than 160,000; that is, twice as large as the first British expeditionary army.

As to the French, the reorganization of their army was completed. Generals innumerable had gone to the rear, old men had given way to younger, political officers had succumbed to the grim decision of Joffre. The glorious traditions of the Revolutionary army had been revived and many who had started in the ranks now wore their shoulder straps. In April the French army had reached the point at which the German began the war and the costs of the delay had not been too excessive.

Now, in this period in which her foes had been advancing daily in numbers and in efficiency, in the time which had seen the arrival of the first armies of English recruiting, which would now be succeeded rapidly by others, for the enlistment had assured this, what had the Germans accomplished? For the thousands and thousands who had given up their lives at the Yser, about Ypres, for the terrible month of fighting in Flanders, for the series of struggles that marked the approach of spring, what had Germany to show?

Just this: she had held her lines. From December 1 to May 1, with incidental local changes, she had retained her footing in France, her occupation in Belgium. But in doing this she had, save for the three

days about Ypres, definitively accepted the defensive. In October her champions, her press, talked about the capture of Calais, the second advance to Paris, the siege and fall of Verdun. But in April the same voices were proclaiming that the contest was a draw, that German defense could not be broken. To support this they pointed to the lines themselves, to German resistance, as splendid as German attack had been.

In January a French offensive north of Soissons had ended in disaster. In February the struggle in the Champagne had left France but a few rods nearer Berlin. The British victory at Neuve Chapelle, the French successes in Lorraine and Alsace, these were local, incidental, had never been a really serious threat to German position. So far the German claim was sound.

But how far was this from the October frame of mind! In the Civil War the same transition followed Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Southern newspapers talked more and more rarely of taking Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, but more and more insistently rose the assertion that Richmond was impregnable, the South indestructible on the defensive, an assertion that came fresh from the press into the hands of the Federal troops when they entered the Southern capital, fifty years before the present April.

Giving the German claim every possible consideration, certain circumstances were forcing themselves upon the minds of the neutral world. The war had

become one of endurance and the numbers were bound to be more and more with the Allies. It had become a question of men and money, and in men and money France, Britain and Russia were certain to gain rather than lose in advantage henceforward. A neutral world supplied Germany's enemies with food and ammunition. A hostile fleet shut Germany off from the outside world. British industry continued, French industry went on in part, but more and more the exits of German industrial production were being closed.

The Allied writers who had forecast immediate famine for Germany had plainly shot far wide the mark. German food held out and was likely to, yet Germany had already experienced the discomfort of a bread shortage. Lack of petroleum and of copper had affected, if it had not crippled, her supply departments. So far she had been no more than inconvenienced, but this inconvenience was bound to increase.

As for the Allies, every week saw new American establishments adapted to making arms and ammunition. Between the South and Germany the parallel was not to be pushed too far. The South had practically no manufacturing equipment. Germany was better off than any one of her opponents at the outset, but she had to face not her enemies, but a whole world.

Now, it is fair to say that what had happened had been foreseen by Germans; it had been forecast by

the whole character of German strategy in the opening weeks. Blunt Bernhardi had said it in unmistakable language when he wrote:

“ If Germany is involved in war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely upon being successful if she is absolutely determined to break the superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or the other of them before their total strength can come into action.”

And Germany had tried, at the Marne and in the battles of Flanders, but in November she had given up the task. She had left France and England to bring their “ total strength up ” while she endeavoured to put Russia out, and she had failed in the East as in the West.

Thus reviewed, the second phase, so far as the West is concerned, becomes simple enough. It saw the rise of a new German offensive, a fresh effort to dispose of one enemy — France — for England was still but a French auxiliary, holding a section of the French line. It saw the failure of this offensive, thanks to Belgian and British devotion. Then it saw the swift transfer of the German effort to the east — a repetition of the attempt to dispose of one enemy before the other could come up. But always with the perfectly clear condition that the Russian foe must be disposed of before French and English menaces became too dangerous. In sum, Germany

had to beat Russia completely in the winter campaign, given her failure in Flanders.

After November the mission of the German army in the West was that of Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. It was to hold the Anglo-French forces in check while the Kaiser disposed of Russia, as Napoleon planned to destroy Wellington, while Grouchy held Blücher at Wavre.

Unlike Grouchy, the German commanders performed their task; under growing pressure they held on. But Russia was not disposed of and Germany's hands were still tied by the needs of her Austrian ally in the Carpathians. Meantime, as Napoleon had always at Waterloo to deal with increasing pressure from the Prussians in Plancenoit, the Kaiser's generals were put to it to hold their long lines in France, Flanders and Alsace.

Even the desperate battle about Ypres, which marked the closing of April, seemed rather the answer to the British and French offensives, a response to Neuve Chapelle and St. Mihiel than any new effort to reach Calais or the Channel. It was a fight for local advantage and moral effect, not one more grandiose offensive such as those of August and October.

In sum, in the West Germany had in the winter phase passed from the offensive to the defensive, and for the meaning of the transformation Bernhardt's words remained a simple and comprehensive explana-

tion — words he could eat and had already eaten in public interviews in American newspapers, but words which had now something of a prophetic character, not to be mistaken by belligerent or by neutral.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST

THE opening move of Germany in the East was the first drive to Warsaw, which started at the precise moment the lines of battle were developing in Flanders. Originally obscured by the Antwerp and Ypres operations, it suddenly filled the press of the world with reports of the imminent fall of the Polish capital.

Petrograd was silent while Berlin was in full tide of victorious statement. Yet, looking backward after many months, it seems plain that the first German offensive in Poland was less considerable than was at first supposed and a direct effort to assist Austria rather than to conquer Poland.

In early October Austrian fortunes had sunk to the very lowest level. Conquering armies were sweeping the ruins of one Austrian host in upon Cracow, of another across the crests of the Carpathians. The mission of Austria had been to keep Russia in play until Germany had disposed of France, and now, at the critical moment in the Flanders campaign, Germany must either abandon the battle along the Yser and about Ypres, or by some strategic combination use small reserves to postpone Austrian destruction.

Germany chose the latter expedient, and gathering up an army she flung it straight upon Warsaw, through Central Poland. It was a venture such as Lee made when he sent Early to Washington in 1864 in the hope of drawing Grant away from Richmond. German command was seeking to save Austria, not to extend her own conquest.

Like Early's raid, that of the Germans almost succeeded. Late in October the guns of the Kaiser were sending shells into the suburbs of Warsaw. But as Grant was able to put a corps of veterans into Washington while Early was still before Fort Stevens, the Grand Duke Nicholas in his turn pushed Siberian troops through Warsaw at the critical moment, struck at the German flank and turned it. Immediately the German invasion was turned back a retreat to the frontier was inevitable. Warsaw, like Washington just a half century before, was saved.

But Germany had attained her purpose. As a consequence of the invasion of Poland Russian advance in Galicia stopped. Russian armies flowed back to the San. Przemyśl was relieved, Jaroslav reoccupied, an advance to Lemberg in sight. For the moment Austria was saved; there remained to Germany time to finish her fight in Flanders, to win, if she could, in the West, before a new crisis in the East should demand fresh diversion of her forces.

Instead of victory, however, there came defeat. Germany failed at the Yser, and about Ypres the golden moment for obtaining a decision in the West

passed. Weather, reënforcements of the Allies, the growing strength of their fortifications, the enormous and sterile German sacrifices, all combined to convince the German high command that if a decision were to be had against any enemy, that enemy was Russia. Such blows as she had struck France and Britain insured that they would be unable to take the offensive effectively for months to come. There was left time to "deal with Russia," to "put the Slav out," as grim Bernhardt would phrase it.

By the time the battles of Flanders had terminated, however, the situation had again changed in the East. New Austrian disasters had sent the armies of Hapsburg rushing back in disorder upon Cracow and into the Carpathians. Russian advance guards were in sight of the suburbs of Cracow, Cossack parties were beginning to flow down the Hungarian side of the Dukla Pass into the Hungarian plain. Austrian corps were being recalled from Belgrade, newly occupied by them, and Austrian disaster at Valievo was in sight.

On the German frontier the situation was even more threatening. A huge Russian army was moving upon Czenstochowa and Kalisz; patrols had for the first time touched German soil in the Province of Posen west of the Wartha; another Russian army was moving southwest upon Cracow, become the gate to Germany, not the outwork of Austria. Finally, a strong Russian army was again in East Prussia, flowing west toward the Mazurian Lakes,

spreading ruin and terror in its pathway. Not alone Hapsburg but Hohenzollern interests now demanded an offensive in the East.

By December 1 Germany was committed to her Eastern campaign. She had definitively failed to get a decision in the West; she was seeking along the Vistula what she had missed at the Marne and the Yser. Eastward from France and Flanders corps after corps of her veteran troops were coming, giving way to reserves; the campaign of the West had ended.

In the military history of the future it is far from unlikely that Von Hindenburg's campaign in Poland will be estimated the finest in the Great War, from the purely professional side. Confused as is the record still, the world does know that at the Battle of Lodz the Russian army was almost destroyed; that by employing his strategic railways, by making full use of his troops, superior in morale, in training, in equipment, the great German commander almost succeeded in enveloping the Russian Polish army.

Two factors served to block the second German bid for a decision, the weather and the great numerical superiority of Russian reserves. By all the seasonal calculations Polish roads should have been frozen solid; they were rivers of mud. Winter, which in Napoleon's invasion had begun prematurely, now held off with equal perversity. From the closing sides of the German net the Russians slipped safely. At Lodz their losses were enormous; but when the

battle was over, when they had withdrawn, they stood behind the Bzura as solidly as the Belgians behind the Yser.

In the Eastern campaign the Battle of Lodz was wholly comparable with that of the Marne in the West. At the Marne the Germans lost and retreated, at Lodz they won a local success and advanced a few more miles, but these two conflicts were the decisive engagements of the war to May 1; in both Germany failed in the battle which was to dispose of a nation.

By January 1 she was at a standstill in Poland as in Northern France, the great prize had escaped her, only the incidental advantage had been brought home. She had set out to destroy an army first in the West, then in the East, she had won some kilometres or versts of territory, captured some hundreds of thousands of French and Russians, demonstrated the superiority of her organization in both fields, but the war was beginning, not ending.

Not only had Germany failed to get a decision in Poland, but as the Russian lines at the Bzura and the Rawka held, German attack was halted here as it had been in Flanders, with the same terrific losses, and there came to Berlin a new appeal from Vienna.

To crush Russian resistance, or at least to relieve Russian pressure on Austria, Germany had made her desperate campaign through Lodz. But Russian pressure had not been lessened. The Czar had evacuated Western Poland to hold Galicia. His armies

were still about Przemyśl and again on the crests of the Carpathians. Only before Cracow had they recoiled to take up the strong position behind the Dunajec and the Nida.

German high command therefore turned from Poland to Galicia and once more had recourse to the familiar German strategy of envelopment. East from Cracow an Austro-German army was pushed. North over the Carpathians toward Przemyśl came a second. Finally, from Bukovina, now largely in Russian hands, a third force was pushed toward Stanisław and Lemberg. The Cracow and Bukovina forces threatened the rear of the whole Russian military establishment in Galicia. The Carpathian expedition beat against the front, behind which the garrison of Przemyśl was sallying forth.

Again a grandiose conception failed. The Cracow army was stopped at the Dunajec, the Carpathian army was unable to clear the lower slopes on the Galician side of the mountains, the Bukovina army swept the crownland clear of Russians, penetrated Russian territory and occupied much of Eastern Galicia, but in March Przemyśl fell and the release of the besieging army transformed the whole situation in Galicia and put the Austro-German forces on the defensive. As the Polish army had escaped envelopment by retreat, the Galician army of the Czar had avoided it by victory. The hope of a decision in Galicia had gone glimmering, as had that in Poland.

Meantime a new Russian offensive claimed attention. While the German waves were beating upon the Bzura-Rawka lines the Russians had sent an army forward into East Prussia, had resumed the attack upon the German line of defence along the Mazurian Lakes, were carrying the torch far into the province nearest the heart of Prussian aristocracy.

To check this became now imperative, and late in January Hindenburg made the one thoroughly successful campaign of the whole winter in the East, the campaign that culminated at the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, in the rout of the Tenth Russian army and its flight from East Prussia to the Niemen and the Narew.

Brilliant in itself, however, the success was without decisive consequences. Pursuit was stopped in the marshes and morasses of the Suwalki Province, the fortress of Ossowetz checked one force, Russian reënforcements defeated another at Przasnysz. Already the growing pressure in the West, the ever mounting peril to Austria in the Carpathians, made insistent demands on German high command.

The close of the winter campaign in the East revealed Germany the victor in a number of great battles, holding many square miles of Russian territory, so far inexpugnable, on her new front from the Baltic to the Nida. Measured by local advantage the prize was fairly hers, but the greater reward had slipped through her hands. Russia had not been

crushed, decisively beaten back to the Vistula; Warsaw still held out. Above all, Russian attack was now at the summit of the Carpathians, German effort concentrated in meeting Russian offensive.

In December German official statements, the officious utterances of German war critics, forecast the speedy fall of Warsaw. Go back to these statements and a full measure of German expectation in the Eastern campaign is at hand. After the Mazurian Lakes the same commentators announced that the collapse of Russia was at hand. The terrible defeats of Lodz and the Mazurian Lakes were hailed as the proof of the coming of the time when sheer exhaustion would terminate the Russian peril.

But March brought the fall of Przemyśl, April the Battle of the Carpathians. Read the same commentators in April and there is disclosed no longer the conviction of German conquest, only the unshaken conviction that German defence could be broken, joined with a more or less frank recognition of the stakes that were being played for in the Carpathians.

In December Germany turned east to dispose of Russia, having failed to deal with France decisively. In April, with Russia still in the field, still advancing, soon to profit by the opening of the ice-bound ports of Archangel and Vladivostok and the influx of arms and ammunition to supply numbers always inexhaustible, she turned west to meet Allied offensive, daily growing more insistent.

The "nibbling" of Joffre in Lorraine, of French in Flanders, had become as troublesome as the autumn attacks of the Grand Duke Nicholas. So Napoleon in his closing days wrestled unsuccessfully with the peril mounting from Spain across the Pyrenees, while his greater foes in Germany pressed ever more irresistibly upon his failing numbers.

Nor was the situation improved when German attention was called to the attack upon her Turkish ally at the Dardanelles. On the issue of this conflict depended the ultimate decision of Rumania and Bulgaria, of Italy and Greece, but their decision lay between neutrality and participation in the work of the Allies, the work of destruction of Austria and Turkey. Turkish resistance, Austrian success in the Carpathians, these might postpone the evil day, but by no stretch of imagination could Berlin longer hope for new allies.

In sum, the end of the winter campaign saw German fortunes in the East not less desperate than they had been in the opening weeks of winter. She had won provinces and lost time, now she must deal with all three of her opponents, for the first time prepared as she had been in August.

Hope of a decision against one had vanished. Only her own allies were weaker than in August; France, Russia, even England, were ready now. Not only ready, but in the Carpathians and in France and Belgium pressing more and more heavily against German resistance, German defence.

Germany had been granted her opportunity, her chances for a decision. Spring saw the Allies reaching out to grasp their chance, saw the whole problem of the Great War changing with the season.

•

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE END OF THE SECOND PHASE

THE Second Phase had opened at the Straits of Dover, it was ending at the Dardanelles. At its inception the fate of British and Belgian armies was in the balance, at its climax Russian military strength was within two steps of destruction. But at its close it was Turkish Empire in Europe, Austrian existence, which supplied the problems for the immediate future.

After the fall of Antwerp peace was the talk of those who, on the outskirts of the conflict, still thought in terms of the world, which had been destroyed in August. On May 1 the talk of peace had almost disappeared. Berlin talked grimly of a settlement, which should leave her, if not possession, exclusive rights in Belgium, of new rules to govern sea power and to insure "the freedom of the seas."

London, Paris, Petrograd talked little of peace and then of the peace that could only come with the overthrow of German military power. Peace as these capitals foresaw it would mean the liberation of Belgium and Luxemburg, the return of France to the Rhine, to her "lost provinces" of Alsace and Lorraine, it would mean the resuscitation of Poland,

with the subtraction from Prussia of more than 3,000,000 Slavs in East and West Prussia and Posen.

As for Austria, her masses might murmur against war, but her rulers could find no terms of peace from their enemies that did not mean the surrender of Galicia, Bukovina, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Southern Dalmatia, the concession to the remaining Slavs of the Empire of rights hitherto possessed only by Teuton and Magyar. Beyond this peace, too, lay the ever mounting menace of new war with Italy, unless the Trentino, Trieste and the Dalmatian coast were ceded, of peril from Rumania, hungering for Transylvania and Bukovina.

Finally, for Turkey no peace on terms was obtainable. The army of the Allies, which had followed the fleet and had on April 25 taken root on the Gallipoli peninsula, came to conquer and destroy Turkish Empire in Europe; Osmanli provinces in Asia were already allotted to the enemy. Germany might still be fighting for success, but plainly Turkey, like Austria, was battling for existence and against patent odds. On the issue of the battles in the Carpathians and at the Straits hung the fate of these empires.

Kitchener had fixed three years as the limit of the war. As the spring campaign opened, as a new phase began, prospect of peace before winter was slight. Germany's enemies were resolved to conquer. No terms which a nation still holding thou-

sands of square miles of her opponents' soil, still unconquered, unshaken, could accept, were to be had. Destruction, not compromise, was the watchword of the three great nations, now more closely than ever bound together for a common end.

In the Second Phase both the chance for a quick decision and the hope of early peace had been eliminated. The war had become one of trenches, of siege, the struggle one of ammunition and of wealth, not skill or generalship. Attrition, not defeat in the field, was relied upon to bring the end, but only in a future still far distant in the minds of most observers. Allied calculations now rested upon the belief that the summer would see the exhaustion of German reserves, the end of the time when she could man her long lines in France, Belgium and Poland, the coming of the time when she would have to shorten her lines to avoid the disaster of Lee at Richmond.

To such calculations Germany retorted with the assurance that her men, like her food and her fortune, were inexhaustible, that she could hold on indefinitely where she stood and that the numbers of the Allies were unequal to the task of uprooting her forces in France and Belgium. Austria, Turkey might fail, Italy, Rumania, Greece join the fray, but where she stood, Germany asserted herself indestructible, unconquerable.

The First and Second Phases had seen the test of German power to conquer, of German offensive, it

had recorded the ultimate failure of this offensive, of this effort to conquer in the West and in the East. Numbers, resources, all that the absolute control of the seas could give the Allies, were now turning against the Kaiser. He had failed to conquer Europe, could he defy it as France of the Revolution had, or would he succumb as France of Napoleon I had?

On May 1 the world looked forward to battle, not negotiation, to struggle, not to peace; nowhere was there a single ray of hope for the pacifist. Temporary enthusiasm of August had hardened into stern resolve before April came. The test of endurance was now to come, the summer campaign was to try the strength of all combatants in fire and the advantage was to be measured in death lists. So Grant had conquered the South, and his method had been adopted by Joffre and Kitchener. Germany's chance to conquer had passed, could the Allies take theirs? Would they fail and make the draw the German press proclaimed inevitable? [These were the questions posed for the summer campaign, the answer was nowhere discoverable as May 1 came to Europe, unobserved and uncelebrated, a final indication of the fashion in which war had swallowed up all political and social considerations.

So far as it was possible to see on May 1, Kitchener's forecast had come true. The war was beginning on this day, that is, the phase of the war in which Allied success first became conceivable, but the

still audible guns about Ypres, the new German thrust just beginning in Galicia, were grim reminders of how unshaken German power still was at the hour, when her great British foe had forecast the beginning of her downfall.

DATES IN THE GREAT WAR

- Oct. 3. Transfer of British army from the
 Aisne to Belgium begins.
 Germans defeated at Augustovo.
4. Belgian Government removes from
 Antwerp to Ostend.
7. Bombardment of Antwerp begins.
8. Fall of Antwerp.
9. Germans occupy Antwerp.
10. King Charles of Rumania dies.
11. British troops arrive at the Aire-
 Bethune Line in French Flanders.
12. Rebellion in South Africa begins.
13. Belgian Government transferred from
 Ostend to Havre.
- 13-31. 1. British engaged from La Bassée and
 Ypres.
14. British occupy Ypres.
15. Germans occupy Ostend.
16. British cruiser *Hawke* sunk by sub-
 marine in the North Sea.
19. Transfer of British army to Belgium
 completed.
20. German retreat from Warsaw begins.
24. Germans attack the Belgians at the
 Yser.

- Oct. 24-31. Battle of the Yser.
27. British dreadnought *Audacious* sunk off Lough Swilly.
29. Turkey begins war on Russia.
The *Goeben* bombards Odessa.
- Nov. 1. Battle of Ypres begins.
British cruisers *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* sunk at Coronel off the coast of Chili.
3. German naval raid on British coast.
4. German cruiser *Yorck* sunk by mine.
5. England and France declare war on Turkey.
England annexes Cyprus.
Austrian offensive in Galicia collapses.
6. Kiao-Chau surrenders.
9. British cruiser *Sydney* sinks German *Emden* off the Cocos Islands.
10. Dixmude captured by the Germans.
11. Przemyśl reinvaded.
12. German advance in Poland begins.
De Wet defeated by Botha.
13. German invasion of Poland develops.
14. Lord Roberts dies in France.
15. End of the Battle of Ypres.
19. Battle of Lodz begins.
21. British occupy Basra at the foot of the Persian Gulf.
26. British warship *Bulwark* blown up in the Medway River.

- Nov. 30. Servians evacuate Belgrade.
Dec. 1. De Wet captured.
South African rebellion collapses.
Austrians occupy Belgrade.
3. Russians invade Hungary and capture
Bartfeld.
Russians evacuate Lodz.
8. German fleet destroyed off the Falk-
land Islands.
9. Servians rout the Austrians at the Bat-
tle of Valievo.
12. Austrian troops begin a new offensive
from Cracow and across the Car-
pathians.
13. Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh* sunk
by British submarine in the Dar-
danelles.
14. Servians reoccupy Belgrade.
16. German cruisers raid Scarborough.
17. Egypt declared a British protectorate.
22. German offensive in Poland halted at
the Bzura.
24. Russians abandon siege of Cracow.
25. British naval and aëroplane raid at
Cuxhaven.
Italian marines occupy Valona.
28. Austrian effort to relieve Przemyśl
abandoned.
29. United States sends note to Great
Britain asking early improvement of

treatment of American commerce by the British fleet.

- | | |
|------|--|
| Jan. | 1. British battleship <i>Formidable</i> sunk by a German submarine. |
| | 3. Russians rout Turks in the Caucasus. |
| | 4. French take Steinbach in Alsace. Russians invade Bukovina. |
| | 8. French offensive begins north of the Aisne. |
| | 13. French driven across the Aisne. Count Berchtold resigns and is succeeded by Baron Burian. |
| | 16. Turks again defeated in the Caucasus. |
| | 19. Zeppelin raid in Norfolk. German cruiser <i>Blücher</i> sunk in naval battle in the North Sea. |
| | 25. New Russian offensive in East Prussia. |
| | 26. German Federal Council announces that all grain and flour will be seized on February 1. |
| | 31. Severe fighting on the Bzura River in Poland. |
| Feb. | 1. German assaults on the Bzura repulsed. |
| | 3. Turkish invasion of Egypt halted at Suez Canal. |
| | 4. Germany proclaims submarine blockade of the British Islands beginning February 18. |
| | 7. Austrians defeat Russians in Bukovina. |

- Feb. 8. Turkish invasion of Egypt abandoned.
 10. Russians routed in Battle of Mazurian
 Lakes.
 13. Russians evacuate East Prussia.
 15. Riots in Singapore.
 18. German submarine blockade begins.
 19. Anglo-French fleet begins attack on
 Dardanelles.
 20. German invasion of Northern Poland
 checked.
 22. British South African troops invade
 German Southwest Africa.
 24. Germans capture Przasnysz.
 Austrians drive Russians out of Buko-
 vina.
 25. Allied fleet silences forts at the en-
 trance of the Dardanelles.
 Bombardment of inner forts of Dar-
 danelles begins.
 26. Russians reoccupy Przasnysz.
- March 1. To April 1. Battle of Champagne.
 British blockade of German ports pro-
 claimed.
 4. Austrian invasion of East Galicia from
 Bukovina checked.
 5. Smyrna bombarded by British war-
 ships.
 6. Venizelos, Greek Premier, resigns.
 10. Battle of Neuve Chapelle.

- German converted cruiser *Prince Eitel Friedrich* reaches Hampton Roads.
- March 14. German cruiser *Dresden* sunk in Chilean waters.
18. *Bouvet, Ocean* and *Irresistible* sunk in the Dardanelles.
19. Russians raid German port of Memel.
22. Przemysl surrenders.
28. German submarine sinks *Falaba*.
31. Great Russian drive across the Carpathians begins.
- April 5. French offensive against St. Mihiel begins.
9. French take the heights of Les Eparges.
12. Germans bombard Ossowetz.
16. Zeppelin raid east of London.
British take Hill Number 60 near Ypres.
- 22-7. Second Battle of Ypres.
25. British troops landed at Gallipoli Peninsula, French troops on the southern shore of the Straits.
27. Germans take Hartmannsweilerkopf in Alsace.
28. French retake Hartmannsweilerkopf.
Allied progress at Dardanelles reported.
29. French cruiser *Leon Gambetta* sunk by

Austrian submarine U-5 in the
straits of Otranto.

April 30. German air-raid over Ipswich in Eng-
land.

THE END

D
521
50
100

THE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara

**THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW.**

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 336 301 7

JK